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Abstract
The Philippines has incurred huge loans from the Asian Development Bank
and other overseas lending institutions for its Contract Reforestation Pro-
gram. People are paid to plant trees on public lands. Alarmed by the dismal
performance in seedling maintenance and protection in the first implementa-
tion phase of this program, this study tried to examine the various success
conditions and the determinant factors of sustained contractor's project par-
ticipation.
Three sets of independent investigations were carried out. The first was a
contrast analysis between two successful and two unsuccessful projects in
Cagayan Valley. The second validated the earlier findings in five additional
successful projects in other regions in the country. The third set investigated
four individual farmers' spontaneous tree growing initiatives.
Seven conditions for sustained participation were identified. In order of
significance they are as follows: 1) the viability of simultaneous intercropping
between seedlings, 2) having interest in other, related tree uses, 3) the aspira-
tion for access/property rights over the project, 4) community cooperation, 5)
a good financial situation of project participants, 6) the aspiration for a good
track record, and 7) the prospect of a good wood market.
The determinant factors of success were derived from three project's back-
ground settings, namely: site characteristics, contractor characteristics and
project management schemes. For the site characteristics, the determinant
factors are: 1) good arability of the soil, 2) accessibility of the project, 3) a
clear property regime, 4) no government prescribed forestland use.
For the contractor characteristics, the determinant factors are: 1) an in-
come situation above subsistence level, 2) the meantime payment of labour-
ers' wages during irregular payments by the government, 3) striving for more
land to cultivate, 4) the allowance for future communal use of the project, and
5) an enterprising attitude.
For the project management schemes, the determinant factors are: 1) the
provision of market prospects, 2) the provision of a prospect for future pro-
jects, 3) government's prompt release of contract payment, 4) the recognition
of participants' usufruct/tenurial rights over the site, 5) the allowance for
other land use combinations, and 6) 'on-site' or 'in-place' recruitment of par-
ticipants.
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The site and contractor features set the success opportunities or con-
straints. The management schemes either build on or mitigate the given set-
ting. They may bring about the desired outcome, or they may spoil and rein-
force the opportunities and constraints, respectively, and lead to project fail-
ure.
Three types of incentives appeared to be crucial for sustained project par-
ticipation in government projects. These are: tenurial, social and financial.
Correspondingly, there are three reforestation modalities: 1) farm-based (with
the tenurial incentive allowing usufruct practice over the land), 2) com-
munity-based (with the social incentive for community cooperation), and 3)
industry-based (with the financial incentive aimed at generating continuous
rural employment).
For spontaneous tree growing by individual farmers without government's
direct cash incentives, assured access to or property rights over the land and
tree produce along with the presence of a wood market are crucial conditions
for sustainability.
Since contract reforestation on public lands cannot take place without ac-
companying incentives, it should be designed around the actor's needs, his
interest in tree growing as well as his financial resources, for maximum pro-
gram efficiency. Those with substantial capital could serve as the project's
financiers and the main stockholders. Subsistent participants in search of di-
rect cash earnings may well comprise the labour force. For those motivated by
access or property rights over the project, a tenurial instrument, alongside the
introduction of a tree-based farming technology is most applicable. Such a
selective application of specific instruments according to participant's needs
and future project options is considered an effective and rational policy for
successful project management. Failure to identify who has interest in what,
how and when, and the inability to recognize the uses of the varied site quali-
ties coupled with the faulty prescription of tenurial arrangements will con-
tinue to siphon off government reforestation funds.
Introduction
1.1 Background of the Study
Reforestation is one of the major government programs with which the Phil-
ippine government hopes to enhance environmental stability. Alarmed by the
environment's rapid deterioration and the slow pace of reforestation in the
country, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) with
a loan from the Asian Development Bank launched a massive tree growing
program in 1988.
To rehabilitate the 6.5 million hectares of degraded lands until the year
2000, the DENR has adopted a new approach to encourage citizens to partici-
pate through 'contract reforestation', as part of the overall plan. All interested
groups or private organizations can join.
Contract Reforestation is one of the latest strategies of the Philippine
government to decentralize and democratize reforestation in the countryside.
Under the National Reforestation Program, contract payments, daily wage,
land tenure and benefit sharing arrangement are offered as incentives to stim-
ulate strong public involvement. Local or private organizations bid for con-
tracts. Each contractor is assured of support.
Although incentives may provide impetus or sometimes may be essential
for active program participation, these appear also to impede the actor's
initiative or motivation for consistent environmentally sound behaviour. This
is shown in experiences in the field. For instance, the burning of some forest
plantations of the RP-Japan Reforestation Project in Pantabangan allegedly
stemmed from participants' desire for continuous employment in the project
(De los Angeles, 1980). A similar incident was reported on the Dona Reme-
dies Forest Occupancy Management project in Bulacan (Bernales and De la
Vega, 1982).
Other cases of irregularities and drawbacks associated with financial
incentives have been reported in the Philippines. One involves the Commun-
ity Forestry Approach Program of the Pulp and Paper Industries of the
Philippines (PICOP). After securing tree-farm loans from the government
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through the company -with an agreement that they will sell their harvest to
PICOP, some farmer-participants harvested the trees they planted prematurely
and sold them to other buyers (Veracion, 1982). Others neglected their tree
farms and shifted to annual cash cropping.
Furthermore, the advent of labour intensive development projects using
direct-wage may discourage small farmers to improve their own fanning
systems through agroforestry. Citing the many watershed projects in Panta-
bangan area that employ wage labour, De los Angeles (1980) found that small
upland marginal farmer-cooperators were in a dilemma whether or not to
prematurely abandon their own farming activities (which are time and labour-
intensive before earnings could be derived from the produce) in favour of
wage-labour opportunities from the projects. Reportedly, wage-earning activ-
ities of the projects attracted migrants to the area because of the high demand
for labour during their construction stage. Eventually, this migration could
pose more pressure on the land after the project was completed.
A major characteristic of environmental and forestry projects is that the
aims of the government often do not coincide with the main aspirations or felt
needs of the people who participate. Aquino (1983) observed in some Social
Forestry Projects in the Philippines that community people participated in the
projects not because of concern for the environment but rather for employ-
ment and other perceived livelihood benefits. The emphasis on forest-related
activities in these projects does not seem to match with local people's felt
need or expectation.
Yet another problem can be that at the program management level, the
bureaucratic 'red tape' often impinges on the smooth execution of develop-
ment programs. The issuance of honoraria and other 'grease money' becomes
a common practice. Failure to give a 'gratitude fee' to administrative person-
nel for facilitating the legal or paper works would mean 'procedural sabotage'
that could derail the program's normal flow.
These previous experiences with incentive systems in reforestation seem
to suggest the risk that the on-going government's tree growing program in
the country would face. However, there are also similar projects reported to
have succeeded because of incentives. This also holds true for a number of
projects in other countries.
The Rural Development Project in Yogyakarta, Indonesia could have met
greater resistance in changing farmers' traditional land management practices
if not for the financial incentives it provided for adoption of soil conservation
techniques (Christanty and Iskander, 1989). Likewise, at the Betagi-Pomoa
Social Forestry Project in Bangladesh, Bose (1989) observed that financial
incentives and benefit-sharing mechanisms were effective in getting people
involved in the project. This is in contrast with the Van Panchayat Chausali
project in India. Thus, villagers withdrew from participation because the
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project management failed to provide sustained financial incentives (Vidyar-
thi, 1989).
Although there are many conservationists who think that financial incen-
tives may only ruin actors' motivation for environmentally sound behaviour,
others argue that they are essential layout in development programs on the
basis of the following examples: Udarbe (1989) urged that the government
should provide fiscal and tax incentives to farmers who cultivate forest trees
owing to the long gestation period of forest plantation. Pragtong (1989) sub-
scribes to the idea that people who are induced to participate in forest village
projects must have funds for living expenses and capital investments during
the early phase of their stay in a new land. He further claims that farmers who
are assured of employment or income would develop their land faster than
those without seed money to start with. Observing community responses to
the Social Forestry Program in Papua New Guinea, Cortez (1989) sensed the
need of providing reforestation fees for people to engage in planting timber
crops as an essential component of New Guinea's Industrial Agroforestry
strategy.
Lessons learned from the above experiences with incentives simply under-
score the need to look into how certain types of instruments can be profitably
applied to attain optimum people's participation in forestry and other environ-
mental programs.
1.2 Statement of the Problem
The Philippines incurred huge loans from the Asian Development Bank (ADB)
and the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) for its environmental
programs. Between 1988 and 1992 alone, a total of us$ 621 million was
loaned from ADB and OECF. About $ 240 Million went to its National Foresta-
tion Program (PFSP Memorandum of Understanding, 1992). Another $ 200
million was granted by the same bank to support the Second Forestry Sector
Project for 1993 to 1995.
With these funds, there was a dramatic increase in reforestation output in
the first two years of program implementation. For the first time, tree planting
in the country outpaced the yearly rate of deforestation by about 90,000 hect-
ares (NPCO Report, 1992). In the following years, however, the image of the
program was marred by rampant burning and premature abandonment of the
project (UNAC, 1992; Baldwin, 1992). On the overall national performance,
the average rate of seedlings maintained and established was estimated to be
as low as 10 to 15 percent only of the total number planted in the same period
(Personal Interview with the NPCO program staff, 1993).
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Field reports claimed that participants' anger over the delayed DENR pay-
ments prompted them to deliberately bum down the projects (ANGOC, 1991;
Tagana, 1992). In addition, 'fly-by-night' contractors and dummy partici-
pants infiltrated the program, resulting in haphazard performance.
The irony behind these big foreign borrowings, as claimed by Korten
(1993), was 'while the loans were made under an environmental rubric, their
huge size emerged out of the need to support the country's balance of pay-
ment's deficit' from the International Monetary Fund. In theory, Korten
(1993) concluded that 'the reforestation activities could have been funded by
the Philippine Government without loan assistance, though it is doubtful that
without the loans, the government would have allocated such substantial
sums to the program'.
Regardless of how the loan was negotiated, the Philippine government has
shown its intent to continue sourcing out more loans to ensure that the pro-
gram will be sustained. However, considering these aforementioned initial
performance, the long-term program's success seems uncertain. This offers a
new challenge to further examine the impacts of financial and other incen-
tives on actors' perception and behaviour in contract reforestation projects.
Research along this interest may well provide a guide to policy makers and
forestry planners as to the manner and context in which incentives may be
used in tree growing projects on public lands. This is presently of great rele-
vance in the Philippines because financial grants and loans are becoming
more easily available to the government for forest development purposes.
1.3 Research Objectives
In view of the pressing need to investigate local actors' motivations for sus-
tained participation in the current tree growing program, this study was car-
ried out with the following research objectives:
1. to determine the various success conditions with their corresponding
determinant factors leading to contractor's sustained participation in some
selected contract reforestation projects in the Philippines;
2. to analyze which of these success conditions and determinant factors are
considered critically relevant in sustaining participation in seedling pro-
tection and maintenance after the three-year contract payment expires;
3. to derive an optimal tree growing model from the analysis, and
4. to draw policy recommendations from the research results.
Contract Reforestation:
Prospects and Strategies
In 1934 the Philippines still had 17 million hectares of productive forest
covering almost half of the country's land area (MPFD, 1990). However, 60
years later, the figure has been reduced to about 6 million hectares of which
5.2 million were residual forest and only less than a million hectares covered
by were primary forest.
Although reforestation efforts have been carried out since 1916, their pace
far lagged behind the rate of forest loss. From 1916 to 1987, or during a span
of 71 years, only about 70,000 hectares had been successfully reforested (For-
est Management Bureau, 1988), compared with the yearly average rate of de-
forestation of 100,000 hectares during that period.
This alarming decline in forest cover coupled with the dismal performance
of past reforestation programs prompted the emergence of a new approach to
forest regeneration, i.e., contract reforestation.
2.1 Program Intention and Assumption
Contract Reforestation provides incentives to the private sector, People's
Organizations (POs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Local
Government Units (LGUs) for tree planting on public lands. An individual or
entity enters into an agreement with the DENR, the implementing agency, to
perform a series of activities required in reforesting denuded areas. In return,
the government pays the contractor for the work.
Premised on the assumption that unless the poor benefit directly from tree
planting on public lands, their participation cannot be expected. Thus, the
program has a dual goal: livelihood generation and forest regeneration. Direct
cash payment is meant to become the main condition for sustained public par-
ticipation.
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The program started in 1988 with an ambitious aim of reforesting 6.5 mil-
lion hectares of denuded land up to the year 2000, including 1.4 million hect-
ares of critical watersheds. Specifically, its main focus was to establish pro-
duction forest plantations for maintaining supplies of timber and fuelwood,
thereby rehabilitating denuded watersheds, grasslands and unproductive up-
land areas. This contracting scheme was perceived by the government as a
good modality for making use of the experience and entrepreneurial motiva-
tion of the private sector and aimed at an efficient accomplishment of the
country's reforestation targets (Umali, 1989).
2.2 Implementation Scheme
The DENR as the main executing agency of the program closely collaborated
with NGOs, POs, LGUs, private organizations and other government agencies
(OGAs).
There are three types of contract being introduced: Family, Community
and Corporate Contracts. Together they will be denoted as 'Contract Refores-
tation' projects. The family contract is awarded to either married or widowed
individuals living within or adjacent to the project sites for sites of not more
than five hectares. The community contract is given to legitimately organized
communities, NGOs, POs, LGUs and OGAs whose area is more than five but less
than 100 hectares. A corporate contract is awarded to corporations and other
constituted entities for areas more than 100 hectares through competitive bid-
ding. On the other hand, the family and the community contracts are
commonly obtained through negotiated bidding.
Comparing family and community contracts, there is more clarity of insti-
tutional arrangement in the former than in the latter. In family contracts, all
decision making, benefits sharing, etc., taken place purely at the individual
level, both 'de jure' and 'de facto'. In community contract, there is supposed
to be a collective level of operation from the local organization's inception,
decision making, project implementation to benefit sharing. In practice, how-
ever, this is not taking place because of the haphazard formation of commu-
nity contracts. The strong pressure on the DENR to attain certain predeter-
mined target goals set by ADB disregards the importance of social preparation
as prerequisite for the awarding of a community contract.
Contract payments are directly released by the Department of Budget and
Management (DEM) to the DENR Provincial Environment and Natural Re-
sources Office (PENRO). The payment of the funds is spread out over a period
of three years. Seedling establishment is said to be the most difficult stage of
the project because it consists of the main bulk of the work, such as site prepa-
ration and nursery activities. For this reason, 60 percent of the total contract
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price is allocated in the first year. The remaining 40 percent is equally divided
over the two following years for seedling protection and maintenance. A mo-
bilization fund of 15 percent of the cost for the first year of operation is dis-
bursed. Contractors are paid on the basis of a fixed schedule of payments,
which is usually quarterly.
Yearly, a field evaluation is conducted. Project performance is measured
in terms of percentage of surviving seedlings being inventoried. The mini-
mum requirement for successful seedling establishment is 80 percent. To
avail of the second and third instalment release of funding, the contractor
must at least have attained the minimum success requirement. In case he falls
short of the required rating, the contractor has to replant the area at his own
expense until he can meet the minimum standard. This yearly field inspection
is conducted by NGOs including academic institutions and other duly orga-
nized civic organizations capable of performing this.
2.3 Major Reforestation Activities
Site preparation, seedling establishment, plantation maintenance and protec-
tion comprise the major reforestation activities. To prepare the site for plant-
ing, each contractor must do the following activities whenever and which ever
are applicable:
1. constructing trails in the project site;
2. complete brushing to be followed by ploughing;
3. strip brushing;
4. allowing natural regeneration.
Tree planting should start at the onset of the rainy season so that the seedlings
can easily thrive without much maintenance. After planting the following ac-
tivities should be carried for seedling maintenance and protection:
1. application of fertilizer after planting and at least once thereafter, prefer-
ably during the first rainy season during the establishment phase;
2. weeding (ring or strip) at least once in the first year and twice in the second
and third years of establishment;
3. cultivation of the soil around the seedlings within an approximated 30-
centimetre radius;
4. replacement of dead or stunted seedlings within two months after planting
or at the start of the rainy season in the succeeding year;
5. establishment of greenbreaks (10-15 meters wide) using fire-resistant spe-
cies with economic value. Examples of these are bananas, kadios, ipil-ipil,
yemane and teak;
6. patrolling and the institution of fire preventive mechanisms;
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7. checking on pest and disease infestation, and
8. controlling squatting or illegal settlements in the project area.
2.4 Incentives for Participation
Participants are compensated for any contracted activity performed in the
project area. Aside from the direct monetary incentive, they are allowed to use
interspaces for cash cropping or maintaining other livelihood projects which
are not harmful to the established plantation. Likewise they can do regulated
pruning and thinning of trees for fuelwood as long as these do not hamper but
rather enhance growth of the trees. Furthermore, they may avail of free tech-
nical assistance, training and educational materials in reforestation and
agroforestation from the DENR.
2.5 Expected Benefit and Projected Output
From the economic point of view, the income from participating in the project
would really make a good take-home earning for an average upland farmer.
With P 20,400 or (US$ 740) as maximum allowable contract price per hectare
for the whole three-year period, about P 16,725 or 83.62 percent goes to la-
bour payment (Table 1).
Table 1.



























GRAND TOTAL: P 16,725.32
Recommended wage rate: P 64.40/manday.
US$ 1 = P 27.56 (as of March 1994)
Source: DENR Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 1990.
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Normally, a contractor obtains not less than five hectares to reforest under the
family contract, while a site under a community contract ranges from 10 to
100 hectares. In a 5-hectare contract, a farmer can realize a total income of P
71,346.12, or an average of P 23,782.04 yearly, good enough to supplement
his farm earnings (Table 2). However, in practice, 60 percent (P 12,240) of
the total contract price is disbursed in the first year; 25 percent (P 5,100) dur-
ing the two remaining years with 15 percent (P 3,060) retention fee at the end
of the contract if the 80 percent seedling survival rate was attained. As men-
tioned earlier, the schedule of payments is programmed according to the re-
quired field accomplishments in the project.




































These cost estimates per hectare from the point of view of the rural poor who
barely subsist from marginal upland farm earnings would be a considerable
help in augmenting household income. Likewise, the program was perceived
to be a good income alternative for most upland dwellers who depend so
much on forest extraction for their livelihood.
The government expects that the terms of contract ensure that the planted
areas paid for would actually grow into forests (Umali, 1989). Thus, the pro-
gram planners are highly confident that through contracting, the needed wood
supply of wood-based industries in the future would be sustained. Likewise,
for the first three years, from 1989 to 1992, the government envisions to re-
forest 225,000 hectares. For the private sector, particularly those individuals
or corporations who would like to venture into industrial forestry, 75,000
hectares of reforested land is the target for 1991/92. During this three-year
period, DENR projected that reforestation would finally outpace the yearly rate
of deforestation in the country.
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2.6 Towards Longer Participation
In the past, government-administered reforestation scheme participants could
not confidently look forward to harvesting in the future what they planted on
public lands. Since the incentive for participation was mainly tied with tree
planting, labourers did not care much whether or not the seedlings planted
would reach maturity. Given the long gestation period of tree crops, this lack
of assured access to future harvest was a strong disincentive to reforestation.
Thus, project participants were rarely concerned to maintain and protect the
seedlings in the long run.
In contract reforestation, however, a new incentive will soon replace the
contract payment at the end of the three-year period intended for seedling es-
tablishment. This instrument is referred to as the Forest Land Management
Agreement (FLMA). It is a 25-year tenurial instrument that is renewable for
another 25 years, providing the participants guaranteed access to the future
produce of the project.
The contractor can harvest, process, sell, and otherwise utilize the products
from trees grown on the project area. Also, he can interplant cash crops, fruit
trees and other agricultural and minor forest products for additional income.
Furthermore, he can avail of free advice and technical assistance from the
DENR. On the other hand, he must, without corresponding payment, maintain
the project until the trees reach maturity. The gestation period for fast grow-
ing species is 10 to 15 years and for long maturing species, between 25 to 30
years.
For a contractor to qualify for the instrument, he should have at least ob-
tained an average ICM rating of 80 percent seedling survival at the end of the
three-year contract period. In addition, the average height of trees planted
should have reached 2 meters and 2.5 meters for long gestation and fast grow-
ing species, respectively.
In the future, when the contractor will harvest the trees, 30 percent of the
total revenue from the produce will have to go back to the government as pay-
ment for the first three-year expenses in seedling establishment and
maintenance.
However, participation in all activities up to tree maturity is not automatic.
In the first three years of the project, people may be conditioned to take part in
the project mainly for payment, as it is the very instrument that was meant to
stimulate participation. At the end of the third or fourth year, they may have
the option to continue or not under FLMA. For those who are interested to ven-
ture into tree farming, they will have to carry out sustained plantation estab-
lishment activities which include fire protection, thinning, prunning, and
other timber stand care and improvement schemes despite no direct monetary
payment given as compensation. However, for those who are not really in-
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tending to pursue a longer contract beyond three to four years, they will only
participate in seedling establishment which include activities such as planting
and replanting, fertilizing, weeding, cultivating, and fire protection. Other
interested contractors will apply for the project through public bidding and
will assume the responsibility for protecting and maintaining the growing
seedlings till maturity.
Review of Literature
3.1 Local People's Participation in Forestry Programs
This section reviews the historical changes in forestry emphasis over the years
in developing countries, the changes in the Philippines in particular, and the
different conditions for people's participation in tree growing projects. The
concluding part provides the theoretical bases of participants' varied behav-
iour towards farm forestry as a livelihood investment.
3.1.1 The new development paradigm
The term 'public participation' has become a magical catch word in most
intervention programs today, to underscore local people's crucial role in their
development process. This 'participative' approach to development seeks to
turn into reality such aspirations as 'social equity', 'people's empowerment,'
'people-oriented development' (Ford, 1987; Chambers, 1983). Local aspira-
tions, felt needs and options often now become the main bases for project
design.
This was a response to the very one-sided economy driven project
approach since the 50s. Thus, in forestry, the idea that there is a structural
interdependence between forest harvesting and the industrial sector of the
economy led to a biased concern for industry raw material demand rather than
for the rural community household needs in the past. Emphasis was on in-
creased timber production, efficient wood utilization and expansion of the
export market.
This concept of 'industrialization as a basic premise for economic growth'
in the early 50s paved the way for the intensive exploitation of the tropical
rain forests in most developing countries by transnational corporations and
local private enterprises. It was assumed that part of the profits from the
growing wood industry would subsequently trigger development in the rural
sector.
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The devastating effect of this assumption only became obvious in the late
70s when backward development processes were observed in one time forest
resource-rich developing countries (Westoby, 1978). As more forest stands
were given up in order to meet the growing demand for industrialization and
consumption in urban centres and in developed countries, rural people be-
came more and more marginalized. The wrecking of the forest by private en-
terprises in a short time increased the time and labour local people spent col-
lecting firewood, fodder and other tree-related needs for household consump-
tion as the distance of the source grew further afield (Fernandes et al., 1988).
The 'trickle-down effect' theory of countryside development came under
increasing criticism. Westoby (1978) even claimed that the 'growing interest
of private enterprises in forest conversion in the 60s in fact was not really
meant to bring about socioeconomic development in the rural areas'. Accor-
ding to him, the main driving force was only profit-making as there were an
ever-increasing need of the rich countries for raw materials. The underdevel-
oped countries that were rich in forest resources just provided the opportunity
to meet such growing need. He added that very few of the forest industries
which had been established in these countries had made any contribution
whatsoever to raising the welfare of the rural masses. He also underscored the
important role of forestry in rural development and that in effect it must be
carried out by the local people. Douglash (1983) considered an integration of
forestry with agriculture and the voluntary participation of local communities
in forest management with the use of appropriate local technology as impor-
tant elements in the overall approach.
Thus, Social Forestry emerged as an upland intervention program in the
80s in countries beset by the problem of shrinking forests, in response to the
need to democratize the use and management of forest resources for the bene-
fit of the greater rural population. This time, emphasis was on local people's
basic tree needs, such as for fuelwood, fodder, food, poles, timber and house
construction. The pursuit of social equity was paramount in the context of
sustainable forest development. People's participation became a means to this
end.
In this way, 'forestry for rural development' as the predominant concern
became the new orientation of most upland programs in developing countries
starting in the 80s. The rationale was to return the control of resources to the
local people and their communities so that they would again be able to meet
their own needs. As a result, they would be motivated to protect the natural
resources for sustainability.
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3.1.2 Local actor's perception and motivation f or participation
Most governments in developing countries often mobilized local communi-
ties in forest development programs. This approach aimed to take advantage
of the strategic role of 'on-site' residents as effective guardians of the forest,
besides equitably distributing the benefits from forest development among the
majority of the neglected poor.
This section presents the different reasons why a farmer participates in tree
growing projects and of the concomitant conditions and motivations.
1. Direct household needs
When tree products and other related uses meet a farmer's direct household
needs, growing trees at the backyard or farmlot can become spontaneous, i.e.
without government support. For most farmers, their immediate need for fuel-
wood, fodder and food can be the primary reason for growing trees. Thus
Senegal, Tanzania, Indonesia, Panama and Nepal provide examples where
people planted trees primarily for wood, fruit or fodder (Kone and Jensen, 19-
82; Skutch, 1983; Jones, 1982; Campbell and Bhattari, 1983, as cited by
Foley and Barnard, 1989). In other places, people grew trees spontaneously
for wind breaks, fences, shade, and for other benefits. In addition, Arnolds
(1987) claimed that fruit trees were planted on almost every farm in Panama,
while nearly half of the farmers interviewed in the Valle Occidental region of
Costa Rica said that they planted trees as windbreaks. In the same survey, he
noted that in the hill areas of Nepal, each household owned an average of 28
trees, mainly for fodder and fruit; about one-third of these trees were deliber-
ately planted and cultivated.
A number of case studies attest that tree growing projects in public lands
which likewise meet immediate household use, are more successful than pro-
jects which do not simultaneously address planters' tree needs. The Bangla-
desh Rural Advancement Committee Project, for instance, has sustained farm-
ers' interest in planting and protecting Leuceana leucocephala in single rows
along roadsides because of the fodder that accrues to them for their livestock
(Hasan, 1990).
2. Direct cash from -wood products sale
Earning an income is one of the strongest incentives in eliciting widespread
participation in tree growing as became clear from projects in Haiti, India,
Kenya, Philippines, and Republic of Korea (Gregersen, Draper and Elz, 19-
89). Arnolds (1987) noted that nearly 40 percent of the rural households in
Kakamega District, Kenya maintain small nurseries, and 80 percent have
planted trees on their land to produce poles for sale. Likewise, in Kovilur,
Trichurapalli, India, many resource-poor farmers planted cashew and euca-
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lyptus species on their small lands for the market. The high profit gained from
tree crop production motivated farmers to invest in tree crops (Malmer, 1987
as cited by Chambers et al., 1989).
3. Land tenure
Land tenure appears to be another crucial factor in motivating local people to
plant trees. In Bong County, Liberia (Harbeson et al., 1984), and in Babati
district, Tanzania (Johansson, 1991), local people were induced to plant trees
in their lots as a demarcation of boundaries and as a legitimate symbol of their
right over a disputed area. In areas where the government would likely expro-
priate land for public projects, land owners seldom plant perennial tree crops,
knowing that they would not benefit from them. It appears from these exam-
ples that aspiration for land right can become a strong incentive for spontane-
ous tree growing on a disputed or public land, but also that an unclear tenure
situation may prevent people from planting trees.
Likewise, security of land tenure affects the spontaneity and sustainability
of farmers' tree growing efforts. Sellers (1977) noted that in Tucurrique,
Costa Rica, the type of tenurial arrangements determined greatly farmers'
preference for forest plantations over short-term crops. Growing coffee,
peach palms and other woody perennials was a spontaneous practice among
farmers with secure titled lands while those with less secure use rights or
those under tenancy opted for short term crops. (I regret to have not gotten
hold of additional information about the tree growing arrangements in Costa
Rica, although I tried to exhaust all available materials on hand in our coun-
try.)
Jones (1982) observed that the lack of security of land tenure in most
farms in Honduras discouraged peasants from introducing fruit trees or plan-
tation crops despite the prospect of high economic benefits from them.
4, Management arrangement
The degree of management responsibility given to local people is another fac-
tor that affects their motivation to participate in organized tree growing pro-
grams. There are a number of successful forestry projects resulting from local
initiatives. Leach and Mearns (1988) described the villagers in Urn Inderaba,
Sudan who established a tree nursery, planted and protected a tree windbreak,
fenced-off a small area to allow for the regrowth of woody vegetation and
planted trees for shade, fuel and fodder. These spontaneous activities were
carried out by highly motivated farmers who were directly involved in project
designing, implementation and management despite its being a government-
initiated endeavour. Another example concerns a farmers' initiative in Shin-
yanga, Tanzania. With farmers' indigenous knowledge, shrubs and trees were
propagated for live fences from cuttings, transplanting wild plants and direct
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seeding instead of being dependent on the nursery seedlings obtained from
the Forest Agency.
McGaughey and Gregersen (1988) observed that most forestry projects
with fanners' direct involvement from tree management to tree harvesting
usually succeed. As such, it appears that one factor for failure in tree govern-
ment growing projects is the fragmented or discontinuous enlisting of the
public from tree planting up to the harvesting (Gregersen, 1985). Where farm-
ers merely execute government plans, quality and sustained participation can
not be guaranteed especially if the benefits they will gain, will have to be real-
ized in the distant future.
Quality participation will not generally evolve spontaneously. The condi-
tions have to be set by the government through an attractive incentive system
or proper institutional arrangements. Therefore, a well-studied management
arrangement has to be set up by the government.
Skutch (1983) learned that about 44 percent of the village woodlots which
she sampled in Tanzania had low farmer project participation as a result of the
Forest Service's 'prescriptive' and coercive management style. There was the
risk that the real needs were not being addressed. There was too much empha-
sis on fuelwood planting which did not fit the farmers' livelihood system.
Furthermore, the trees they planted were regarded as the village govern-
ment's, not their own property.
5. Conservation measures
Soil conservation behaviour is seldom regarded in literature as an incentive
for farmers to grow trees. Thus, Sen et al. (1985) reported that in one farm
forestry project in West Bengal, participants were more aware of the direct
benefits than of the effect of the project on soil conservation. In general, soil
conservation becomes an important motivating factor if it is clearly linked to
direct livelihood needs. Where short-term cash crop production constitutes
the farmer's main livelihood, soil conservation may become a major concern,
especially in rolling arable areas. Farmers in Mwenezi, Zimbabwe responded
positively to tree growing as they learned the impact of soil degradation on
farming (Leach and Meams, 1988). Comparably, Coughenour and Chamala
(1989) reported that Kentucky and Queensland grain farmers chose to adopt
soil conservation measures over an intensive and erosive cropping system
despite the promise of huge profits from the latter.
In sum, farmers' tree growing initiatives can be prompted by their immedi-
ate household needs or cash striving and can be enhanced or suppressed by
the effect of certain institutional arrangements or other incentive systems. Ta-
ble 3 provides an additional guide for understanding the particular conditions
in which rural farmers may or may not participate in tree growing.
18 TREE GROWING ON DIFFERENT GROUNDS
Tables.
Heuristic guide showing the basic conditions in which a rural farmer may or may not
participate in tree growing
Condition
Factor Do not plant/Protect Plant/Protect
1. Land tenure
2. Rights to usu-
fruct








Priority for government or
subject to taxation, or
ambiguous
Uncertain or not included






Conservation and for wood
industry needs
Secure or aspiration for secu-
rity
Vested primarily in the house-
hold, regularly exercised wit-
hout restriction or rent
Provided and binding
Owned by the household by





Equity and for immediately
felt household needs
3.1.3 The theoretical bases of actor's behaviour
To understand in a more general way what inhibits rural farmers from grow-
ing trees voluntarily or from cooperating in tree growing projects when in fact
their need of them is so obvious, brings us to a theoretical discussion. There
have been many attempts to explain such behaviour in a more encompassing
way. Although some theories had shed some light on this problem, no single
theory has yet explained sufficiently the varied responses in different situa-
tions. Four of the theoretical bases will be discussed in this section which will
try to illustrate some facets of the farmers' responses. They are treated as
complementary to each other because they can only explain an aspect of the
responses at stake. The first two theories were cited by Lovelace (1985) as a
guide in understanding farmers' attitudes towards innovations. The third and
the fourth were drawn from selected theories of Moral Domains and Collec-
tive Actions, respectively.
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1. Risk-aversion
The risk-aversion type of reasoning is drawn from Scott's (1976) theory on
the Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast
Asia. While studying the survival patterns of rural villages in Vietnam, Scott
concluded that rural peasants are 'avert risk' as reflected in his strongest state-
ment:
'The basic idea upon which my argument rests is both simple and, I
believe, powerful. It arises from the central economic dilemma of most
peasant households. Living close to the subsistence margin and subject to
the vagaries of weather and the claims of outsiders, the peasant household
has little scope for the profit maximization calculus of traditional neoclas-
sical economics. Typically, the peasant cultivator seeks to avoid the failure
that will ruin him rather than attempting a big, but risky, killing. In
decision-making parlance, his behaviour is 'risk-averse'; he minimizes the
subjective probability of the maximum loss.'
2. Rational peasant theory
The rational peasant type of reasoning is drawn from Popkin's (1979)
'Rational Peasant' theory. Like Scott, he focused specifically on rural Viet-
nam. His argument and conclusions, however, were quite different from
Scott's as noted in his view:
'I propose a view of the peasant as a rational problem-solver, with a sense
of both his own interests and the need to bargain with others to achieve a
mutually acceptable outcome. I hope to leave the reader not with pity for
peasants or with a longing to recapture their presumed innocence and sim-
plicity, but with a respect for the intelligence with which they develop
practical solutions to the complex problem of resource allocation, authori-
ty, and dispute settlement that every society faces.'
3. 'Moral Domains ' theory
The works of three contributors of this theory were cited on the basis of their
relevance to the subject, namely:
(3.1) Goodin (1982): According to Goodin, there are two possible routes
of reasoning, whichever would prevail over the other that theoretically
guides individual's investment decision. This reasoning either stems from
economic motivation (i.e., the ($) dollar domain) or ethical consideration
(i.e., taking morality seriously). These two domains are said to be incom-
patible with each other, such that, only one route can be pursued at a time.
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(3.2) Jack and Jack (1989): Like Goodin, Jack and Jack subscribe to the
idea that there are two contending weights of consideration in the making
of every decision and only one will prevail over the other. These two con-
siderations are 'homo economicus' and 'ethics of care'. Both are not dis-
tinctively different from Goodin's '($) dollar domain' and 'moral domain'
respectively.
(3.3) De Groot (1992): De Groot developed a variant of Goodin's and Jack
and Jack's early works by identifying three modes of moral reasoning,
namely: a) 'care', b) 'homo economicus' and c) 'honoris'. The first two
are identical with Jack and Jack's motivational considerations. However,
De Groot believes that there is still another dimension that can move indi-
viduals into voluntary compliance which does not necessarily stemmed
from either economic or 'ethics of caring' motivation. He termed this third
domain as 'honoris' to mean one's striving for prestige or recognition for
his work. Accordingly, vaguely or rigidly, there are different modes of
moral reasoning, in which different criteria for choice apply. Things and
situations may be treated in one (or vaguely more) modes.
4. Olson's logic of collective action
There are a number of theories related to the management of common prop-
erties (e.g., Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons and the Prisoner's Dilemma).
But only Olson's 'logic of collective action' will be highlighted here because
of its direct relevance to the subject presently under study. However, both
Tragedy of the Commons and Prisoner's Dilemma have to be briefly intro-
duced first because they were the contexts on which Olson's logic of collec-
tive action was based.
Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons presupposses that under a completely
open access to resource condition, each resource user is assumed to be a ratio-
nal utility maximizer who receives positive utility from the benefits derived
from the resource and negative utility from over-use of the same resource.
When the aggregate of all users' activities begins to exceed the sustainable
yield of the resource, each user is still motivated to intensify his scale of ex-
traction because he benefits wholly from such additional increase in utility
and only a partial share of the additional cost resulting from his over-use of
the resource. According to him, 'each man is locked into a system that com-
pels him to increase his resource utility without limit, in a world that is lim-
ited. Ruin is the destination towards which all men rush, each pursuing his
own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons'.
For Hardin, the only viable solution is 'mutual coercion, mutually agreed
upon', by which restrained access can be enforced from the outside (state ap-
paratus).
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The Prisoner's Dilemma in a common-pool resource use regards the
choice as being either to cooperate with others in a rule of constrained access
or to not cooperate. The argument is that each individual has a clear prefer-
ence order of options:
a. everyone else abides by the rule while the individual enjoys unrestrained
access (he 'free rides' or 'shirks');
b. everyone, including himself, follows the rule ('cooperate');
c. no one follows the rule; and
d. he follows the rule while no one else does (he is 'suckered').
To arrive at the best situation (second option), the only solution is either coer-
cion from outside the group to force people to reach a common restraint, or
change in the rules from outside the group to a private property regime.
Olson's 'logic of collective action' appears to be similar to the Prisoner's
Dilemma in a sense that it presupposses that 'unless there is coercion or some
other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, ratio-
nal, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group
interest'. In here, the use of punishments and inducements are legitimized and
must be selectively applied so that those who do not cooperate can be treated
differently from those who do.
For Olson, voluntary collective action will not produce public goods. Only
collective action based on selective (that is, excludable) positive or negative
incentives may produce public goods. He further argues that the likelihood of
voluntary collective action (without selective punishments or inducements) is
high for small interest groups, low for large ones, and intermediate for inter-
mediate ones.
Like Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons and the Prisoner's Dilemma,
Olson's argument would lead us to account for non-cooperation in terms of
free riding, and to account for cooperation in terms of punishments or induce-
ments which overcome free riding. Furthermore, there was so much emphasis
on the difficulties of strictly cultivating voluntary collective action-that which
proceeds from moral commitment, or habit, or a calculation of the benefits to
each if each individual complies.
3.1.4 Theoretical implications
These four theoretical reasonings will now be examined to determine their
relevance in explaining farmer's response to tree growing in earlier field and
literature findings.
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1. Risk-aversion
According to Lovelace (1985), the risk-aversion theory assumed that rural
villagers have historically led a rather precarious existence. Peasants' behav-
iour was conditioned to be 'risk-averse' as a result of constant climatic irregu-
larity and adverse environmental conditions along with agrarian problems.
Farmers are continually conscious of risks, which they tend to avoid even if it
means forfeiting opportunities for considerable economic returns. The 'safety
in subsistence first' mentality precludes all other considerations.
Simon (1975), in a much earlier independent account of how the poor re-
spond to risk, described them as:
'(...) people living on a subsistence level or barely above it understandably
resist change, when one miscalculation can destroy the thin security which
their traditional habits insure. No matter how much he may want to better
himself, a farmer eking out a marginal existence cannot afford to gamble.
Improvements have to be demonstrated, and must be part of an integrated
program of change that offers him a social and economic security more
dependable than the one he is asked to give up. '
Similarly, Leach and Mearns (1988) observed:
'Rural people always assess, informally, the costs and benefits of investing
their time and energy in different tasks. There are always explicit trade-
offs between these demands on labour, and between expected benefits in
the short-term and those in the long-term. One dimension of poverty is the
frequent necessity to forego long-term benefits in order to meet short-term
needs. This is the vulnerability aspect of poverty: having to spend one's
saving or liquidate one's assets rather than saving them for a rainy day'.
The implication of the risk-aversion theory proposes that for an intervention
program to become successful in a marginally subsistent economic condition,
it should not violate or create major risks for the target population's survival
patterns (Lovelace, 1985). Skutch's (1983) findings regarding the Tanzanian
government's Village Afforestation Program illustrate this effect. In the 18
village woodlots she investigated, the extra demands on agricultural labour
time and the loss of private land for communal use were found to be the main
reasons for low farmers' participation. Hoskins (1982) raised the same dilem-
ma for the poor subsistent farmers saying, 'If tree growing directly interferes
with food production or off-farm wage earning activities, such sacrifices may
be too costly to make'.
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2. Rational peasant
Based on Popkin's theory, the rational peasant theory presumes that indivi-
dual rural villagers and family units are accustomed to take risk and make all
sorts of long- and short-term investments. This is in fact gambling on their
future.
This theory implies that individual villagers are open to innovations as
long as they are certain to benefit from the project rather than merely being
used by outside agencies. According to Lovelace (1985), 'There is less need
to take into account all of the complexities of each situation because it is as-
sumed that most rural villagers are motivated by the same thing, namely, eco-
nomic success, and are able to recognize and take advantage of a good oppor-
tunity when it arises.' This coincides with Chatterjee's (1985) findings that
the majority of farmers in India who lived below subsistence level were moti-
vated to shift from pure agricultural production to tree growing when there
was a decline in net returns from both food and non-food production, while
the price of wood, bamboo and other wood products increased from 1971 to
1979.
3. 'Moral Domain ' theory
The Moral Domains theory presumes that farmers' motivation to grow trees
may not only stem from economic consideration but can also be prompted by
the intrinsic value of the activity or aspiration for prestige. The moral and psy-
chological drives are treated as equally rational as the economic basis for tree
growing. Whichever dominates could be the bottomline condition for farm-
ers' tree growing participation. However, fanners' motivation can chance
over time. This means that his motivation can shift from 'ethics of care' or
'honoris' to 'homo economicus' at one time.
A case in point was the alteration of farmers' motivation in Dy Abra, Tu-
mauini after cash payment was introduced for tree planting (Pasicolan, 1992).
Initially, farmers grew trees voluntarily as an appreciation of the intrinsic
value of trees. However, very recently, farmers can no longer plant trees on
communal lands spontaneously without assurance of payment from the gov-
ernment.
4. Logic of collective action
Olson and the other collective action pessimists argued that only through state
intervention would there be an order and control of resource use in common
properties. Since the mechanisms of restraint are assumed to be externally
imposed, it is therefore logical to think that only coercion or application of
selective punishment or benefit could bring about resource control.
Olson's logic however does not apply to all cases of common property. A
number of successful cases of locally devised rule systems indicate that it is
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not necessary for regulation of the commons to be imposed from outside
(McKean, 1984; Ostrom, 1986 and Wade, 1987). Secondly, Olson's emphasis
on the size of selective benefits or cost (punishment) as means to discrimate
between people who participate and not contribute to the protection of a pub-
lic good does not always hold true. His argument about the effect of size of
groupings as a determinant of voluntary collective action was later on dis-
counted by Wade's (1986) findings about the voluntary collective action that
evolved within the local irrigation users in 31 villages in South India. In short,
these villages exemplify the proposition that it is possible for an interest
group organization to emerge voluntarily and be sustained, on the whole,
voluntarily- that is, without selective benefits or costs- if the collective benefit
is high. According to Wade, selective inducements to discourage free riding
are completely lacking, and selective punishments (i.e., fines or even oppro-
brium) are present but are hardly the central motivating factor.
In principle, Olson's logic of collective action, as well as the Tragedy of
the Commons and the Prisoner's Dilemma, seem to apply strictly to an 'open
access' situation wherein everybody is free to use a resource that does not ex-
actly belong to anybody. As such, the state plays a crucial role in protecting
the resource. One example is a public forest or a public fishing ground where
everybody tries to maximize his benefits from the resource without having no
sense of moral obligation to protect it from over-use. However, for common
resource that is being managed by local users under a common institution,
Olson's argument does not apply in strict sense. An example of this is the
community forestry in the hills of Nepal (Gilmour and Fisher, 1991). The lo-
cal people were able without outside guidance to make arrangements to pro-
tect and regulate access to forest resources for which there is no single power.
3.2 Incentive Systems in Forestry Programs
When one talks to rural people about forest conservation, they usually
respond by sharing their needs and their struggles to make a living. For people
who live from 'hand to mouth', long-term conservation measures are a luxury
(Kummer, 1984). The striving for subsistence induces them to view
conservation efforts as counter to their pursuit of a livelihood (Pasicolan,
1991). Marginal farmers usually think of their immediate and specific daily
needs while conservation programs consider greater societal benefits which
focus on long-term effects and require controlled resource use.
Owing to this disparity in value orientation between conservationists and
participants, it is often difficult to sustain conservation programs. On the one
hand, there is the urgency to address conservation issues and not only the lo-
cal people's immediate needs. On the other hand, conservation efforts
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through local participation cannot apart from meeting participants' immediate
felt needs. It is here where incentive systems can play a role. This section
presents the rationale of incentive systems in forestry programs. Also, it re-
views the experiences and lessons learned about the use of incentives as in-
struments for participation in forest conservation.
3.2.1 The rationale
Although farmers' responses to tree growing and to incentives for participa-
tion are not yet fully understood, it is clear that reforestation on public lands
cannot be accomplished without incentives. Among the reasons for the use of
incentive systems in public tree growing are:
1. the longer gestation period of tree crops compared with that of agricultural
or cash crops;
2. the many risks associated with forest plantations, such as forest fire, insect
infestation, man-made disasters, the lack of a sure market and price insta-
bility;
3. the need to subsidize farmers' income during the transition from mono-
cropping to a diversified perennial cropping system, that goes with agro-
forestry and other tree growing-related activities;
4. the fact that in watershed management, the one who carries out tree gro-
wing at the upper catchment may not share directly in the long-term down-
stream benefit of his investment. The principle of 'externalities' applies
here, i.e., the real beneficiaries of a watershed project may well be far re-
moved from the upland farmers who protect and develop the watershed
(McGaughey and Gregersen, 1985). The farmer is unlikely to make the
investment unless the profit from eventually harvesting the trees provides
a good rate of return for him in the future.
As mentioned in Section 3.1.2, people will hardly participate effectively and
sustainably in tree growing if they do not benefit directly from it. To increase
the chances of project success, we need to know more about the specific ap-
plicability of the different types of incentive. First, however, we must have a
general idea about the various types of incentive systems.
3.2.2 Typologies of incentive system
Government incentives for public tree growing are generally meant to affect
certain target groups' behaviour towards an activity of high social value. Spe-
cifically, they are policy tools for overcoming participants' major constraints
in forest conservation or reforestation projects.
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Gregersen (1985) classified incentives into two major categories. The first
is direct and tied to a response from or an action by the farmer. This may take
the form of cost sharing (e.g., cash grants, goods, materials), services (e.g.,
management, marketing), subsidized credit (loans), fiscal measures (e.g., tax
rebates, or exemptions, special taxes) or reduction of uncertainty (e.g., rental
contract, price guarantees, insurance, forest protection agreements, land ten-
ure). The second consists of indirect incentives which are not tied to the farm-
er's response or action. These include market information, price reporting,
extension, research and analysis, general forest protection and infrastructure.
The use of these two types of incentives, however, varies with the type of pro-
ject and with the institutional or social arrangements between tree growers
and their collaterals (Teeguarden, 1985).
Goulet (1989) divided incentives either as material/economic and non-
material/socio-cultural. Material incentives stem from financial-economic
consideration, and take the form of money (e.g., salaries, subsidies, income
from sales). They may also come in kind (e.g., free housing, access to land or
production inputs, seedlings). On the other hand, non-material incentives
stem from inner values or psychological considerations and take the form of
moral rewards (e.g., status, recognition, belief); or penalties (e.g., disgrace or
sanction).
Goulet's classification was not encompassing and seemed more applicable
to small-scale tree growing or soil conservation projects at the household or
community level. Gregersen's classification, on the other hand, is applicable
to large scale industrial plantations under private management where there are
high economic stakes for the private investors or the government.
This review will analyze free growing incentives at the household and
community level. Goulet's classification will thus be the point of reference,
with material incentives as the focus. Only those incentives which are being
used in the Philippine reforestation program will be studied, along with some
incentives in Gregersen's classification which may be relevant to the present
study.
3.2.3 Design and performance of incentives in forestry
Seven types of incentive will be examined, namely: 1 ) cost-benefit sharing, 2)
wages or paid labour, 3) subsidies, 4) loans, 5) market incentives, 6) land ten-
ure, and 7) access to future produce. A general outcome for the literature
study is that in practice, no single incentive can function by itself in the long-
run. It will always have to be complemented by one or more other types. Thus
in assessing their individual impact, it is difficult to isolate the effect of one
incentive from that of the others. On the other hand, for some aspects the tools
can constitute alternatives for each step.
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 27
A review of the field performance of the different incentives applied in
forestry will provide a better understanding of their strengths and limitations.
The following discussion briefly describes the mechanism, functioning and
results of the above incentives as applied in forestry projects in various
developing countries.
1. Cost-benefit sharing
Partnership between a private entity/government and the tree farmer may be
based on shared inputs. Usually, the farmer provides the labour and land,
while the government or private enterprise takes care of the capital inputs.
This type of arrangement is meant to be mutually beneficial especially to
farmers who often lack the capital. However, in practice, the arrangement
may not always fully benefit the farmer. For instance, the cost sharing be-
tween a private enterprise and a landowner in Ecuador is seemingly lopsided
(McGaughey and Gregersen, 1988). The private enterprise obtains a loan
from the government and pays the landowner for the cost of establishing a
plantation. In return, a large part of the harvest reverts to the private enterprise
proportionate to the cost he invested. Although the farmer-landowner derives
fodder, fuelwood and other wood products from the plantation before harvest,
he receives little of the profit (e.g., 75 percent of the sales value of the timber
goes to the private enterprise and 25 percent goes to the farmer). The same
holds true for some community forestry projects in Nepal (Molnar, 1981).
Some villagers were reluctant to plant new areas and manage them because
the government would receive most of the profit.
In general, we can say that if in a cost-benefit sharing arrangement
between the tree grower and the private enterprise the former perceives that
his benefit is not worth his cost, a successful partnership is not likely to be
achieved.
2. Paid labour
In most government-initiated watershed programs, participants are paid in
kind or in cash for work done either on private or public lands. This instru-
ment by itself appears insufficient in motivating sustainable participation.
Farmers in one village woodlot under Panchayat management in Nepal asked,
'Why should we expend our scarce time and labour even if we are paid, if
only to create and manage a forest for the government to make a profit?'
(Molnar, 1981). This coincides with the Risk-Averse Theory claiming that
farmers are reluctant to gamble their limited time and labour in something that
does not improve their basic security even if they get paid for it (see Risk-
averse theory, Section 3.1.4.1).
A similar drawback was observed in the strip plantation and village
woodlot reforestation projects in Gujurat, India (Chatterjee, 1985). Strip plan-
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tation was established on public land along canals and roads, while the village
woodlot was on communal land. Both project sites used to be a communal
grazing area and a ruelwood gathering site for the local residents. After the
conversion of the communal land into plantations, the people, despite having
received tree planting wages, felt uneasy. The conversion seemed to have
alienated them from their one-time communal resource (Banerjee, 1985;
Molnar, 1986).
These two examples in themselves do not contradict the use of paid labour.
However, they imply the need to look into which situations paid labour can
and cannot be used. From the above cases, we glean the following insights:
First, the village woodlot project in Nepal calls for complementary incen-
tives to back-up paid labour. In such setting, benefit-sharing could ensure par-
ticipants' long-term project involvement.
Second, using paid labour in the reforestation project in Gujurat, India,
failed to stimulate long-term people's participation. The people resented the
conversion of their previous communal grazing area into a reforestation pro-
ject. Wiersum (1984) cautioned that when rehabilitating communal lands, it is
important to identify from the beginning who holds what rights to ensure that
the planter will receive the benefits of his investments and to avoid unin-
tended destruction of existing rights for resource gathering and grazing.
Third, another way to overcome low participation is to increase partici-
pants' wages proportional to the benefits forfeited for giving up a communal
resource.
While wages seem attractive at first, some landless marginal farmers cont-
inue to search for arable land or at least a sustainable income source. The Wa-
tershed Management Project at Madagascar is one example (FAO, 1983). Des-
pite the regular wages for reforestation work, the participants continued to
clear forestland for planting coffee, cloves and vanilla for export. This may be
because intercropping of arable crops for subsistence was not permitted in the
project area.
When wages are complemented with other incentives, farmers tend to re-
spond positively, especially when land tenure rights or equitable benefit-shar-
ing arrangements are included. A case in point was the successful experience
of one social forestry project in West Bengal which provided additional bene-
fits aside from participants' reforestation wages (Chatterjee, 1985).
In the absence of a benefit-sharing arrangement, two mechanisms may
make paid labour more attractive. One is to grant a progressive payment to the
farmer for every tree protected and maintained over time. Hoskins (1979) ob-
served that tree survival was 100 percent in the SODEVA Project in Senegal
due to the progressive payment given to the participants. The other mechan-
ism is to allow farmers to introduce cash crops in between rows of the tree
seedlings, as in the case of the Village Agroforestry Project in Thailand
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(Boonkind, Fernandez and Nair, 1984) and the Watershed Management Pro-
ject in Panama (FAO, 1983). What sustained farmers' interest in these projects
was the provision for intercropping of agricultural crops between plantation
seedlings in addition to their wages. When farmers are adequately compen-
sated through other direct benefits from the project for the forfeited income,
which would have resulted from the adoption of new land use, high participa-
tion can be expected (Saxena, 1987; SIDA, 1988).
In general, paid labour by itself can not sustain participation. However,
with back-up incentives like an equitable benefit-sharing arrangement, con-
trolled access to tree products (e.g., for fodder, fuelwood or post) or provision
for intercropping, sustained participation can be enhanced even in public and
communal tree planting projects.
3. Subsidy
' Subsidy' in this review refers to ad hoc support incentives either in kind or in
cash. In a strict sense, subsidies are meant to help the farmer out of an adverse
situation (e.g., crop or price failures as a result of flood, drought, pest). They
cannot be applied as a permanent or long-term measure (Botero, 1980). In
forestry, because of the long gestation and intense capital requirement needed
in tree farming, subsidies can complement other existing incentives, but are
usually intermittently applied on a short-term duration. They are most appli-
cable in watershed management when an impending environmental impact
(e.g., soil erosion and sedimentation) that may cause downstream degrada-
tion, has to be averted (Filius, 1986).
In Peru, Panama, Venezuela, and Honduras, for instance, farmers received
seedlings, equipment, land tools and often a food ration as subsidies in kind
(Gregersen, 1985). Cash subsidies, on the other hand, were intended to raise
private return rates or reduce investor's uncertainties.
Chatterjee (1985) claimed that the heavy subsidies provided by the gov-
ernment in India along with other financial incentives attracted many farmers
to shift from annual cash crop production to tree growing in Western Uttar
Pradesh. In 1980, 109 families were involved in the project, covering an area
of approximately 43 hectares. The following year, participation increased to
15,239 families with 4,950 hectares planted. This dramatic shift was attribu-
ted to the government subsidies reinforced by good market condition.
McGaughey and Gregersen (1988) also attested that most Latin American
countries with successful tree farming programs provide subsidies for private
companies.
Although short-term subsidies are indeed effective in stimulating partici-
pants' sustained interest in tree growing, there are also problems associated
with their application.
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When people have become accustomed to subsidies, their interest in mak-
ing personal investment may diminish. From a public point of view, too much
dependence on subsidies may not give much return to investment, as the sub-
sidies merely substitute for private capital.
This repercussion could further be aggravated if one has chosen for the
application of heavy subsidies. Gregersen (1985) argued that a subsidy cove-
ring more than 100 percent of the cost that a private entity would incur in a
conservation project is no longer an efficient allocation of resources from an
economic point of view. It may even be detrimental to the project's overall
goal to promote sustainable participation.
Worse, when the subsidy is withdrawn later on, it can ruin participants'
initiatives for sound environmental behaviour. Blustain (1985) claimed that
the 100 percent subsidy applied in the Soil Conservation Project in Jamaica
had a counter-effect on participants' commitment to the project's conserva-
tion goals. When the subsidy was later reduced to 75 percent, the participants
were no longer motivated to maintain their terraces and ditches, and began
complaining that they were not given the full amount of the benefit entitled to
them. Others rationalized that: 'Since it was government's money that had
built the terraces, then it should be government's money that should maintain
them.' This shows that high subsidies only induce farmers to participate in
order to get access to the incentive rather than the long-term conservation
benefit.
In practice, subsidies are intended to remove tree growers' constraints
which are associated with cost of production, risk and uncertainties that are
transitory in nature. However, it should not be applied in excess, otherwise, it
will become uneconomical to the government. Also, it will ruin private initia-
tives to invest on socially beneficial projects.
4. Loans/credits
Loan or credits are meant to solve a cash flow problem or lack of access of
capital resources. It is granted either directly by a public agency or a private
group with government loan guarantees at a reduced interest rate (Gregersen,
Draper and Elz, 1989). In addition to a low interest rate, small farmers appear
to prefer loans with long repayment duration and a grace period correspond-
ing to the time until tree crops are marketable.
The Plan Bosque project in Ecuador is an example of high participation in
farm forestry due to low interest loans given to small tree growers (Gradwohl
and Greenberg, 1990). According to a government report, the project's great-
est impact was on the tremendous barren area planted at a very low establish-
ment and maintenance cost. A similar case was observed in the Saemeul Un-
dong Reforestation Project in Korea (FAO, 1983). The credit scheme consisted
of a 3% yearly interest payable in 15 years with a 10-year grace period. These
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terms stimulated strong public participation and had accomplished 85 percent
of its reforestation objective in just five years.
These experiences show that loans can lead to project success, especially if
given at the beginning of the project, since small farmers usually do not have
the adequate capital to start a new venture. If loans and credit schemes are
designed to suit the terms of poor farmers rather than those of the financially
stable, strong public participation may be expected.
5. Market incentive
In Uttar Pradesh, India, many farmers were encouraged to convert part of
their agricultural fields to Eucalyptus plantation because of the ready market
with a promising price for wood, along with the soft loans and subsidies given
by the government (Chowdhry, 1985). In contrast the application of this tool
met clear problems. Thus in local fruit production in Almora, northern Uttar
Pradesh, Vidyarthi (1989) attested that:
'In all villages studied, the villagers had indicated interest in planting fruit
species on private land. However, opportunities for doing so on a large
scale did not exist owing to market uncertainties. Local markets did not
create enough demand to absorb large volumes of production. This did not
attract investments from would-be entrepreneurs, especially since most
fruit trees grown in the region such as oranges, peaches, and plums die eas-
ily.'
The two above cases point to three critical factors in tree growers' investment
decision regarding market incentives: market security, good pricing policy
and provision of back-up incentives to overcome tree growers' investment
risk.
6. Land tenure
Another provision that can reduce investment uncertainty is security of land
tenure. 'People who have insecure or short-term rights of access to land can
obviously not be expected to make long-term investments in tree planting'
(Wiersum, 1984). An NGO working with tribal groups in the Banwasi Sewa
Ashram project in Uttar Pradesh, India noted that despite having received
funds from a donor agency, it could not get people interested in planting trees.
There was no incentive to undertake any long-term investment, whether by
planting trees, or by soil and water conservation, because the area was consid-
ered as 'squatted' lands (Prem Bhai, 1987 as cited by Chambers, Saxena and
Sha, 1989).
A separate study by Sen et al. (1985) in West Bengal, India found that
there was a greater participation in tree growing on land grants under individ-
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ual management than on village woodlot (communal property) under the
Panchayat (local community council). In both projects, fertilizer and insecti-
cides were given in the first year. In addition, cash incentives were given per
seedling maintained for the first two years and increased cash incentives were
given per seedling maintained for two years beginning in the third year. Un-
der the individually managed tree growing project, lands were clearly
demarcated and allocated for each farmer. In the village woodlot, however,
there was no clear land demarcation for each participant since it is a commu-
nal property. The contrasting result of these two conditions suggests the
importance of tenurial security and management autonomy in stimulating lo-
cal people's participation in a project.
In this context, Wiersum (1991) identified two important aspects relating
to participants' degree of power in social forestry projects. The first is the de-
gree of control which refers to the use or ownership of land and tree resour-
ces. The second refers to the degree of management responsibility over for-
est/tree resources which includes farmer's prerogative to select the species
and planting site as well as his use of indigenous technical knowledge. These
two elements provide a framework for classifying various tree growing pro-
jects. The objective of this classification is to define the appropriate institu-
tional arrangement between the government and local people so that manage-
ment or ownership issues over the resource are dealt with in the proper con-
text.
In other words, security of land tenure may greatly affect farmers' motiv-
ation to invest in long-term crops. Where there is security of land tenure,
farmers may well be motivated to grow trees. However, like the other incen-
tives, it also functions best when combined with other instruments like paid
labour, cost-benefit sharing, subsidies, loans and market support.
7. Access to future produce
Ownership right or usufruct practice over the land is not the only means that
can sustain tree growing on public lands. In the absence of a land tenurial ar-
rangement, the provision of tree tenure may suffice in the striving for property
right over the project.
A number of field cases revealed that when there is no provision for farm-
ers' rights over the trees they planted, they shy away from involvement. For
example, in Honduras, private individuals were discouraged from venturing
into tree farming because of the state policy claiming that all trees grown on
private lots or on public lands did belong to the State (Jones, 1982).
When people are assured of direct benefits from the projects, they will
more likely participate (Campbell, 1978). Sen et al. (1985) observed that
farmers in West Bengal participated more actively in a farm forestry project
when the benefits that would accrue to them were clearly defined. The privi-
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lege given to them was their access to collect forest products from the planta-
tion. In addition, 25 percent of the income from future harvest would go to
them (SIDA, 1988). These arrangements encouraged them to participate activ-
ely in the project. Similarly, Gradwohl and Greenberg (1988) attributed the
success of the Agroforestry and Outreach Project in Haiti to farmers' secured
access and control over the fast growing trees they planted on state lands.
However, when farmers perceive no future direct benefit from the trees
they planted on state lands, they are likely not to do the job well, even if short-
term incentives are provided (Francis, 1987). Thomas (1964) found that peas-
ants employed with 'food-for-work' in some developing countries to plant
trees on land where they had no access of use, deliberately planted the seed-
lings upside down in the ground. Since the incentive was tied with the instant
number of seedlings planted rather than the benefits from maintaining the
plantation over the years, participants cared little whether the trees had grown
or not. Thus, access to future produce from the project may be crucial in sus-
taining participants' involvement in tree growing on both public and commu-
nal lands. This incentive, however, usually functions as support to other
instruments.
3.3 Incentives in the Previous Philippine Reforestation
Programs
Reforestation in the Philippines started in 1916. Although it has always been
included as a regular program within the forestry sector, it was only towards
the 90s that it became the centrepiece of the country's environmental pro-
gram. In the 70s, however, many upland development programs have already
emerged with varying concerns and emphases, yet with the common goal of
forest re-establishment.
This section reviews briefly the content of the country's past upland
development programs, forerunners of the current contract reforestation pro-
gram. The various incentive systems and their effects on people's level of par-
ticipation are analyzed.
3.3.1 From forest enemies to partner s in development
The old Forestry Laws and Regulations in the Philippines regarded upland
dwellers and traditional forest communities as illegal occupants of the forest.
Since the introduction of private ownership during the Spanish colonial pe-
riod, the primitive usufruct access of forest occupants over the lands they oc-
cupied and cultivated ended (Sajise and Baguinon, 1982). This was embodied
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in the Regalian Doctrine declaring all public lands, including the forest zones
as state property in the name of the King of Spain.
In the early 1960s, shifting cultivation began to be recognized as one ma-
jor factor of rapid forest denudation (Aquino et al., 1987). Because indige-
nous people and migrants inside the forest zones were regarded as squatters,
the government employed punitive measures to curb the growing upland en-
croachment. Fines and imprisonment were imposed alongside forced resettle-
ment schemes for people residing inside the forest.
This approach, however, did not succeed. Despite threats of imprisonment
and intimidation, those resettled in new areas went back to their original set-
tlements as in the case of the kaingineros in Mt. Makiling in the late 60s (Per-
sonal Interview, 1986). According to them, they were not only determined to
go to prison but even felt better-off inside iron bars with daily food provision
from the government than resettling in such harsh and unfamiliar environ-
ments. This experience taught forestry authorities and policy makers to view
shifting cultivation as a socioeconomic problem rather than a technical or le-
gal one.
Beginning in the early 70s, the government adopted a humanitarian ap-
proach in addressing upland problems. The development concern was redi-
rected towards the socioeconomic welfare and political plight of forest occu-
pants. Forest occupancy management was implemented. This was backed up
by agroforestry technology promotion, census of forest occupants, and the
creation of livelihood employment. This approach was reflected in the For-
estry Reform Code of 1974.
For many years under heavy pressure from the government, the forest's
former enemies now have become the targets of intervention programs. The
government believed that only by addressing forest occupants' basic survival
and tenurial needs, could the occupants be motivated to cooperate in forest
protection and development.
3.3.2 Early strategies in upland development
With the dramatic change in government policy towards the uplands starting
in the 70s, the use of incentives in public tree growing was considered as piv-
otal in democratizing forestry practice in favour of the poor majority.
In the early 70s, the first three pioneering social forestry programs were
launched by the nowadays defunct Bureau of Forest Development, namely:
Forest Occupancy Management (FOM), Communal Tree Farming (CTF) and
Family Approach to Reforestation (FAR). These had dual objectives: social
upliftment of the poor and environmental rehabilitation.
While these emerging social forestry programs were being implemented,
the long existing (regular) reforestation projects continued to operate under
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government administration. In addition, the private industry had its own
reforestation scheme, the Industrial Tree Plantation (ITP). The next section
describes the upland forest development programs in the 70s and the 80s.
1. Forest Occupancy Management
The main thrust of the Forest Occupancy Management was to help settle
kaingineros or swidden farmers and to stabilize their farming system in ways
consistent with improved upland productivity and soil conservation. The pro-
gram offered two options: relocation and managed occupancy.
Relocation applied to bonafide forest occupants willing to be relocated to
new areas where continuous cultivation would not pose adverse effects on the
immediate environment and public interest. In managed occupancy, qualified
occupants were allowed to remain in their settlement as long as they would
not expand their clearings, and would undertake activities to conserve and
protect the forest resources, following a management plan prepared by the
Forestry Agency. In both options, the maximum land area allocated per fam-
ily did not exceed seven hectares.
To legitimize the kaingineros^ stay in the forest, a two-year Forest Occu-
pancy Permit was given. They were also allowed to harvest the trees and agri-
cultural crops in their area. In addition, technical assistance, training and free
seedlings were given as incentives.
2. Communal Tree Farm
The Communal Tree Farm aimed to establish a communal forest in every
town or city. This would involve the community people and the local govern-
ments in coordination with other agencies and the private sector. Each family
was entitled to develop and cultivate two to 50 hectares of open public lands.
Furthermore, the program provided a one-year provisional CTF Certificate,
with which could be converted into a 25-year stewardship provision and
could be renewed for another 25 years, if the performance of the participant
was satisfactory. Except for its longer land tenurial arrangement, it had the
same incentive system as the Forest Occupancy Management.
3. Family Approach to Reforestation
The Family Approach to Reforestation (FAR) was actually a short-term con-
tractual reforestation scheme, meant to hasten the government's tree growing
efforts at a lower cost, while generating income for families living in the pro-
ject areas. A maximum of five hectares was allocated to each family. The
families were paid in three instalments per seedling that survived and main-
tained. Apart from the wages gained, they were also allowed to interplant ag-
ricultural crops between rows of trees and to benefit from them as long as they
worked in the project. The main difference between this program and the first
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two was that there was no land tenure provision. It merely contracted a family
to reforest a parcel of land, paying for the labour, over a period of one to three
years, after which the Forestry Agency took over.
Both FOM and CTF provided security and access for future produce along-
side with land tenure. Only the size of land holding and the length of tenure
differed between the two. The CTF offered better terms of land size and tenure
than FOM. On the other hand, what distinguished FAR from FOM and CTF was
the absence of land tenurial arrangement and security over future produce
from the trees the participants planted. Work in the project was compensated
with direct cash instead.
4. Old Existing Reforestation Projects (= Regular Reforestation)
In addition to the above mentioned new instruments, the government had
been maintaining a number of reforestation sites under its regular appropri-
ation.
Until recently, it had maintained 189 reforestation sites throughout the
country. Participants were paid for their work and were not entitled to any
share from the produce since they were planting trees on public lands. The
extent of local participation was quite low as compared to FOM, CTF and FAR,
being dependent on the fixed and limited funds appropriated for each project
site.
5. Industrial Tree Plantation
While the government spearheaded the massive regreening campaign in the
countryside, the private sector also carried out its own forestry development
strategy known as Industrial Tree Plantation (ITP).
This scheme was a tree growing partnership between private wood indus-
try and the local community. Farmers were encouraged to grow trees either on
their farmlots or on public lands. In addition, they were assured of a ready
market for their produce since they entered into contract with the private
wood industry. As part of the incentive package, the company provided loans,
seedlings and other production inputs intended to overcome the fanner's con-
straint to tree growing. Furthermore, farmers were allowed to plant cash crops
in between the seedlings as an intermediary crop while waiting for the wood
products to be harvested. The small-tree farmholders of the Pulp and Paper
Industry Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP) is an example of this type of
program.
As a summary, the five earlier reforestation approaches were tied with var-
ious incentives for participation. The key instruments used include: paid la-
bour, production loans, market incentive, land tenure and access to future
tree produce. Although these instruments were applied in each program, live-
lihood generation and environmental rehabilitation remained their two pri-
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mary goals. Table 4 below presents the various incentives for each type of
program.
Table 4.
Incentives being used in the early tree growing programs in the Philippines
Incentive
Program Paid Land Loan Market Access to
labour tenure security future produce
1. Forest Occupancy X X
Management (fb)
2. Communal Tree Farming (cb) X X
3. Family Approach to X
Reforestation (fb)
4. Regular Reforestation (cb) X
5 . Industrial Tree Plantation (fb) X X X
fb: family-based
cb: community-based
3.3.3 Impact of incentives on the past reforestation approaches
In 1989, a performance evaluation of all regular reforestation projects in the
country was carried out by various private organizations and state universi-
ties/colleges (BU/BUDF Evaluation Report, 1989), by order of the central gov-
ernment (DENR). The aim of this was to make an extensive inventory of the
actual accomplishment of the program over the past years. The information
obtained served as bench mark data in preparation for the launching of a
larger reforestation program known as 'Contract Reforestation'. Prior to this
activity, other studies were conducted independently to assess the perform-
ance of a number of social forestry projects in the Philippines. Based on the
results of these aforementioned studies and evaluation efforts, the impacts of
the most important incentive systems used in the different programs were ex-
amined:
1. P aid labour
Under the past regular reforestation program, people in the nearby commun-
ities usually participated in tree planting activity merely for economic secur-
ity reasons but when the projects slowed down or terminated, due to budget
constraints, the same people destroyed the trees to clear space for subsistence
cropping. Some local residents prompted by the following reasons burned or
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cut down government tree plantations: for farming or pasture use, for gaining
continuous employment through extended project operation or simply out of
negligence. Hence, no matter how determined and highly motivated the con-
tractors or the Forestry Department would be in the tree planting activity,
without community cooperation there will be a very slim chance for project
success.
If paid labour is viewed by the project labourers as an end in itself in the
absence of other livelihood options, there appeared to be no guarantee for real
reforestation success. One example was the deliberate burning down of newly
established plantations allegedly committed by participants who were eco-
nomically motivated to prolong their stay in the project (De los Angeles,
1980).
While monetary incentives could easily attract participation, it remains a
big question how to sustain farmers' positive attitudes towards tree growing
when the payment ceases. Aguilar (1982) noted that the temporary and spor-
adic wage employment opportunities offered by the Buhi Agroforestation and
Watershed Development Project raised already some doubts about
sustainable participation. Discouragement resulting from delayed payment
caused most participants to stop working before the contracted activities were
completed.
The hiring of local residents as contract labourers has been one way of di-
verting the destructive activities in the area. This strategy, however, was not
effective in Albay (BU/BUDF Evaluation Report, 1989). This may be due to the
fact that the forest occupants were hired as a subtle way of gradually ejecting
them from the project area. Being paid to plant and to protect the seedlings,
the farmers diligently cooperated with the project management at the start.
Later, they deliberately mutilated the seedlings to justify the extension of their
presence in the area. This example shows that paid labour can not ensure
quality participation, unless a more binding arrangement with the forest occu-
pants is provided for a longer term of participation in project protection and
maintenance.
There are more examples where paid labour without additional instru-
ments did not result in a desired outcome. In the Balatan Reforestation Pro-
ject, the contracted labourers cut trees prematurely and sold them to local
buyers and charcoal makers to compensate for the low project cash earnings
(BU/BUDF Evaluation Report, 1989). It was also observed in some regular re-
forestation projects in Cagayan Valley that participants' project income was
partly invested for tools or draft animals needed to expand and develop new
forest clearings in another area (Personal Interview, 1991). This is a case
whereby, unintentionally, an instrument meant to create environmental re-
sponsibility ended up reinforcing a destructive livelihood elsewhere. Unless
income from the project is sufficient to meet the average household basic
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needs, participants may continue to strive in augmenting their meagre earn-
ings even though it means violating the project's overall objective.
However, there were also a number of instances wherein project partici-
pation was greatly improved as a result of cash incentive. Aguilar (1982)
found that direct cash payment for tree planting had attracted many local peo-
ple to work in forestry projects. In the case of the Pantabangan Family Ap-
proach to Reforestation project, 30 families participated in the first year,
which increased to 70 families and then dropped to 40 in the second and third
year, respectively. Later, the project succeeded in mobilizing 100 families.
The reversal in the third year was attributed to ill-timed reforestation activi-
ties which coincided with the more lucrative onion growing. This jibes with
the above mentioned 'Rational Peasant' theory which presupposes that rural
farmers can recognize and take advantage of a good opportunity when it
arises.
Conversely, in another project site evaluated by the BU/BUDF Team (1989),
the long-term and uninterrupted working days for forest occupants and local
residents, which meant more income from the project, resulted in a relatively
low incidence of forest fire and a low tension between management and
participants.
Overall, paid labour in the past reforestation programs appeared not to be
economically efficient. Of the 189 regular reforestation projects with paid
labour that have been operating with total target area of one million hectares,
only 0.274 million hectares or 27.16 percent of the original target had report-
edly been established in December 1988 (FMB, 1990). Cost wise, the 166,462
hectares planted from 1978 to 1985 involved a total expenditure of about P
1.9 million based on 1985 values (Durst, 1986 as cited by Castillo, 1991).
This means that per hectare the cost was P 11,409, and assuming 50 percent
survival, the effective cost was P 22,818 per hectare (= US$ 912) (Castillo,
1991).
In summary, it appears that paid labour can elicit massive project partici-
pation but in general its effect can not be sustained. When it is perceived as an
end in itself, paid labour becomes counter productive. The overall result of
this incentive in the framework of the various past government tree growing
programs was seemingly low as indicated by the slow rate of forest renewal in
the countryside.
2. Land Tenure
Aguilar (1982) cited the exemplary accomplishments of the Communal Tree
Farm Project of San Pedro and the Ikalahan Social Forestry project, in con-
trast with the rest of the projects he studied. Both used land tenure as the main
instrument for participation, while other projects used paid labour, or cost
sharing and subsidy as incentives. Looking at the overall performance of the
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Communal Tree Farming Program nationwide, it consistently surpassed the
two other programs: Forest Occupancy Management and Family Approach to
Reforestation (Aquino et al., 1987). The Family Approach to Reforestation
did not provide land tenure since it was only intended to back up the regular
reforestation projects of the government. While both Forest Occupancy Man-
agement and Communal Tree Farm provided security of land tenure, the latter
offered a longer tenure and a larger land holding per family. Comparing the
total hectarage covered by each program, CTF ranked top with 20,165 ha with-
in two years time; followed by FOM with 11,220 ha within ten years time; FAR
rated last with 1,853 ha within two years time (Bernales et al., 1982). CTF hav-
ing by far the largest number of participants and area covered indicates that
the longer land tenure attracted more farmers to the program.
Security of land tenure is the primary concern of most upland farmers be-
cause the existing Philippine forestry laws declare the uplands as public do-
main. Aquino (1984) noted that in the social forestry projects she visited, the
people rarely mentioned deforestation problems. Security of land tenure ap-
peared to be their top concern. When not met, plantation fires increased, but
once secured, the number of trees planted increased significantly and the
recurrence of fires decreased.
Similarly, Aguilar (1982), from his study of eight social forestry projects,
raises his concern about the land right issues in the uplands, saying:
'Tribal communities in particular resent being called 'squatters' and would
go to the extent of indiscriminate use of resources and protest burnings of
forest to vent their resentment, especially in the face of displacement
threats. In such situations, land insecurity can be counter-productive not
only in terms of inflicting environmental damages, but in the up lander's
reluctance to plant perennial crops for fear that once the area is reforested,
there would be even stronger grounds for the government to reclaim the
land as forests. '
Sajise and Baguinon (1981) share the same feeling that 'an uplander who
feels he has no secure land tenure, especially on public land, will tend to go
for short-term and exploitative types of resource utilization'. Short rotation
crops, although highly erosive, are much preferred to perennials because
farmers think of the investment risk in tree crops under uncertain tenurial con-
ditions.
Lynch (1986) claimed that uplanders' resistance to adopt soil conservation
measures and reluctance to make long-term and sustainable improvement on
their illegally occupied lands stemmed from their lack of legal means to se-
cure their occupancy. A similar view was shared by Fujisaka, 1986; Fer-
nandez, 1988; Cruz and Cruz, 1988;Garrity, 1991, and Pingali, 1991.
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In summary, obtaining a secured land tenure could develop a farmer's pos-
itive attitude towards tree growing. Duration of the tenure also matters, as in
the case of the Communal Tree Farm Program. Farmers' choice of crops to be
raised in usufruct areas depends greatly on how he perceives his security of
tenure over the land he cultivates. Thus, it appears that security of land tenure
is crucial in sustaining people's participation in tree growing projects on pub-
lic lands.
3. Loan/credit
The loan as an incentive was effective in the case of the Paper Industries Cor-
poration of the Philippines (PICOP), a smallholder tree farming project.
Through the Philippine Development Bank, the corporation secured loans for
tree growers at 75 percent of the cost spent to establish and maintain forest
plantation. The grace period was set until the first trees were harvested, while
repayment of interest and principal was spread over several years (Hyman,
1983).
During the first year, in 1968, only 22 farmers participated, covering an
area of 220 hectares. In 1981, the number of participants grew to 3,778
covering 22,600 hectares.
Although the program had successfully met the raw material needs of the
wood industry through private tree growing, it failed to obtain the massive
participation of the small and landless farmers (Kirchhofer and Mercer,
1984). Since having a land title was set as a condition for the loans, only the
large landowners and the rich farmers were able to participate. From the wood
industry's perspective, it was the most practical and the most cost-effective
approach in raising its raw material needs.
In other countries like the Plan Bosque in Ecuador (Gradwohl and Gree-
berg, 1990) and the Saemeul Udong Reforestation Project in South Korea
(FAO, 1983), there was a greater participation of the rural poor. There the
loans were given mostly to the small farmers who were engaged in tree grow-
ing on both private and public lands.
In general, loans and other types of credit assistance appeared to be at-
tractive incentives that could draw both small and large farmers' participation
in tree growing. The interest rate should be low and the mode of payment be
liberalized to help the poor farmers who cannot pay the prevailing interest
rate of commercial banks and credit institutions. However, under favourable
conditions, small farmers can also pay their interest, if the Bank also grants
small amounts of fund and has a good field infrastructure. In this way, this
tool will provide a good possibility for government help. The aim is either to
keep the interest rates low, or to act as a security/collateral to small farmers
who are unable to pay their loans on time to private banks or other lending
institutions.
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4. Market incentive
One contributing factor to the above mentioned PICOP farm forestry's success
was the easing of participants' risk and uncertainties by providing a sure
wood market (Hyman, 1983). The loan agreement also gave farmers crop in-
surance besides market security. PICOP contracted the tree growers to sell their
wood products from their plantations for the company's paper mill. This at-
tracted many farmers to tree farming on their private lands.
Most upland farmers in the Philippines are reluctant to shift from annual
cash crops to tree crops because of the following constraints: the lack of mar-
ket incentives, the capital intensive characters and the long maturation time.
There could have been a big incentive for tree growing at the farm level, con-
sidering the growing demand for more fuelwood in some urban centres. How-
ever, the lack of an organized marketing system for small firewood gatherers
seemingly has become a disincentive to venture into a massive scale fuelwood
production. In one firewood gathering community in Cagayan Valley, the
middlemen took the biggest share of the profit from the firewood sale because
of the absence of a cooperative system among the resource gatherers (Pasico-
lan, 1988).
From the successful experience of the small-tree farm holders of PICOP and
the plight of poor firewood gatherers in Cagayan Valley, market and price
security appear to be very important conditions for a sustainable farm and
community forestry.
5. Security of future produce
In the Philippines, access to trees already planted is usually linked with secu-
rity of land and free tenure. A sense of ownership over frees planted by the
farmer motivates him not only to plant frees but also to protect and manage
them.
An example is the pinugo (family-owned forest) of the Ifugaos, a tribal
minority in Northern Luzon. According to the Ifugao culture, each family in
the community has to raise and protect one or two pinugos. Dacawi (1984)
describes the close relationship between the community and forest, by saying:
'The value of the forest is so infused in the mind of the Ifugao that he
maintains it well and takes from it no more than what he needs. The frees
that he fells for his basic requirements are replaced by planting during the
rainy season. He knows that the pinugo is the watershed from which
springs forth the water he needs to irrigate his rice fields. He also knows
that the pinugo is his ready source of wood for building his house and for
cooking his food.'
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Reflecting on the Ifiigaos' experience, access to future produce, coupled with
land tenure security were the major factors which attracted the local people to
the Communal Tree Farming Program of the government. In principle, when
farmers are assured of achieving future benefits from their labour, they will
more likely participate not only in tree planting but also in plantation protec-
tion and maintenance.
3.4 Incentives in the Current Reforestation Program
The past reforestation strategies which have not been totally phased out were
integrated into one new bigger program. However, the phasing out of the ear-
lier programs led to the adoption of the new ones. Included in the current re-
forestation programs in the country today are: 1) Integrated Social Forestry
Program (ISFP), 2) Community Forestry Program (CFP), 3) Contract Refores-
tation (CR), 4) Forest Land Management Agreement (FLMA), and 5) Industrial
Forest Management Agreement (IFMA).
Although most of the five approaches evolved independently and in differ-
ent periods, later they were all subsumed under one bigger umbrella program
referred to as the National Forestation Program (NFP) in 1986. The NFP has a
target of 6.5 million hectares to reforest until the year 2000. The major com-
ponent of this program is contract reforestation.
This section introduces the main features of the five current reforestation
approaches and also presents some preliminary findings about the perform-
ance of the contract reforestation program.
3.4.1 The current reforestation approaches
In the following the content of ISFP, CFP, CR, FLMA and IFMA are described.
1. Integrated Social Forestry Program (ISFP)
The Integrated Social Forestry Program (ISFP) subsumed all other previous
reforestation approaches, including the Citizen's Tree Planting Degree (P.D.
1153) launched in 1976, the CTF in 1979, the FAR, Industrial Tree Farm (ITF),
Tree Farm (TF), and Agro-forest Farm (AFF) in 1981. Under a Letter of In-
struction (LOI) No. 1260 in 1982 which created the ISFP, 'forest resources are
to be mobilized for social and economic progress, and that the government
recognizes that the less privileged sectors of society, the kaingineros and
other forest occupants, can be made effective agents in the rehabilitation of
forest lands'.
Two main goals of ISFP are: increase upland production through appropri-
ate farming technology and reforestation. The logic here is that by making
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upland farms productive and their incomes higher, it is assumed that farmers
will have no more reason to move from one clearing site to another. In addi-
tion, by having reforestation activities, farmers can benefit by being
employed in the projects. Thus, they are expected to develop a sense of com-
mitment to conserve the forest resources.
To pursue these goals, the government provides land tenure security to
participants through the issuance of a 25-year Certificate of Stewardship Con-
tract (CSC) which is renewable for another 25 years, depending on partici-
pant's performance. Forest occupants are given three (3) to seven (7) hectares
of land to cultivate and develop wherein a portion (20 percent) should be
planted with trees. All income or proceeds from the land goes to the partici-
pants, including forest products derived or harvested from the area. Technical,
legal and financial assistance is also extended to participants.
2. Community Forestry Program (CFP)
The Community Forestry Program is a joint forest protection and manage-
ment responsibility between DENR and qualified organized rural communities
on residual or existing secondary forest. To stimulate active participation of
local community groups, a 25-year Community Forestry Management Agree-
ment (CFMA) renewable for another 25 years is granted. In addition, the instru-
ment gives the local residents a legitimate access to extract, process, and sell
products from the forest. Organized rural communities may be granted an
area of 500 hectares or more but not exceeding 1,000 hectares.
Recruitment of participants is on a collective basis or by community. Lo-
cal residents have to be organized and to be trained as a legal entity to come
into partnership with the government as the new forest manager and local user
under a controlled and improved system of resource extraction. For CFP being
initiated by LGUs, contracting is usually done in the name of the community
with the mayor or any constitutional or informal head of the village as the rep-
resentative and chairman of the management board for the whole group. To
make participation a real public responsibility and a privilege, the community
participates in the coming up of a forest development plan through public
hearing and consultation. Later, the CFP plan will be integrated in the overall
municipal development plan where public ordinances governing forest devel-
opment and use will be premised.
Under the CFMA, the direct users of the forests are the local communities.
In return, however, CFMA holders are responsible for protecting, managing
and developing the forests. They are required to reforest all open, denuded
and marginal lands within their contracted area, and to plant five (5) seedlings
for every tree harvested during cutting operations. Furthermore, the suitable
portions of up to 30 percent of the area may be developed into agroforestry
farms. In short, the main incentive in this program is the provision of local
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communities' access rights to utilize and dispose of forest resources within
their localities.
3. Contract Reforestation (CR)
The 'snail pace' performance of the government regular reforestation in the
past led to the adoption of Contract Reforestation. Private groups, non-gov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs), local communities and families can enter
into contract with the DENR to carry out tree growing in denuded and barren
areas in the countryside for a three-year period. The participants who are paid
for any reforestation activity, are also allowed to plant cash crops between
rows of seedlings. Cash payments become the main motivating force to attract
participation.
The past regular reforestation was under the full administration of the then
Bureau of Forestry. There was a very limited public involvement and the re-
cruitment of the participants often was politically motivated. Under the con-
tract reforestation, the NGOs and other private and local organizations are mo-
bilized extensively to do the task of project implementation, monitoring and
evaluation. This development is viewed by the author as very strategic in ac-
celerating the pace of reforestation in the country.
4. Forest Land Management Agreement (FLMA)
The Forest Land Management Agreement (FLMA) is a 25-year forestland lease
and a production-sharing arrangement between the DENR and family, commu-
nity and corporate contractors of reforestation. This instrument is meant to
succeed the three-year reforestation contract and the agreement is renewable
for another 25 years.
Under this agreement, the contractor can harvest, process, sell, and other-
wise utilize the products from trees and plants grown on the land. He can also
interplant cash crops, fruit trees, and other agricultural and/or minor forest
products for additional income. In return, the contractor must protect and
maintain the tree farm without any compensation. In addition, he has to adopt
harvesting methods that ensure sustainability of the farm, and has to reforest
areas that are harvested; the same holds true for additional areas not covered
by FLMA.
Since both DENR and the contractor bear the costs, they are entitled to share
the benefits. The Forest Land Manager (FLM) shall pay back 30 percent of the
future proceeds to the DENR a share equivalent to the cost of reforestation dur-
ing the first three to four years of seedling establishment and maintenance.
The FLM will provide funds for maintenance, protection, replanting the area
after each harvest, and for other operating expenses, and profits for its mem-
bers. In short, the main incentives are: cost-benefit sharing, usufruct over the
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area and access to future produce. So far, not many reforestation contracts
have been converted to FLMA yet.
5. Industrial Forest Management Agreement (IFMA)
To ensure the sustained and adequate supply of timber and forest products for
the wood industry in the future, industrial plantation is conceived as alterna-
tive source to the shrinking natural forest in the country. The Industrial Forest
Management Agreement is a 25-year forest lease given to qualified individu-
als, corporations, partnerships, associations and cooperatives to occupy and
possess, in consideration of a specified rental, any forest land of the public
domain between 1,000 hectares and 20,000 hectares for the establishment of
an industrial plantation. The holder of IFMA can avail of Internal Revenue Tax
exempt, reduced forest charges, rentals, credit assistance and usufruct over
the area. Trees and other products planted under IFMA belong to the holder
who shall have the right to harvest, sell and utilize the produce from the plan-
tation. He can also interplant secondary crops between rows of trees. The in-
fusion of private capital in tree growing does not only relieve government's
fund for the activity but also generates rural employment. In practice, IFMA
closely resembles that of the ITP in the past in terms of objective. However,
with regard to local people's participation, the IFMA provides greater chance
for the rural populace to take part than ITP because local groups can more eas-
ily have access themselves to this institutional incentive.
Of the five aforementioned current reforestation approaches, only the ISFP
and Contract Reforestation are presently fully implemented. The achieve-
ments of these two instruments will be discussed below. The CFP, FLMA and
IFMA are presently (i.e., 1993) still in the pilot testing. As a guide, Table 5
presents the various incentive system for each program.
Table 5.


































all: referring to all legal entities e.g. universities, corporations, communities, NGOs etc.
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3.4.2 The performance of Integrated Social Forestry Programs
The main incentive for participation in ISFP is the 25-year stewardship lease
agreement which can be renewed for another 25 years. The effect of the in-
strument on participants' motivation towards tree growing is somewhat diffi-
cult to determine because of the absence of appropriate indicators.
Roughly, 50 percent of the 807 (of the total of 1,068) projects assessed by
the defunct Bureau of Forest Development in 1984, were involved in agro-
forestry nursery activities (Aquino et al., 1987). Over the three-year period
there were 700 agroforestry nurseries established nationwide, covering an
area of almost 200 hectares with a cumulative total planting stock of 28 mil-
lion seedlings raised. In 1985, about 21 million seedlings were distributed to
the participants. This claim, however, does not give a clear picture of the indi-
vidual participant's involvement in agroforestry on his iSFP-farm. A better
basis of assessing the incentive's effectiveness should be the voluntary partic-
ipation of farmers in tree growing on their farms rather than the area covered
or the number of nurseries added or seedlings raised over time.
In an ISF project in the Cagayan Valley Region, Pasicolan (1991) noticed
that participants lacked interest in tree growing inside their iSFP-farms despite
the rigorous campaign conducted by the DENR and F/FRED-winrock Multipur-
pose Tree Species Project in the area. Tree growing as one condition in the
2 5-year Stewardship Contract should have motivated the farmers to take ad-
vantage of the free seedlings and other assistance offered by the project. Two
nurseries were constructed for the production of Multi-Purpose Tree Species
seedlings. When the seedlings were ready for transplanting, only 6 out of the
18 farmers asked for seedlings for their farm. Apparently, the 'wage-for-
work-done' mentality introduced by the early DENR field staff had ruined the
motivation of participants who were asked in the present project to construct
hedgerows and terraces along the contours of their farmlands.
There appears to be no real guarantee that farmers will respond to tree
growing by means of a land tenure arrangement in itself. The response varies
with the type of socio-cultural or political settings participants used to live in.
For the Ikalahan, a forest dwelling community in Sta. Fe Nueva Viscaya, se-
curity of tenure appeared to be an appropriate solution to their land dispute
problems. For years they were subjected to constant threats of ejection by
land speculators. When the area was finally declared under ISFP, there was a
significant progress in forest regeneration and protection carried out by this
tribe (Rice, 1984). Here, the recognition of the tribe's ancestral domain had
strongly improved people's participation in forest protection.
In contrast, Maus and Schieferli (1989) found that in the regular refores-
tation site in Liwanag, Tumauini, the disputed land rights had caused continu-
ous burning down of the project. According to local residents, portions of the
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project site used to be their farmlands under usufruct, prior to the project's
implementation. As an attempt to resolve the problem, a proposal to convert
the project area into ISFP by the DENR was presented. However, the local peo-
ple felt that the Certificate of Stewardship Contract (CSC), the 25-year land
tenure provision of ISFP did not go far enough and they wanted the area to be
fully privatized (Interview of CVPED conference participants, 1991 ).
From a legal viewpoint, the apprehension of the local people in the above
mentioned project area is somewhat legitimate. One limitation of the steward-
ship contract, indeed, is its being just a lease contract. It is often considered
inadequate as it has a limited term. Its validity only holds true under certain
conditions. Also, it cannot be used as collateral for loans because it is not
bankable since it can be revoked anytime by administrative action.
As an overall assessment of the impact of the program during its first
seven years, Sajise (1991) is sceptical that the provision of land tenure alone
can motivate and sustain participation in upland conservation and develop-
ment in the long run. However, he still views the program as a potential major
vehicle for developing capacities, values and orientation, skills and technol-
ogy to harmonize the existence of the present occupants of the uplands with
their environment.
3.4.3 The initial performance of Contract Reforestation
The National Forestation Program's accomplishment targets were mostly an-
chored on the Contract Reforestation. The Philippines staked its credibility to
the lending banks being highly optimistic that the new reforestation approach
in the country would be a show case for the ADB's expanded plans for
environmental lending. This posed a strong pressure for the DENR to set unre-
alistic goals in order to justify the huge loans acquired (Korten, 1993).
It was a good show at the start, because for the first time in the history of
reforestation in the country the pace of tree planting far exceeded the target
goal for that period. However, this was a short-lived gain. The sustainability
of people's participation began to decline in the second and third years of the
contract. Based on the findings of many field evaluators there was a lower
performance in terms of actual number of seedlings that survived, compared
with what was initially reported during the tree planting phase.
The sub-optimal average performance of the program was partly attributed
to participants' lack of technical preparation (ANGOC, 1991). However, the
DENR's administrative limitations claimed to have aggravated the problem
(Korten, 1993). The effects of cash payment on participants' project perfor-
mance are presented below.
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a. Effect on environmental goal
Most participants viewed the program as a mere livelihood option rather than
as a means to protect the environment (ANGOC, 1991). Accordingly, some ISFP
farmers abandoned their farms to join nearby contract reforestation projects,
because they were allured by the immediate income. At the program level,
there was a pressure to spend the huge funds regardless of the manner. Some-
times there were overlaps in the selection of project sites. A number of refor-
estation areas apparently already under the regular program, were designated
as new planting areas (Personal Interview, 1991). More specifically, Umali
(1989) identified three drawbacks with respect to the environmental goal.
First, the simple order to the field to 'plant, plant and plant' to reach the
plantation establishment targets, only diverted the program's real qualitative
goals/objectives (e.g., social equity, provide labour, sustainable development,
and the necessity to maintain an established plantation).
Secondly, the choice of species was almost ad hoc. There was no prior and
proper attention given to site characteristics, end-uses of the wood and the
marketing aspects. The choice was just based on the availability of seeds.
Thirdly, the specific purpose of the plantation and the intended end-use of
the wood and other produce were seldom specified. Also, there was no
assessment of the economic, social and environmental viability of the pro-
jects.
b. Participants ' socio-economic condition
Many participants claimed that the contract reforestation program was econ-
omically beneficial. Some invested their project's earnings to start a new live-
lihood option, others used their income for their children's schooling (NFP,
Vol. l,Nos2, 3,1990 & Vol. 2, No. 1,1991).
While many claimed that they were benefited, others were further
exploited, however. In the case of the Matigsalug-ug ethnic group in the Sinu-
da Contract Reforestation Project (ANGOC, 1991 ) it was reported that:
'The natives were initially eager to work for the reforestation because the
contractors promised a high compensation rate. But wages were often de-
layed up to six months after their tasks had been completed. The contrac-
tors would instead offer them 'value' sheets to purchase goods from the
contractors' stores. Food sold in these stores was extremely expensive
which resulted in lower cash incomes. The natives experienced that pay
arrangements were arbitrarily revised. For example, they were promised
payment of P 900/hectare for planting. Yet many said they were only paid
half of this. This situation angered many workers and prompted them to
sabotage the program by throwing away seedlings instead of planting
them.'
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c. Effect on NGOs ' and Local People 's participation
The mushrooming of participating NGOs and community local organizations
in such a short a time is very evident. During the period of 1989-90 alone, the
DENR granted contracts to 9,594 families, 2,911 community associations, 465
corporations, and 142 local government units (Metin, 1991). This is in con-
trast to the 189 regular reforestation projects the government had maintained
by December 1990. Up to June 1991, more than 20,000 contracts had been
processed and were envisioned to be in full operation soon. In addition, eighty
five percent (85%) of the 622 accredited NGOs were enlisted to assess and
evaluate DENR contract reforestation projects throughout the country (NFP,
Vol. 2, No. 1, 1991). However, not all of them were really committed to the
cause of the program. Many developmental NGOs were much disturbed by the
increasing number of 'fly-by-night' NGOs formed by individuals who simply
wanted reforestation contracts and had no commitment to poverty alleviation
or environmental restoration (Korten, 1993).
d. Actual Field Performance
Based on the DENR field evaluation report of 1991, there seems to be a sharp
contrast between past achievement and the present contract reforestation.
During 1988-1990 alone, there were about 154,127 hectares reforested as
compared to the 274,270 hectares planted under the regular reforestation pro-
jects during the past many decades. In addition, the DENR claimed that defor-
estation has radically dropped to 17,401 hectares and reforestation had in-
creased to 104,110 hectares from 1987 to 1988. In 1989, 131,404 hectares
were reforested when the annual target was 100,000 hectares. If this rate of
reforestation would have been sustained, undoubtedly, this would have
exceeded the targeted total area of 225,000 hectares to be rehabilitated until
the end of 1992. Quoting the impression of the team leader of the ADB Project
Evaluation Mission in August 10, 1990, 'The National Forestation Program
has shown commendable progress with all the targets having been met or sub-
stantially exceeded'.
However, despite this high commendation of the donor institutions about
the initial accomplishment of the program, it was still too early that time to
conclude that the present reforestation scheme is indeed successful. In most
projects evaluated by ICRDF (1991) and HGAI (1991) in Pangasinan and Mar-
induque, respectively, in the past three years tree planting was reported to be
more successful than seedling maintenance and protection. The separate eval-
uation made by NPCO-NFA (1991) of the 41 OSEC-funded community refores-
tation projects in Nueva Ecija did not mention any significant physical
accomplishment of most projects assessed. Instead, it highlighted the poor
seedling protection. The ICRDF (1991) shared these findings in one of the big-
gest contract reforestation projects in Tarlac.
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Because the field assessments generally registered more failure than suc-
cessful performance, the DENR's reforestation achievement report was proba-
bly merely based on selected good cases which in addition only focused on
the total area planted rather than on the area actually maintained and pro-
tected.
e. Participants ' environmental behaviour
To some degree, the program has heightened participants' environmental
awareness (NFA Bulletin, 1991). However, with the recurrence of grassland
fires and other related destructive activities taking place in most project sites,
local people's participation became questionable. Some speculated that the
delay in releasing funds, extortion and envy induced participants to sabotage
the projects (NPCO-NFP Internal Report, 1991 ; HGAI, 1991 ).
Most participants probably interpret the program just as an employment
activity. The cash-oriented and employment generation aspect of the program
overwhelmed the value of environmental concern in the participants' mind. In
Dy Abra, some local residents, who used to plant trees voluntarily in their
farms and communal areas, began to associate tree planting with payment
after the contract reforestation project was introduced in the area (Pasicolan,
1991). This coincides with what Goodin (1982) and Jack & Jack (1989) im-
plied in their Moral Domain Theory. Accordingly, every decision could only
be treated in one domain (i.e., either 'care' or 'homo economicus', whichever
prevails over the other) because the two are incompatible with each other.
Furthermore, the basis of decision cannot be fixed but rather changes depend-
ing on the prevailing drive.
Also organisational problems have been reported. The recent NPCO-NFP
evaluation of 23 projects in Nueva Ecija mentioned the claim of some partici-
pants that there were contractors using dummy organizations, so that they
could act as presidents to obtain more contracts. It was also discovered that
most of them only undertook reforestation for profit motives. This is in accor-
dance with the observed prevalence of many 'fly by night' contractors and
NGOs(ANGOC, 1991).
3.4.4 Information gaps and research issues
Based on the aforementioned results and findings of using tenurial and finan-
cial instruments for participation in the ISFP and the Contract Reforestation
respectively, the following information gaps and research issues can be iden-
tified.
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1. Perception of the instrument by the target group
The experience with tenurial arrangement under ISFP has revealed the varying
relevance of the instrument with respect to different types of participants. For
example, the 25-year Certificate of Stewardship Agreement may be viewed
by the DENR as appropriate to meet uplanders' quest for land rights. However,
there were ISFP participants who perceived it as insufficient. There are in-
stances wherein the instrument fits participants' needs; then, tree growing
becomes an incentive to legitimize further an ownership claim over the area.
This is for instance at stake in the case of tribal communities like the Ikalahan.
But in general, it seems that the current contract is not perceived as suffi-
ciently strong.
In the case of Contract Reforestation, most participants view the program
as employment generation rather than as an environmental endeavour,
because every activity is tied with cash payment. In some project sites, how-
ever, contract reforestation functions well. These good projects have some
success attributes which are worthwhile to investigate.
Given the long experience with tenurial instruments under ISFP and the
initial performance of paid labour in the case of the Contract Reforestation,
the transition from the latter instrument to FLMA is rather uncertain. There-
fore, there is a need to study further the various contexts in which the instru-
ments do and do not function well to determine their optimum effectiveness
and limitations.
2. Effect of the instrument on sustainable participation
While direct cash payment can arouse instant and widespread participation,
based on the preliminary findings from the literature review, it appears that
the effect of this incentive can not guarantee sustained project involvement in
the long-run. Amongst others this was manifested by the incurrence of partici-
pants' behavioural problems associated with the irregularity of project cash
flow. In this respect, it is important therefore to examine how financial instru-
ments in the form of paid labour can contribute to participant's sustainable
environmental behaviour. Both its comparative effectiveness and the possibil-
ities to combine it with other instruments should be studied.
3. Transition period
The contractor's financial and technical preparation are two major factors that
may impinge on the smooth transition from paid labour arrangement to FLMA.
A subsistent FLMA holder may be tempted later on to go back to his initial
livelihood or may search off-farm jobs since it is not sufficient for him to de-
pend on the direct cash earnings from maintaining and protecting the project.
The probability that this will happen is high because there will be no immedi-
ate income options directly linked with the project.
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In short, there is a need to examine contractor's considerations for sus-
tained project participation to determine the bottomline of his long-term in-
volvement after the three-year contract payment has expired.
4. Appropriate project performance indicators
In the DENR's project performance evaluation, the number of hectares planted
and the rate of seedling survival constitute the main basis for the alleged suc-
cess. There is no weight given to the social, economic and psychological as-
pects of actor's participation. In the long-run, such a performance evaluation
scheme is too limited because the socioeconomic and psychological factors
are crucial for real long-term project survival. In this regard, it is equally im-
portant to determine participants' perceptions, motivations and project behav-
iour. Such parameters will provide an empirical explanation of the project's
physical performance and will be a better indicator of future success. The dy-
namics of participant's behavioural changes resulting from the shift of incen-
tive system is as equally important as his field accomplishment in the project
monitoring process.
3.5 Summary and General Conclusions
This section briefly summarizes the findings of this chapter. It also presents a
few general conclusions gleaned from the literature study.
3.5.1 Local people 's participation in forestry programs
In the past, forestry practice was mainly focused on industry needs. Towards
the 80s, the emergence of Social Forestry marked the beginning of people-
oriented programs with emphasis on tree growing for rural needs. People's
participation became a magic catch-word in most forestry projects to high-
light the call for massive local involvement in forest development.
Experiences in various countries revealed that tree growing by rural
farmers may be conditioned by one or more of the followings factors:
a. direct household needs: e.g., fuelwood, fodder, food, housing and fencing
materials and other tree-related needs;
b. income: earning from direct sales of tree products;
c. land tenure: it determines farmer's spontaneity and sustainability in tree
growing;
d. security over future tree produce: tree grower's future access over the pro-
duce from the project, which is usually associated with tenurial security;
e. management arrangement: localized and semi-autonomous project
planning and implementation;
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f. soil conservation: if this factor becomes a critical condition for the promo-
tion of sustainability of own resources (short-term cropping) then farmers
will find an incentive in growing trees.
There is not yet a clear picture of how the different factors or conditions for
spontaneous tree growing work in different situations. Much even less there is
one encompassing theory which explains the different types of farmers'
responses to possible tree growing programs of the government. However,
existing theories can contribute together, in that they explain specific parts or
aspects of the farmers' behaviour.
3.5.2 Incentive systems in forestry programs
The long gestation period of tree crops, coupled with many risks, makes tree
growing a less acceptable livelihood option among most rural farmers. Incen-
tive systems are introduced to remove farmers' constraints and to increase the
feasibility of tree growing investment. Among the common incentives used in
forestry programs are:
a. Paid labour, it can stimulate instant and massive participation, but is in-
sufficient by itself. It must be complemented with or backed up by other
incentives.
b. Land tenure: this is a critical condition for active and sustainable tree
growing on public lands. If it is secured and clearly defined along with
other incentives, farmers may well invest in long-term tree crops. How-
ever, under a vague or insecure tenurial arrangement, project participation
tends to become erratic, conditional and problematic.
c. Access to future produce: this incentive always goes with security of land
tenure. Both support each other in effect. When local people are assured of
access from the tree produce apart from the other direct incentives gained
from participation, their involvement in plantation maintenance and pro-
tection on public or communal lands may likely be sustained. However, if
access to future produce is not provided, participation tends to be super-
ficial and conditional.
d. Cost-benefit sharing: this is advantageous to poor farmers without initial
financial capital whose main project input is land or labour. However, this
would pose a problem on participation if the sharing arrangement is not
equitable from the viewpoint of any of the contracting parties in the pro-
ject.
e. Subsidy: it is often applied to change the allocation of the means of pro-
duction. Its application can be necessary to motivate private individuals to
engage in projects of high social value but with a low rate of return in the
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short-run. However, it should not be too excessive, otherwise it may well
become uneconomical from the government's viewpoint or it may even
rain participant's initiative for environmental sound behaviour.
f. Loans/credits: these are meant to solve cash flow problems or lack of capi-
tal to start and sustain a tree growing project. If granted with low interest
and a grace period corresponding to the time until the tree crops are mar-
ketable, this instrument will benefit resource-poor farmers.
g. Market incentive: this is a very powerful incentive that can attract sponta-
neous and private tree growing. With a ready market and promising price
of wood, farmers will be encouraged to invest in tree plantation, especially
for fast growing species.
Each incentive has its own distinct role and degree of effect on sustainable
participation. However, in practice, no single incentive can exist by itself. It is
always complemented with or succeeded by another instrument. As to their
relevance, it appeared from the literature that the most crucial factors to sus-
tainable and spontaneous tree growing on public lands are the following: the
market incentive and land tenure and/or access to future produce.
3.5.3 Incentives in the earlier Philippine reforestation programs
Reforestation in the Philippines is an old national policy concern which was
also shared by most upland development programs in the past. Included
among the early tree growing strategies initiated by both the government and
the private forest industry on public lands were the following programs: 1)
Forest Occupancy Management (FOM), 2) Communal Tree Farming (CTF), 3)
Family Approach to Reforestation (FAR), 4) Regular Reforestation (RF), and
5) Industrial Tree Plantation (FTP). To gain the public participation, various
incentives were used. Experiences with these programs revealed the follow-
ing effects of the incentives used on participants' project behaviour.
a. Paid labour, when regularly given on a continuous basis, participation is
generally high. However, it is a risky approach because it does not really
result in a sustainable tree growing activity, especially if it is regarded as
an end in itself. The overall effect has been poor as manifested by the low
program output in the past.
b. Land tenure: if it is secured, farmers generally responded positively to tree
growing. Both clarity and duration of tenure made the participants of the
tree farm projects confident to plant trees in their areas even though the in-
strument was just simply under leasehold agreement.
c. Access to future produce: the sustainability of the indigenous forest man-
agement system developed by the Ifugao lies mainly in the tree growers'
assurance of future access over the tree crops they planted. The 'Pinugo' is
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a family-owned forest and it integrates Ifugao culture with the environ-
ment.
d. Loan/credit: this incentive proves to be effective in stimulating the sus-
tained interest of small tree farm holders to engage in farm forestry. Small
farmers' participation in plantation establishment in private lands in-
creased when loans were made available.
e. Market: with a sure market along with production loans, small tree holders
at the PICOP Southern Philippines were encouraged to shift from annual
cropping to tree cropping. This incentive strongly motivates the small
farmers to grow trees in their private lands.
Based on the literature review about the performance of the various incentives
in the previous reforestation approaches in the Philippines, security of land
tenure appeared to have the strongest positive effect on farmers' motivation to
grow trees on public lands. In private tree growing however, both provision of
loans and market incentives appeared to be crucial in farm and industrial for-
estry.
3.5.4 Incentives ' impact on the current reforestation program
Under the new reforestation scheme on public lands, the government pres-
ently adopts the following programs: 1) Integrated Social Forestry Program
(ISFP), 2) Community Forestry Program (CFP), 3) Contract Reforestation (CR),
4) Forest Land Management Agreement (FLMA), and 5) Industrial Forest
Management Agreement (IFMA). Due to the recent emergence of some of
these programs, only the Integrated Social Forestry Program and the Contract
Reforestation were included in this review because in practice they have al-
ready been fully implemented nationwide for a certain number of years.
In the ISFP, the 25-year stewardship or leasehold contract as a tenurial ar-
rangement between the government and the farmer appears to have varying
effects with respect to the different socio-cultural backgrounds of the partici-
pants. Among the tribal groups, the leasehold contract in principle can suffice
their quest for security over their ancestral domain which redounds to strong
cooperation in forest development. However, on the overall effect the instru-
ment seems not sufficient to meet most participants' aspirations for a truly
secured tenure. This was manifested by the lack of voluntary response of the
participants to tree growing or adoption of soil conservation measures in their
ISFP farms.
The Contract Reforestation on the other hand, shows both signs of success
and failure as based on the preliminary findings of the field evaluation carried
out in its second year of implementation. As a cash incentive-based program,
people are paid to plant and maintain forest species seedlings on public lands
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for three years. Among its good effects on the overall attainment of the refor-
estation goals are:
1. there is a greater public participation compared to the results of the regular
reforestation program. Various NGOs, People's Organizations, Local Gov-
ernment Units, individual households and other private and local groups
were fully mobilized;
2. there is a relatively higher attainment of social equity, compared to the
past regular reforestation scheme, in which employment benefits were
confined within a very limited group. As such, the economic benefits from
participation is widely spread over the rural communities;
3. there is an immense participation of NGOs, People's Organization and
other local groups in the building up of community institutions as well as
in the monitoring and evaluation activities of the program;
4. in general, the most obvious characteristic of the current reforestation pro-
gram is its accelerated pace of tree planting as a result of massive public
participation.
On the other hand, the program implementation suffered a great setback, par-
ticularly caused by the huge ADB loan, which outmatched the DENR's bureau-
cratic capacity. Among the negative repercussions evidently observed are:
1. the large environmental loans forced unrealistic targets for the implement-
ing agency. The consequences were: haphazard recruitment of contractors,
mushrooming of 'fly-by-night' and dummy NGOs, delineation of in-
appropriate areas for planting, rigid compliance to a prescribed field plan,
unscrupulous program spendings resulting to graft and corruption;
2. the late releases of contract payments derailed the program. Subsistent
participants were much affected and were forced to quit prematurely or to
participate inconsistently and conditionally. However, those above sub-
sistence level endured to remain in the project until they were able to ob-
tain a lumpsum of the delayed project earnings;
3. the Contract Reforestation was perceived by most participants as merely
an employment rather than as an environmental program. Those who di-
rectly depended on the project for subsistence had erratic, intermittent,
conditional and problematic involvement in seedling protection and
maintenance;
4. there was a remarkable field accomplishment in the first year in terms of
number of hectares awarded and planted. The succeeding years were char-
acterized by premature abandonment of the project, deliberate burning and
low seedling survival. This dramatic turn of events coincided with the late
releases of payments and the reduced expected project earnings in the sec-
ond and third year of implementation.
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3.5.5 Contract Reforestation Sustainability Conditions
From the above mentioned preliminary findings, the following are some con-
ditions for contractor's sustained participation:
1. contract payment should be given equitably and regularly;
2. community contracts should have a real and strong organizational control
that emanates from the group's majority decision or aspiration;
3. contractor's initial development plans and options for the site should be
integrated in the over all reforestation plan;
4. accomodate contractor's species and plant spacing references;
5. introduce or diversify contractor's subsistent patterns preferably a liveli-
hood linked to tree growing;
6. provision of other incentives in kind (e.g., fencing materials, farming in-
puts or animals);
7. equipping contractors and labourers with social and technical preparation.
3.5.6 Contractor's options
The following are among the possible project options of contractors:
1. the subsistent contractors would prematurely abandon the project in search
of immediate source of earnings in case of prolonged delays of payment;
2. disgusted subsistent contractors may likely abandon the project and would
even be tempted to sabotage it;
3. under a good climatic and soil condition, landless subsistent contractors
may simultaneously intercrop between seedlings in the project area;
4. rich contractors with initial development plans for the project area may be
interested to pursue longer participation beyond the three years contract;
5. contractors representing tribal or strongly organized communities may
continue to participate in protecting the project even after the three year
contract expires prior to the awarding of the FLMA.
3.5.7 General conclusions
Based on the findings obtained from the various experiences in the Philip-
pines and in other countries, a number of factors or success conditions for sus-
tainable tree growing were roughly identified. Although there is already some
initial picture of how these different factors work, it is still quite unclear the
extent to which one factor works individually or in combination with other
factors to attain a long-term success under different conditions. Hence, there
is a need to examine in what context a certain incentive works and when it
does not function well. Also, it is equally important to investigate how the
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various incentives for tree growing complement or support each other to bring
about the desired outcome in the long-run.
3.6 Research Questions
There is a rather varying but predominantly insufficient and even negative
result of the contract reforestation program up to now. In addition, there is a
dearth of information about the conditions which are essential for the success-
ful implementation of paid labour as an instrument for participation. Given
the assumption that paid labour is still a powerful tool, which can or has to be
profitably used in the Philippine reforestation program, the following re-
search questions can be formulated:
1. What is the bottomline of actor's sustained participation in the three-year
contract reforestation period of the program?
2. What are the various success conditions for and the determinant factors of
farmers'/participants' sustained project involvement after the three-year
contract payment has expired?
3. To which extent can these success conditions and determinant factors be
differentiated with respect to different situations?
4. How can these success conditions to sustainable tree growing be possibly
enhanced and sustained in the Philippines?
Research Structure and Methodology
4.1 General Research Structure
The field investigation of this study consisted of three main parts: 1) contrast
analysis, 2) validation study and 3) investigation of spontaneous tree growing
activities.
4.1.1 Part I: Contrast analysis
A comparative assessment between successful and not successful reforesta-
tion projects was conducted in Cagayan Valley region. The aim was to ident-
ify the various parameters related to contractor's successful project perform-
ance. It examined the effect of paid labour (as instrument for participation)
and the other exogenous factors on his sustained seedling protection and
maintenance in the second and last year of the three-year contract period.
From this analysis the various conditions for project success and the back-
ground factors behind them were identified and analyzed. The findings from
this analysis served as baseline data for the further study in other tree growing
projects included in this research.
4.1.2 Part II: Validation study
This was an independent follow up study carried out in selected successful
reforestation projects in other regions in Luzon Island. The primary objective
was to test whether the success parameters determined in Part I (contrast anal-
ysis) correspond to those in other regions in the country. Also, this validation
study tried to identify other possible success parameters and the background
factors behind them that seemed to be not evident in the earlier study.
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4.1.3 Part III: Investigation of spontaneous tree growing
An extended field investigation was carried out in spontaneous tree growing
activities in the same locations of a number of unsuccessful government re-
forestation projects. The purpose of this research was to validate whether or
not the success parameters present in government-sponsored reforestation
projects would also hold true for spontaneous tree growing projects through
farmers' initiatives. On the basis of this analysis, it may also be worthwhile
for DENR to develop a policy aimed at stimulating these spontaneous tree
growing activities.
4.2 The Conceptual Framework of the Analysis
In all these three parts of the study, a four-step procedure was followed con-
sistently throughout (see Fig. 1). These steps were:
1. assessment of project performance, in terms of seedling survival. Based on
DENR's performance evaluation criteria, the 80 percent seedling survival
served as the ultimate basis of project success;
2. assessment of participants' behaviour in terms of their performed activi-
ties. The term 'participant' is a collective name to mean both contractor
and labourer. What distinguishes one from the other is that the contractor,
being the primary actor, has a formal role and with a definite tenure of pro-
ject involvement. In contrast, a labourer in most cases, is someone who is
hired on a daily basis without a definite duration. Often, he participates
mainly to earn an immediate income from the reforestation activities. In
practice, the contractor has a higher stake and a moral responsibility over
the project than the labourer, being the very person who entered into
agreement with the DENR;
3. identification of the contractor's motivations, in terms of the various con-
ditions for his sustained participation in seedling maintenance and protec-
tion for the first three-year period of the project. By determining the bot-
tomline motivation for his participation, this provided an empirical basis
in explaining his project behaviour;
4. identification of the background factors determining contractor's motiv-
ation for participation. These were broadly categorized under three major
components of the project setting:
a. site's characteristics comprised the biophysical and tenurial features of
the project site;
b. contractor's characteristics comprised his socioeconomic condition as
well as his personal traits and attributes;
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c. project management's characteristics comprised the program's imple-











Conceptual framework of the analysis
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In Part I and II, the key respondents were contractors in government refores-
tation projects. In Part III however, they were individual farmers and tree
growers without contracts from the DENR and government introduced incen-
tives.
4.3 Set-Up and Methodology of the Contrast Analysis
4.3.1 Set-up
The set-up of the Contrast Analysis consisted of three stages:!) site selection,
2) exploratory investigation and 3) in- depth investigation.
Stage 1: Site selection
There were four project sites in Cagayan Valley region selected for the con-
trast analysis. The selection criteria were rather broad and were based on the
level of project performance and geographical distribution according to each
province. The core point was that two 'successful' and two 'not-successful'
projects were selected based on the most recent results of the DENR's field
performance evaluation. All four projects were in their second year of oper-
ation. Table 6. presents the project site locations.
Table 6.
Location and distinctive features of the four case study sites selected in
Cagayan Valley Region













Stage 2: Exploratory investigation
The aim of this investigation was to identify the conditions and factors that
distinguish the performance between successful and not-successful projects.
Since the main focus of the study was to evaluate the effect of financial incen-
tive in the form of paid labour on local actors' project participation, the effect
of this instrument was used as starting unit of inquiry. However, the focus of
the analysis was centred on the various conditions for contractor's sustained
project participation. This stage was regarded as the 'scanning phase' because
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it tried to identify roughly all variable factors that would seem to have a bear-
ing on project performance.
Stage 3: In-depth investigation
The conditions for actor's sustained project participation identified in the Ex-
ploratory Analysis were further probed. This stage was regarded as the 'focus-
ing phase' because each condition for sustained participation was thoroughly
examined. The purpose of this stage was to identify and characterize the vari-
ous background factors that enhance or suppress the setting of each condition
for sustained participation.
4.3.2 Methodology for site selection
The DENR regional Office was first referred to for background information
about status of the reforestation projects in the region. This provided a prelim-
inary basis for site selection. Various sites were identified both for the suc-
cessful and unsuccessful projects. The DENR basis for success is measured in
terms of seedling survival. For a project to be rated as successful it should
have a seedling survival not lower than 80 percent of the total seedlings plant-
ed per contract.
A field visitation was conducted in the different projects sites recom-
mended by the DENR to select the four case study sites. The Rapid Rural Sys-
tem Appraisal Method (Sajise et al., 1991) was used for site profiling. Key
informant interviews were also carried out to obtain the pertinent baseline
information related to the study.
4.3.3 Methodology of the exploratory investigation
a. Activities
An actual project field performance assessment was conducted through actual
field observation and measurements. This was to validate the DENR's seedling
survival inventory made earlier. A series of interviews with reforestation par-
ticipants followed. The purpose was to determine whether or not there is a
relationship between project performance and actors' motivation for partici-
pation. An instrument to rate contractor's project behaviour and other socio-
economic variables influencing his motivation was used in the assessment
(see Appendix 1).
b. Respondents
A total of 202 respondents (i.e., 52 contractors and 150 hired daily wage la-
bourers) were interviewed. There were two separate interviews made to dis-
tinguish between primary actors' (contractor) and peripheral actors' (hired
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wage labourers) participation. Although the latter formed the main work
force, they do not have a formalized role and certainty of longer involvement
in the project. In practice, only the contractor had permanency and moral re-
sponsibility over the project.
c. Social inquiry technique
Participant observation, direct, unstructured and informal interviews were the
main tools for the data collection in this stage. Here, respondents' perception,
motivations and behaviour towards the project were examined. Vayda's
(1983) Progressive Contextualization concept combined with De Groot's
(1992) Actor-in-Context analysis provided practical insights in carrying out
the field interviews. Three basic principles were observed in the interview:
1. there should be no a priori framework set about the problem to be inves-
tigated or any predetermined structure of questions in order not to pre-
empt a bias judgement about any perceived deviation from the normative
actor's behaviour. The premise was 'all human actions are rational in their
own context';
2. there should be no fixed system boundary set, to pursue the 'element of
surprise' which may disguisedly be hidden beyond the domain of the cho-
sen object of the field inquiry. Here, it is important to keep track of the
context of every action link to the problem under investigation and to de-
fine the who, what, where, when and why dimensions of the inquiry. With
this approach, the researcher can switch from one unit of analysis to an-
other as called for by the situation;
3. the analysis should start from the actor's problematic activity and continu-
ously pursue towards getting into the core of the problem as more actors
and activities linked to the activity are being investigated with progressing
context.
4.3.4 Methodology of the in-depth investigation
Since the in-depth study was a follow up of the exploratory investigation, the
same field interview approach and tools were used in the inquiry. In this stage
however, the research inquiry was more focused on the last step of the frame-
work of the analysis (Fig. 1), i.e., the identification of the various background
factors to actor's sustained participation in the project. Also, the interview
was confined at the contractors because they are the direct actors who have a
formal role with a more defined interest in the project than the daily wage la-
bourers. The concluding part of this stage was the Chi-square test of signifi-
cance of the various conditions which seemingly have a bearing on contrac-
tor's sustainable participation in seedling protection and maintenance.
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Chi-Square Test was used because it fitted the type of data, which were
organized in 2 x 2 blocks (success/no-success and factor/no-factor). It is a
measure of a significance of a difference between two populations (is factor A
distributed in the successful population diffently from in the unsuccessful
population?). The sample being drawn was two out of the population of suc-
cessful projects and two out of the population of unsuccessful projects in
Cagayan Valley, generating a larger number of contractors in these projects.
The basic condition for applying Chi-Square Test, that E (expected value) is
larger than 5 was satisfied.
4.4 Set-Up and Methodology of the Validation Study
4.4.1 Set-up
Stage 1: Site selection and profiling
Five additional successful government reforestation projects located in other
regions in Luzon Island were selected as a follow up of the four case studies
in Cagayan Valley. The main features of the project sites were examined in
relation to their biophysical and contractors' characteristics.
Stage 2: Exploratory investigation
The aim of the analysis was to identify and examine the conditions of contrac-
tor's sustained participation in seedling protection and maintenance as well as
the background factors behind these conditions in the five additional success-
ful government projects.
Stage 3: Validation and identification of new variables
The aim of this stage was to compare the success conditions and background
factors obtained from the four case studies in Cagayan Valley (in the contrast
analysis) with that of the five additional projects. Also, it was intended to de-
termine other variables to contractor's sustained project participation that
were not present in the earlier case studies.
4.4.2 Site selection and profiling methodology
a. Criteria for site selection
The five additional sites were selected based on the following criteria. First,
the project should have a successful field performance with at least an average
seedling survival of 80 percent for the three successive years of the contract
period. Secondly, the project should be due for turn over by the DENR to the
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contractors for FLMA. Thirdly, each project site must represent one region in
Luzon. Table 7 presents the geographical location for each project.
Table 7.
Geographical locations of the five additional case studies in other regions
Project Location Region
Sta. Marcela Kalinga, Mountain Province Cordillera Autonomous Region
Labney Mayontoc, Tarlac Central Luzon
Bugallon Bugallon, Pangasinan Ilocos Region
Cavinti Cavinti, Laguna Southern Tagalog Region
Virac Virac, Catanduanes Bicol Region
b. Activities
The National Reforestation Coordinating Office at the DENR Central Office
was consulted in the selection of the study sites. After determining the sites,
an ocular inspection and field interviews with the prospective FLMA contrac-
tors were conducted.
c. Research tools
A rapid assessment of the project site was done using the Rapid Rural System
Appraisal Approach. For the field interviews, the same research tools were
used as in the contrast analysis study.
4.4.3 Exploratory investigation methodology
The same social survey tools and approach in the first four case studies in
Cagayan Valley were applied in the conduct of interviews with respondents in
the five additional study sites. Likewise, the four steps of pursuing the re-
search inquiry in the contrast analysis study were also used with Fig. 1 as a
basis.
4.4.4 In-depth investigation methodology
The validation of the earlier findings in Cagayan Valley with the research re-
sults in the additional five projects investigated was done by comparison and
contrast. The identification of the new variable factors to contractor's sus-
tained project participation was accomplished in the process of doing the ex-
ploratory investigation.
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4.5 Set-Up and Methodology of the Investigation of
Spontaneous Tree Growing Activities
4.5.1 Set-up
Stage 1: Discovery of observation sites and profiling
Four sites with spontaneous tree growing activities by individual farmers
were included in order to compare with and validate the research findings
obtained in the nine government-sponsored tree growing projects. The main
features of each observation site were examined with much focus on the farm-
ers' background and attitudes in relation to tree growing. Table 8 presents the
geographical location of the sites of the four spontaneous tree growing activi-
ties.
Table 8.
Geographical locations of the sites of the four spontaneous tree growing activities by
individual farmers
Observation site Location
1. Quibal Penablanca, Cagayan
2. Maguirig Solana, Cagayan
3. Nagtimog Diadi, Nueva Viscaya
4. Timmaguab Sta. Ignacia, Tarlac
Stage 2: Exploratory investigation
The aim of the analysis was to identify and examine the conditions of farm-
ers' spontaneous tree growing activities and the background factors behind
these conditions in the four observation sites.
Stage 3: Validation and identification of new variables
The aim of this stage was to compare the success conditions and background
factors obtained in the nine government tree growing projects with that of the
spontaneous projects. Likewise, it was intended to determine other pertinent
variables to successful tree growing which may apply to both government and
spontaneous tree growing projects.
4.5.2 Discovery of observation sites and area profiling
The discovery of the four observation sites was accidental but was mainly
inspired by the 'look for and enhance contrast' general guiding principle in
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De Groot's (1992) Action-In-Context Research Method. By looking for ac-
tors who appear to be in the same circumstances as those first identified but
who do not carry out the problematic activities (i.e., deliberate burning or pre-
mature abandonment of the project, undue grazing, conditional participation,
etc.), the location of the spontaneous tree growing activities were discovered
through evaluating a number of unsuccessful government projects in the same
sites.
The same profiling method was used as in the first two sets of case studies.
4.5.3 Exploratory and in-depth investigation methodologies
The same exploratory and in-depth investigation methodologies in the vali-
dation study on the government tree growing projects were applied for the
spontaneous tree growing activities.
4.6 Summary of Research Activities
The research activities were carried out in four different periods from May
1992 to August 1994 (Table 6). The first phase consisted of two stages. These
first and second stages were regarded as the 'scanning' or 'exploratory'
phase. Two successful and two not-successful projects in Cagayan Valley
were contrasted and analyzed. Site profiling and identification of the various
success conditions for contractor's sustained participation in seedling mainte-
nance and protection were conducted under this contrast analysis.
The third stage is referred to as the 'focusing' or 'in-depth analysis' phase.
Here, the various background determinant factors of success conditions iden-
tified in the scanning phase were investigated in more detail.
The fourth stage is the 'validation phase'. The different success conditions
and the corresponding determinant factors found in the contrast analysis were
further validated in terms of their presence and relevance in the five additional
case studies of government projects and the four spontaneous tree growing
activities by individual farmers in other regions in the country. Table 9 pres-
ents the program of research of activities of the study.
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Table 9.
Generalized program of research activities
Period Research activity
I.May-Sept. 1992
2. Oct. 1992-March 1993
3. April-Dec. 1993
4. Jan.-Aug. 1994
Reconnaissance survey, selection of the four case
studies for the contrast analysis and key informants'
interview
Project assessment and exploratory investigation of
the various success conditions for contractor's sus-
tained project participation in the four case studies
under the contrast analysis
In-depth investigation of the various determinant
factors of the success conditions identified in the
exploratory study under contrast analysis
Validation of the contrast analysis findings in addi-
tional five selected government reforestation pro-
jects and in four spontaneous tree growing activities
by individual farmers in other regions in the country
Contrast Analysis
5.1 Selection and Brief Characterization of the Study Sites
Four reforestation projects in Cagayan Valley were taken as case studies.
There were two 'successful' and two 'unsuccessful' projects compared and
contrasted. The aim was to examine the success conditions of good perform-
ing projects and the factors of failure of unsuccessful ones.
There were no prior criteria used in the selection of the project sites except
for their current field performance and geographical location. The two suc-
cessful projects are found in Salinas and Lacab and the two unsuccessful ones
are located in Villa Meimban and Maguirig. As an overview of the four case
studies, Table 10 gives general features of each project area.
Table 10.
General features of the four case study sites selected in Cagayan Valley Region,
Northeastern Philippines
Project Location Size Type of Number of Total Project
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Figure 2.
Location map of the four study sites for the contrast analysis in Cagayan Valley
region
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The projects in Lacab and Villa Meimban were dominantly under family con-
tract. In Salinas and Maguirig, almost all projects were under community con-
tract. The minimum required number of participants in a community contract
is 15. The contractor, being the formal representative of the group, has a rela-
tively permanent tenure throughout the contract period. Most participants are
often just hired as daily wage labourers, although in principle, they comprised
the membership of the association they represent. Under the family contract,
the work and benefit are confined within the household members.
The four projects were in their second year of operation and being under
the same DENR regional administrative set-up, they shared common experi-
ences and circumstances as regards to the problems of delayed issuance of
contract payments.
The following sections discuss in detail the results of the exploratory in-
vestigation for each case study. Fig. 2 presents the location of these four case
studies in Cagayan Valley region.
5.2 Exploratory Investigation
5.2.1 Salinas case study
a. Project setting
The Salinas Reforestation Project was established in 1940 as watershed pro-
tection of the Lower Magat side that partly drains in the Cagayan River. The
total project area is roughly about 10,000 hectares extending to the eastern
Cordillera Mountain Range.
In the 70s and 80s the area was frequented by many tourists and excursion-
ists because of its spectacular natural salt spring. After the killer earthquake in
1990, the salt geyser died out. Since then, the former tourist spot became a
rather desolate place with just the reminiscence of a massive solid white rock.
Although tourism no longer provided additional income for most of the local
people, the community still seems to prosper economically because of the
boom in rice production.
Rice farming is a rewareling livelihood. More than 1,000 hectares of rice
fields are under cultivation year-round due to the continuous abundance of
irrigation water . Both rice and vegetables rank top most in the farmers' cash
crops with market outlets extending even up to Manila and Baguio.
In short, rice farming and vegetable gardening remain the dominant live-
lihood of most people in the community with earnings from the reforestation
project as supplementary income.
The project had 240 participants representing 57 households in the com-
munity. Of this number, five households were pasture leaseholders while 42
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engaged simultaneously in rice and vegetable farming with the project earn-
ings only as additional income. Only ten households were partly dependent
on the income from the project for their subsistence. With the high demand
for farm labour year-round, farmers have no time to waste. Every participant
had at least two or more income options.
Majority of the participants had experienced working as daily wage
labourers in the past regular reforestation project under government adminis-
tration. With contract reforestation, participation was increased including
barangay officials and some rich local residents. The majority of the partici-
pants were above subsistence level while most contractors were financially
stable with cash surplus. All participants were locally-based.
b. Project performance
On the average, the performance of the whole reforestation project was rela-
tively satisfactory. Despite the project being situated in a fireprone area, there
was a minimal and sporadic occurrence of grassland fires which were unin-
tentional as claimed by the participants.
Based on the 1992 DENR evaluation, few contracts obtained an ICM1 rating
slightly lower than the 80 percent passing mark. On the average, the project
rating was 88.68 percent, a score that qualifies for FLMA. In the same year,
another field evaluation was carried out as part of this study with the overall
performance rating shown in Table 11. The measurement used to assess quali-
tatively the performance of the project is found in Appendix 1.
c. Research findings
A majority of the participants were not desperately dependent on the project
for their subsistence. They withstood the agony of waiting for their payments
without prematurely leaving the project. First, the presence of other sources
of income in the community enabled them to cope with the situation. Second-
ly, the wealthy project contractors defrayed meantime the wages of poor
members of the project which prevented the disintegration of the group. Thus,
there was a strong community cooperation in fire fighting and strict regula-
tion of open grazing in the project site. Thirdly, their striving for FLMA moti-
vated them to perform well in the project.
1 ICM = Inspection Chart Map is a tabulated recording system being used in keeping a periodic
assessment of the percentage seedling survival in the project area For a project to be considered
'successful', it must have an ICM score of at least 80 percent
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Table 11.
Performance rating of Salinas Reforestation project as per actual evaluation in 1992
Parameter Rating
1. Seedling Survival: (new plantation: 85%) Very high
2. Level of Local Participation Very high
3. Sustainability of People's participation High
4. Sense of Ownership High
5. Level or Moral Responsibility High
6. Ability to Contain Problems Related to DENR's Project
Implementation Practices High
7. Level of Awareness About the Program Very high
8. Level of Psychological Satisfaction Towards the Financial
Instrument Very high
9. Level of Organization Very high
10. Level of Environmental Concern Very high
11. Trust in the Project Management Low
12. Participants'Working Morale High
Few participants viewed project earnings as additional source of subsistence.
Often they were conditioned to participate when immediate payment was as-
sured. Participants above subsistence level on the other hand were not much
affected by the delayed payments. They regarded project earnings as savings
or additional capital for future investments or for sending their children to
high school. Unlike the subsistent participants, they withstood cash-related
problems and remained actively involved in the project. Also, most of them
felt no resentment towards the DENR or the project management for the late
payments. Some wealthy contractors even used their personal funds mean-
time in paying their labourers' wages.
Most of the successful contractors manifested strong sense of ownership
over the project. Some even ambitioned to convert the site into homestead
later on. Majority of the contractors perceived the prospect of turning the area
into agro-silvi-pastoral project in the future. Some farmers introduced other
perennials such as fruit trees in the project site. A number of them were able
to interplant short-term subsistent crops in those arable portions. One contrac-
tor fenced his area with much confidence that he will be awarded with the
FLMA soon. Almost all of them were looking forward with much anticipation
the conversion of their contracts into FLMA in the near future.
d. Conclusion
Based on this exploratory assessment, the high financial security of most con-
tractors and the above subsistence level of the majority of the labourers ap-
peared to have a significant effect on project success. Also, there was a strong
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sense of project ownership felt by most contractors. Their overwhelming an-
ticipation for the FLMA motivated them to introduce site developments includ-
ing simultaneous intercropping in the area. The prospect of agro-silvi-pastoral
management was much ambitioned by them. Furthermore, the strong commu-
nity cooperation spared the project from rampant grassland fires and open
grazing. In short, five success conditions appeared to have bearing on the pro-
ject's success, namely: 1) good financial situation of the participants, 2) inter-
cropping between seedlings, 3) assured access/property right, 4) having inte-
rest in other related tree uses, and; 5) community cooperation.
5.2.2 Lacab case study
a. Project Setting
In the 1970s, the project site used to be a kaingin area. It was occupied by the
Ilocanos and Ifugaos who first came to the place in search for land to farm.
Being endowed with good soil and favourable climate, the site became a
promising cropland.
Although it is within the forest zone, its accessibility to Maddela town
enables the farmers to bring their harvests and other farm products to the near-
est trading centre regularly. Marketing their farm products is not a problem at
all.
In 1989, the DENR turned the area into a reforestation site in response to
the new order of planting trees in all open forestlands. The people did not re-
sist such move because there was no spatial displacement or alteration of farm-
ers' position in the newly declared reforestation site. Each farmer became a
reforestation contractor of his own farm. While reforestation was taking place
in the site, short-term cash and subsistent croppings continued in between the
seedlings. The contractors were also given the freedom to choose the tree spe-
cies to plant.
To prolong the use of the land for annual cropping, farmers chose to plant
long gestation species like narra (Pterocarpus indiens) and mahogany (Swie-
tenia macrophyld) instead of the fast-growing species recommended for re-
forestation like Gmelina arborea and Eucalyptus. The planting space adopted
was 4 x 4 meters instead of the prescribed spacing of 2 x 2 meters.
The project management usually consulted the farmers for any plan or
new developments concerning the project. They were encouraged to partici-
pate in meetings and to decide for themselves in all matters affecting their
stay in the area. A strong community cooperation was enhanced with the in-
volvement of the village council in the project management. Fire fighting and
plantation protection became a communal activity. With this climate trust and
confidence built between the community and the DENR, the participants felt
the strong sense of project ownership.
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There were 12 family contracts covering a total area of 66 hectares. Out of
48 participants, about 30 are Ifugaos and Igorots while the rest were Ilocanos
and Ibanags. These farmers have settled in the area since 70s and 80s. Some
of them have both upland farm and a small parcel of irrigated rice field. These
farmers are said to be self-sufficient in food and that they go out rarely during
off-season in search of a part time job to augment their subsistence. Around
80 percent of the produce from their farms is for home consumption, while
the remaining is sold in the market. However, their major source of income is
derived from banana, vegetables, fruits, swine and sales of other farm ani-
mals. An average farmer can realize a weekly income of P 300-400 from ba-
nana sales, an amount sufficient enough to provide a family of five members
in the rural area the basic household needs.
b. Project performance
Apparently, 'paid labour' was not the main motivation for contractors' par-
ticipation. In a strict sense, it appeared that there was no payment needed to
motivate participants in protecting and maintaining the project. As they
cleaned and cultivated the land for annual cropping, they also provided the
same care for the seedlings since these were planted in between the main
crops. Such kind of treatment, together with good soil and favourable climate,
resulted in a high seedling survival and a height reaching an average of almost
1.5 meters in just two years. Likewise, there was no incidence of grassland
fires or other plantation damage despite the fact that the project is situated in a
fire prone area. With the strong sense of communal spirit among the contrac-
tors they agreed to help each other in protecting their farms from astray ani-
mals and grassland fires.
The average ICM rating based on the 1992 DENR's evaluation is 93 percent
seedling survival, with average tree height of 1.5 meters, which is highly
qualified for FLMA. Likewise, in the same year, an independent evaluation
was conducted in this present study reporting the overall performance rating
as presented in Table 12 below.
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Table 12.
Performance rating of Lacab Reforestation project as per actual evaluation con-
ducted in the study in 1992
Parameter Rating
1. Seedling Survival: (new plantation: 90%) Very high
2. Level of Local Participation Very high
3. Sustainability of People's Participation Very high
4. Sense of Ownership Very high
5. Level or Moral Responsibility Very high
6. Ability to Contain Problems Related to DENR'S Project Imple-
mentation Practices Very high
7. Level of Awareness About the Program High
8. Level of Psychological Satisfaction Towards the Financial
Instrument Very high
9. Level of Organization Very high
10. Level of Environmental Concern High
11. Trust in the Project Management High
12. Participants'Working Morale Very high
c. Research findings
The recognition of the farmers' usufruct over the recently declared reforesta-
tion area appeared to be an important factor for the project's success. The
original settlers, being assured of their land rights over the site, were moti-
vated to participate actively in the project. Later on, this was further rein-
forced by their awareness of FLMA as a means to ensure long stay in the area.
Also, the farmers' free choice of species to plant and the seedling spacing to
follow, boosted their confidence of ownership over the project. In the future,
they envisioned to introduce agroforestry when short-term cropping would no
longer be feasible in between the growing trees.
The cash-for-work done in the project is not a crucial factor in sustaining
project participation. Most of them viewed paid labour as additional incentive
but they were not dependent on it for subsistence. According to them, 'they
may not even be paid for the trees they planted because it is within their farm-
lots anyway'. More interestingly, some participants expressed willingness to
reforest new sites even without payment to avail of additional landholdings
for farming.
A majority of the participants felt satisfied with the earnings from the pro-
ject. They seldom uttered any negative remark against DENR or the project
manager regarding late payment or undercompensation. According to them,
'what matters most is that they can farm in the same area and hope to attain
the FLMA in the future'. Furthermore, they were not desperately dependent on
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the project's earnings for subsistence because they gained food and cash
needs from simultaneously farming the area.
d. Conclusion
Based on this exploratory assessment, the creative management intervention
(i.e., recognizing 'on-site' contractors' informal rights over the site), triggered
their strong acceptance of the project in their croplands. The uninterrupted
farming alongside with the reforestation relieved contractors' direct depend-
ence on project payment for their subsistence. This helped much in sustaining
their participation amidst irregularity of payment.
In conclusion, project success was primarily attributed to the following
conditions: 1) contractors' assured access or property rights over the site, 2)
their practice of simultaneous intercropping between seedlings, 3) their non-
dependence on project payment for subsistence, 4) their interest in other re-
lated tree uses, and 5) their community cooperation.
5.2.3 Villa Meimban case study
a. Project setting
Villa Meimban Reforestation Project lies in the eastern side of the Magat Re-
forestation Area. Situated in the foothills facing the Cordillera Mountain
Range from the extreme east, its topography is rugged and steep. The area is
dominantly covered with grass (Imperata cylindricd) and randomly inter-
spersed by shrubs, brushes and kaingin farms.
Adjacent to the project site is the 281-hectare Integrated Social Forestry
Project (ISFP). Farmers simultaneously farmed the ISFP land and planted trees
on project sites.
The area is notable for its high production of corn, vegetable, banana and
fruits. However, its isolation from the nearest commercial centre makes it dif-
ficult for farmers to transport their products, especially during rainy season.
Farmers travel to Cordon town three times a week during dry season, but only
occasionally in the wet season.
Life in the community became harder when the kaingin farms deteriorated
due to soil depletion. During lean months, many farmers migrated to other
places searching for off-season jobs. Others gathered stumps, tree trunks and
branches for charcoal making. Fifty out of 200 households (25 percent) pro-
duced charcoal while farming.
All reforestation participants are members of the ISFP and farm two to
three hectares. Around 50 labourers on a rotational basis were hired when the
project started in 1987 under the regular project administration before becom-
ing a contract reforestation. This scheme enabled them to re-arrange their
farming activities so that they could work on the reforestation sites and farm
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simultaneously. But farming remained their number one priority. Reforesta-
tion was just a part-time work especially during the dry season.
b. Project performance
In 1988, Villa Meimban Reforestation Project garnered an award as a model
reforestation site in Cagayan Valley. However, after one year, most of the
area was burned and the plantation experienced yearly fires. This coincided
with many participants leaving the project.
The management's inability to pay regularly the participants prompted
them to quit the project in favour of other jobs elsewhere. Only when the re-
forestation project served as their last income resort did participants make it a
priority.
Based on the DENRICM evaluation conducted in 1992, the project obtained
an average aggregate rating of 78 percent seedling survival which was short
of two percent for the passing mark. An independent evaluation was made in
this study in the same year with the following results presented in Table 13
below:
Table 13.
Performance rating of Villa Meimban Reforestation project as per actual evaluation
of the study in 1992
Parameter Rating
1. Seedling Survival (new plantation: 78%) Short of the
passing Mark
2. Initial level of Local Participation Very high
3. Sustainability of People's Participation Very low
4. Sense of Ownership Very low
5. Level of Moral Responsibility Very low
6. Ability to Contain Problems Related to DENR'S Project Imple-
mentation Practices Very low
7. Level of Awareness About the Program Low
8. Level of Psychological Satisfaction Towards the Financial
Instrument Very low
9. Level of Organization Very low
10. Level of Environmental Concern Low
11. Trust in the Project Management High
12. Participants'Working Morale Very low
c. Research findings
A majority of the participants complained about the delayed payments and
undercompensation. As a result, many left the project prematurely. Likewise,
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during farming season, they tended their lands more than the project. They
only worked full-time at the sites during lean months or droughts. The irregu-
lar payment forced the subsistent farmers to shift from one income option to
another.
All participants viewed the project as an employment opportunity. The
cash offered for tree planting motivated them to join the project but their par-
ticipation was conditional and intermittent just as there were delays in DENR's
payments for six to 12 months.
Participants claimed that they hardly participated during fire fighting ac-
tivities since their project involvement was characterized as 'come and go'
type. They were most active only during the first year. However, in the sec-
ond and third year, only few remained involved. According to them, they
were motivated in the first year because they received up to 60 percent of the
total contract price. Motivation decreased in the second and third year
because they only expected 20 percent each year. According to them, some
plantation fires were attributed to members' distrust and resentments towards
the project management.
As to the acceptability of FLMA, all of the participants strongly opposed the
instrument. They preferred another three-year reforestation contract if pay-
ments would be regular and equitable. They also preferred regular reforesta-
tion to contract reforestation because of assured payment even on a weekly
rotational basis.
d. Conclusion
Based on this exploratory assessment, the gradual decline of the project's per-
formance was attributed to participants' growing disinterest in their payment
coupled with their resumption of farming after a period of inactivity. Their
direct dependence on the project's earning for subsistence especially during
lean months prompted them to seek other immediate source of earnings in
times of late payments. No community cooperation was evident because the
participants had a low regard of the project. This was exemplified in their
disinterest to pursue project ownership through FLMA in the future. The low
performance of the project seemingly attributed to participants' conditions
and negative attitudes towards the project were as follows: 1) direct depend-
ence of participants on project's earnings, 2) no interest in intercropping, 3)
no interest in assuming future property rights over the project, 4) no interest in
other related tree uses, and 5) the absence of communal concern in protecting
the project.
84 TREE GROWING ON DIFFERENT GROUNDS
5.2.4 Maguirig case study
a. Project setting
Maguirig Reforestation Project is often referred to as 'no man's project' be-
cause of the existence of many claimants over the area. Historically, the site
has been as agricultural land since the early 1940s as claimed by the original
inhabitants of the community. In the 1950s, a cadastral survey by the then
Bureau of Lands and many of the local people at that time were able to apply
for a title because it was declared as 'alienable and disposable' land. During
that time, agriculture was the dominant land use practice in the area.
In 1978, a reforestation project was introduced in the same site. There was
no resistance among the local people against the project. While the Bureau of
Forestry began to introduce trees in the site, it likewise assured the original
claimants of their right of use for agricultural production. Later on, when the
Land Survey and Classification Division under the Bureau of Lands was
merged into the Bureau of Forestry, the area was finally reclassified as forest
zone owing to its topography.
Between the 80s and the present, the tenurial status of the area was con-
stantly transformed from one property regime to another. In 1980, it became a
communal tree farm area while a portion was used as pasture land of a local
politician. It was declared as an Integrated Social Forestry Project site in
1985, then reverted to a regular reforestation project in 1989. Finally, it be-
came a contract reforestation site starting in 1990 to the present.
Although DENR claims the area as being under its jurisdiction because of
the presence of the project, some community people still believe that the land
belongs to them. A number of cattle owners on the other hand, regard the area
as a communal grazing site.
Local project participants desired to plant short-term agricultural crops in
between the tree seedlings but they were inhibited to do so because of the
overlapping tenurial status of the area. However, a number of local non-par-
ticipants have succeeded in clearing and maintaining patches of kaingin farms
inside the project site.
Most of the project contractors were non-residents of the community.
Some of them held key positions in government offices and/or had private
business. Of the 15 contracts, only six were given to the community people
headed by the barangay council. Also, out of the 225 labourers, about 135 (or
60 percent) were from other places (Table 14).
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Table 14.
Number of local and non-local participants of the Maguirig Reforestation Project,
1992





















The awarding of the few contracts to the community was even perceived by
most local people as politically manipulated because most of the selected par-
ticipants were related to the village leader either by blood or extended social
affiliation.
The 'off-site' contractors chose their labourers preferably coming from
their place of origin. These labourers were not bound by formal agreement
because they were just hired or subcontracted to perform specific activities in
the project at certain periods of the year. Out of 96 local participants, a great
majority were tenant rice farmers but only 3% were land owners who were
also project contractors.
b. Project performance
The notion that there is a fund for every activity spoiled the participants' ini-
tiatives. Everything revolved around money. Community participation espe-
cially in fire fighting could hardly be practised after the introduction of the
contract reforestation scheme. Unlike the regular reforestation project in the
past, collective voluntarism among local residents was evident even without
payment. But now, fire fighting had become associated with payment to non-
participants of the project. According to them, only with forest fires they
could benefit from the project because they could demand payment from the
contractors.
Based on the field evaluation conducted by DENR in 1992, out of the 15
contracts, only four obtained an ICM rating above 80 percent. These contracts
all belonged to the Local Government Unit. Most of the unsuccessful ones
were contracted by people from outside who abandoned prematurely their
sites which were raged by fire. In the same year, an independent evaluation
was made by this study reporting the performance rating as presented in Table
15.
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Table 15.
Performance rating of Maguirig Reforestation project as per actual evaluation con-
ducted by the study in 1992
Parameter Rating
1. Seedling Survival (new plantation: 85%) Very low
2. Recent level of Local Participation Low
3. Sustainability of People's Participation Very low
4. Sense of Ownership Low
5. Level or Moral Responsibility Very low
6. Ability to Contain Problems Related to DENR's Project Imple-
mentation Practices Low
7. Level of Awareness About the Program Low
8. Level of Psychological Satisfaction Towards the Financial
Instrument Low
9. Level of Organization Very low
10. Level of Environmental Concern Low
11. Trust in the Project Management Very low
12. Participants'Working Morale Very low
c. Research findings
The overlapping land tenure of the area impinges on the successful imple-
mentation of the project. This was compounded by a low recruitment of local
people in favour of rich and influential outsiders. Local participants did not
intercrop in between seedlings although most of them desired to do it. This
stemmed from their preconceived notion that the land on which they were
planting trees belonged to a particular individual in the community.
Subcontracted participants viewed themselves as mere hired labourers
whose participation was transactional where they were paid on a daily basis.
Being itinerant off-farm workers depending on the daily earning for subsis-
tence, the labourers found their immediate payment crucial in sustaining their
participation in the project. In short, earning an immediate cash was what mo-
tivated them to join the project.
Delayed DENR payment aggravated by the growing disgust of most local
people for not being hired in the project resulted to non-community cooper-
ation during grassland fires. Furthermore, open grazing became rampant in
the project site. Nobody really looked after the condition of the seedlings
planted, except for the few local contractors.
d. Conclusion
Based on this exploratory investigation, it appeared that the failure of the pro-
ject to secure local claimants right over the project site contributed greatly to
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the non-sustainability of reforestation in the area. Instead, it even reinforced
the vague tenurial status by awarding more contracts in favour of the outsid-
ers. This boiled down to non-cooperation of the community in fire protection
and disinterest of local contractors to intercrop simultaneously in the area.
This problem was exacerbated by the DENR's late release of contract pay-
ments resulting in conditional and problematic participants' project involve-
ment. Since the greater majority of the labourers were subsistent daily wage
earners, their sustained participation was conditioned by the regularity of pro-
ject payment.
In conclusion, project failure stemmed from the following conditions: 1)
participants' direct dependence on project's earnings, 2) local contractors'
lack of confidence to intercrop simultaneously due to the overlapping tenurial
regime of the site, 3) contractors' lack of security of future project ownership,
4) contractors' lack of interest in related tree uses due to insecurity of land and
tree tenure, and 5) absence of community cooperation in fire fighting and in
the strict regulation of open grazing in the site.
5.3 In-Depth Case Analysis of Salinas
5.3.1 Introduction
One objective of contract reforestation is to provide economic incentive for
the rural poor to motivate them participate in tree growing projects. This strat-
egy is based on the assumption that the poor have limited economic option.
With the ready cash earnings the program can offer, massive participation of
rural farmers would likely be expected.
In Salinas, rice farming and vegetable production are the main year-round
preoccupation of people in the area. Participation in the project is just one
among various income sources available. The project's relative financial prof-
itability is rated against that of the other income patterns in the community.
It is interesting to examine how the project's earnings would rate with re-
spect to other income options in the community. Likewise, it is important to
know the context in which project's income may be regarded as an incentive
or not.
This section highlights the effect of level of economic security on partici-
pants' behaviour and quality of project's performance. Having a stable sub-
sistence or being in the state of cash surplus appeared to be a plus factor for
project success in the case of most contractors in Salinas.
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5.3.2 Comparative economic advantage
Joining the reforestation project was more of a part-time livelihood activity
than a main occupation among subsistent farmers. The presence of diverse
income sources in the community made participation in the project just an-
other economic option for the people (Table 16).
On-farm labour was in continuous demand year-round because rice and
vegetables are raised three and two cropping cycles, respectively. At P 75 a
day on the average, a farmer with a household of five can subsist at a mini-
mum food level. Some farmers engaged for an even better rate in contract
jobs like road and drainage construction during off-farm season.
Table 16. Livelihood options for an average farmer in Salinas, Bambang, Nueva



































A vegetable farmer can earn in one year from his 0.5 hectare kaingin an aver-
age net income of P 30,000 in two cropping cycles. This was in contrast to the
expected income of P 33,284.5, P 16,923.00 and P 16,923.00 in the first, sec-
ond and third years respectively in a five-hectare reforestation project. Fur-
thermore, there were higher labour and man-day inputs for seedling establish-
ment, maintenance and protection. Full time attention was needed especially
during dry months to prevent grassland fires in the project area. However,
despite the comparative profitability of other livelihoods over projects' earn-
ings, many farmers still participated in the reforestation.
Some farmers preferred to spend their off-season in improving and clean-
ing their fields more than joining the project. On the other hand, most daily
wage earners preferred work that ensured daily take-home pay.
In practice, most participants had more than one income source. Those
who were not dependent on the project for subsistence can endure late pay-
ments from the DENR as often as it was the case. However, few subsistent la-
bourers who cannot wait any longer for their delayed payment dropped out
easily from their participation. The local residents near the project area found
it more convenient to work in the reforestation than search for off-farm jobs.
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But, unless there was regular cashflow from participation their continued in-
volvement was not guaranteed. Among participants who are above subsis-
tence level or already in a cash surplus status, joining the project was an in-
centive. However, for the below subsistent level participants, it was a disin-
centive at times they cannot avail of their immediate payment. Cash regularity
defined their sustained participation.
5.3.3 The agony of prolonged waiting
Delayed payments were not expected by most participants. Usually, it took
six months or sometimes even a year before they got paid. According to the
Forestry Field Officers, the problem of delayed payment was beyond DENR's
control. They blamed the Department of Budget and Management for the
faulty programming of fund release. Another cause of pending payment was
due to contractor's failure to meet certain requirements in their contract.
There was a significant decline in interested participants over time. Those
who experienced difficulties in the first year dropped out from the activity in
the following years (Table 17).
Table 17.
The declining trend in the number of participants in the Salinas Reforestation during
the three year contract period (Personal Interview, 1993)
Period Contractor Labourer Total
First year 16 224 240
Second year 16 102 118
Third year 16 56 72
The lower seedling maintenance and protection budget in the second and third
year of the contract also partly attributed to the decreasing participation. Con-
tractors were forced to limit the number of their work force since they cannot
spend beyond what was appropriated. Furthermore, at P 64.60 daily hiring
rate for labourers, only the participants above subsistence level who remained
in the succeeding years because they withstood the late project payments.
Many of those who dropped out sought on-farm work like weeding,
ploughing, planting, harrowing, and harvesting vegetables and rice. Accord-
ing to them, they would rather settle for a lower hiring rate, as long as they
can bring home cash daily.
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5.3.4 The role of spending meantime personal fiind
Irregular cash flow impinged on the smooth conduct of the project. On the
other hand, it indicated participants' commitment to the project. Contractors
who were determined to maintain good performance exhausted all means to
save the project from blowing off. In most cases, they drew from their per-
sonal resources the money, rice or any good in kind, as a support to their poor
labourers. This prevented the labour force from disintegrating. Some contrac-
tors without sufficient personal funds borrowed from other sources, however,
not all were willing to spend their personal fund in the meantime. The lack of
financial means was the main reason in the case of the poor contractors. How-
ever, those who could afford but did not defray their labourers' wages had no
intention of pursuing the FLMA in the future. Often, they were complacent
contractors without any motivation to work hard. The worse, they made the
DENR's failure of providing the funds on time as an excuse for their projects'
poor performance.
However, contractors who perceived the prospect of assuming future pro-
ject ownership, sacrificed personal fund to pay their labourers' wages. The
Local Government Units (LGUs) in particular strived best because they were
put at the public eye. There were two driving conditions that motivated them
to excel. One stemmed from their desire to qualify for FLMA in pursuit of their
ambition to turn the project into a silvipastoral system. The second reason was
aspiration for good track record to win the confidence and favour of the DENR
for more contracts in the future.
Contractors' practice of paying their labourers' wage improved their
working relationship considerably. Those who helped their labourers enjoyed
a strong cooperation during sudden outbreaks of fire more than those who did
not.
In Salinas, of the 16 contractors, 10 had a satisfactory performance. The
success of the four community contracts, according to them, was mainly at-
tributed to the confidence their members had towards them. By being support-
ive and generous, they were able to sustain their members' participation in
seedling protection and maintenance. The six contractors who were passive
and antipathetic to the group's needs were prematurely deserted by their orig-
inal members.
Although this practice of paying labourers' wages was not a contractor's
stipulated obligation, it was found to be a very crucial factor to the project's
success. With this, it appeared that the selection of contractors and the type of
contract should be given much attention.
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5.3.5 Dominant factor s of project success
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Participants' degree of involvement varied greatly with their level of eco-
nomic security. Likewise, contractors with future plans for the project had
better performance than those without any desire to participate any longer.
Three main factors appeared to have effect on these varied degrees of partici-
pation among different types of participants:
Table 18.
Comparative profile between wage labourers below and above subsistence level in
Salinas (Personal Interview, 1993)
Parameter Subsistence level
Below Above
1. Average yearly income
2. Main income source
3. Cash flow regularity
4. Livelihood diversity
5. Subsistence stability
6. Income depends on the
project




10. Future project options
P 18,500 P 32,000























Enter into bidding as a
contractor
a. Level of economic security
In most cases a participant's income level and the stability of his current live-
lihood determine his level of involvement in the project. Participants with
marginal income and an unstable livelihood pattern usually viewed project's
income as a supplementary source of subsistence (Table 18). The level and
quality of their participation consequently, was conditioned by the timing and
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amount of payment. When they failed to gain what they expected at the time
they needed most, they shifted to other off-farm jobs. Similarly, contractors
who were barely within subsistence level tended to abandon their project pre-
maturely to seek a more reliable source of income when payment was de-
layed. Participants with a stable source of subsistence viewed their compensa-
tion as a supplementary source of household income. They were less affected
by delayed payments because they have other sources of subsistence.
Table 19.
The average subsistent and rich contractors' profile in Salinas (Personal Interview,
1993)
Parameters Contractor's socioeconomic status
Subsistence level Cash surplus
1. Average income/annum




6. Sense of project
ownership
7. Future development op-
tion
8. View of the income
from the contract
9. Actual use of the
income
10. Degree of dependence
11. Effect of project income
on his behaviour
12. Level of satisfaction

















































Contractors who were already in the state of a cash surplus prior to joining the
project or at least above subsistence level, viewed the project's earnings as a
reserved income for buying farm implements or for their children's schooling
(Table 19). Also, they can patiently wait for their payment without much
complaint and irritations. Often, the wealthy willing contractors defraying
meantime labourers' wages took the burden of absorbing the negative reper-
cussions of members towards the project for the late DENR's payments. They
even knew in advance that if the project fails they would not be able to obtain
the 20% last payment.
The majority of the Salinas project contractors were not desperately
dependent on the reforestation wages. The presence of multiple income
sources in the community cushioned them when payment was short and irreg-
ular.
In general, the participants' current level of economic security deter-
mined their degree and sustainability of participation. The higher the security
is, the greater would be the chance of success. Subsistent participants, on the
other hand, had conditional and discontinuous participation. They tended to
shift to jobs that could ensure a daily income.
b. Sense of future project ownership
Most daily wage labourers did not desire to assume future ownership over the
project. They viewed their participation as a means to gain additional income.
Those below subsistence level preferred to work as a daily wage labourer
rather than opt for FLMA.
The majority of the contractors however, wanted to pursue FLMA. The in-
troduction of FLMA concept on the second year of the contract period signifi-
cantly heightened their interest in maintaining and protecting the seedlings.
Surprisingly, however, their desire for a pasture area, rather than the future
produce from the trees was their main motivation. Most of them were pres-
ently tending at least five heads of cattle. Likewise, a number of pasture lease
owners in the area were willing to disperse cattle to interested contractors un-
der a benefit sharing agreement.
Thus, most of the contractors envisaged an agro-silvi-pastoral project in
combination with tree growing later on. Those who do not have the initial
capital to start a livestock project, thought of entering into a partnership with
ranchers for an animal tenancy arrangement. Likewise, those on good soil
type were interested to interplant cash crops and fruit bearing trees.
Contractors who did not intend to own the project appeared to have
superficial and problematic participation. Everything was conditioned by di-
rect cash payment. They did not have the initiative to improve the area be-
yond what was required of them. Whenever the payments got delayed, they
made it a reason to abandon or neglect the project. Sometimes after receiving
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the initial payment for the first phase, they abandoned the project and looked
for other livelihood options.
In general, contractors with a strong sense of future ownership over the
project tended to perform better than those without intention of pursuing
FLMA. The most preferred type of land use combination suggested the rich
contractors was silvipastoral management. Those who are positioned in good
soil intended to interplant cash crops and fruit trees. Their strong aspiration
for future ownership motivated them to introduce long-term developments in
the site while at the same time spent personal resources to sustain their work
force.
c. Type of local organization
Projects managed by 'Family Contracts' and 'Ethnic Tribal Group' were
more successful than those under 'People's Organizations' (PO) or the
'Community Contract.' The tribal groups had a stronger community spirit not
evident in most community contracts. Likewise, in the family contracts, the
financial benefit from participation was confined solely among members of
the household or kinship. As a result, there was minimal feuding among
members which usually stemmed from inequitable sharing of the project's
benefits. Tribal contracts, like the family contract operated on a very organ-
ized structure, with a system of shared values, aspirations and needs. Most
people's organizations and community contracts emerged overnight without a
common institution to bind diverging interests other than the financial moti-
vation.
The terms 'Local Government Units' or in general, the 'community con-
tracts' are misnomers. There is no such thing as a real community contract
since all members do not equally benefit from the project's income. Accord-
ing to most participants, almost all community contracts were organized with-
out a clear and common consensus among members. The initiative usually
comes from the contractor, and the members joined because of the job offered
to them. Sometimes, even dummy members were included among the list of
participants.
In a community contract, there is a de jure collective level association to
take care of the decision making, the project implementation and sharing the
benefits of the contract payments. In practice, however, this is not the case in
most instances. One powerful individual (e.g., the mayor) can head an asso-
ciation in the name of the members of the community. What he normally does
is first to enlist people as members to satisfy the de jure conditions of the con-
tract, but later simply treat them as daily labourers when it comes to decision
making and benefit sharing. There are some exceptions however, e.g. in the
case of a few community contracts, belonging to tribal groups and in some
situations that necessitate strict collective action as in the case of fire fighting
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activities and restriction of open grazing practices in highly motivated local
groups.
In practice, most community contracts did not evolve from a common in-
terest among members, but usually from a one-person initiative. Even the se-
lection of the group's head or the officers was already predetermined before
organizing. Equitable benefit sharing rarely materialized since the project ini-
tiator by virtue of his effort in organizing the group, usually takes the biggest
share and treats the other members as subcontracted daily wage labourers. As
a result, a spirit of voluntarism was often lacking especially during plantation
fires in most unsuccessful projects. Furthermore, when some members sensed
that the contractor was subtly extorting the fund, most of them just abandoned
the project without feeling responsible or accountable to the group. Most
problematic projects belonged to community contracts, including people's
organizations, local government units, non-government organizations and
other local-based organizations that failed to give members real representa-
tion.
In general, projects without of a common institution such as shared values,
needs and aspirations to transcend diverging personal interests likely to have
superficial and unsustainable participation. Projects based on family contracts
and with tribal groups with strong internal control system based on traditional
values are likely to be more successfull. Furthermore, a community project
without a clear representation of the participating organization, the situation
appears to be even worse.
5.3.6 The search for appropriate social actors
From the aforementioned findings, it is difficult to conclude that the project
really benefitted the rural poor. Whether it was an incentive or just an income
option, depends greatly on who defines it. The wealthy contractors may view
it as an incentive. According to them, it was not only an additional income but
savings that can be invested in other economic endeavours. Most enterprising
contractors charged interest for the money or goods in kind they lent or pro-
vided to members while the latter waited for their late payments. The daily
wage labourers who were not desperately dependent on the project for their
subsistence also considered the project's income as supplementary support
for their children's schooling, home furnishing, and social functions.
However, participants who were below or barely above subsistence level,
regarded participation as a disincentive. During late payments they bought or
borrowed the needed food for their household at a higher price. According to
them, they were all the more marginalized because they bought goods from
the local stores on a credit basis with a higher price than what they would nor-
mally pay in cash. Some complained about the forfeited economic opportuni-
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ties due to their investment of their time and labour in the project, which in
the end did not provide them with a better pay and immediate income. Also,
the delayed payments prevented them from investing in other worthwhile pro-
jects. For most of them participation was just an income option. Among wage
income earners, it was difficult to find participants who were really fully sat-
isfied of the cash earnings they expected to obtain from the project.
These varied effects of cash incentive on the labourers of different econ-
omic stature bring us to the conclusion that those who benefitted most are the
ones who have already much. The poor to some degree also benefitted, since
the project provided an added income option. The only limitation was that
they cannot entirely depend on it in times of late payments.
This implies the need to give careful attention to the selection of appropri-
ate actors in government tree growing projects. The rich contractors appeared
to be in a better position to form a partnership with the government than the
community. Aside from representing a fixed social entity, they also have the
initial capital to venture into it. Subsistent participants, or the community
could be relegated to serve as the labour pool. However, the government
should provide legitimizing and enabling instruments to remove the tree
growing constraints and risks in order to allow private enterprise to embark
on massive tree growing projects. Another possibility is that the community
could do the three-year seedling establishment phase and receive payment for
their labour. After the contract expires, the government could turn over the
project to interested prospective FLMA holders such as the private enterprise if
the community is not interested to manage it. However, the community could
still serve as the labour force in maintaining and protecting the project at the
private entity's expense. The private enterprise or the rich contractors could
take care of the management aspect and at the same time serve as the
stockholder of the business venture. The government's role is to provide the
policy instruments to safeguard both parties' interests. Ultimately, the gov-
ernment would benefit from this arrangement because it is the private sector
that does the reforestation. The public fund supposedly for the activity can
now be diverted to other economically profitable development projects in the
countryside. In other words, it is a matter of matching actors with the proper
role in the reforestation program and providing the appropriate incentive
packages peculiar to their needs and context. Failure to define who needs
what, how and when may continue to siphon off government's funds.
In summary, the determinant factors to project success of most contractors
in Salinas can be enumerated as follows: 1) DENR's assurance of more future
projects for successful contractors, 2) DENR's approval of other future land
use combinations, 3) DENR's recruitment of'on-site' contractors 4) labourers'
above subsistence level and contractors' cash surplus status, 5) contractors'
meantime payment of their labourers' wages, 6) contractors' enterprising atti-
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tude, 7) good arability of some portions of the project site, 8) project proxim-
ity and accessibility to the participants, and 9) clear tenurial status of the site.
The varied socioeconomic and organizational settings of the different ac-
tors in the program defined the level and type of their participation. The cash
surplus contractors and labourers above subsistence appeared to have a better
performance than those marginal subsistence ones. The family and tribal
groups function better than community or people's organizations in contract-
ing. The worse situation could happen if community contracts do not have a
real representation of their membership. In terms of organizational set-up, a
business partnership between the private sector and the community can be
feasible. The former could serve as the financier and stockholder while the
latter could provide the labour force. The government could function as a cat-
alyst providing enabling policy instruments. This arrangement would infuse
private fund to reforestation activities, thus sparing public money for other
noble purposes.
5.4 I n-Depth Case Analysis of Lacab
5.4.1 Introduction
Normally rural farmers are reluctant to introduce long-term improvement or
soil conservation measures in areas where they have no security of tenure.
The upland farmers at Lacab Reforestation project however, acted quite dif-
ferently. Participants were highly motivated to plant and maintain tree seed-
lings on their kaingin farms because of the prospect of one day owning and
sustaining usufruct practice in the project area.
The people were squatters and subsistence farmers in the logged-over area,
prior to its conversion into a reforestation site. Faced with the possibility of
losing their usufruct access if the project would be turned over to outsiders in
the future, they were prompted to protect and maintain the planted seedlings
as a condition for longer use through FLMA. Their exemplary performance
clearly demonstrates their willingness to work, even amidst irregular payment
and undercompensation. Maintaining their usufruct mattered more than the
wages from tree planting and protection. This section is an in-depth analysis
of the Lacab case study. It tries to highlight the positive effect of assured ac-
cess or property right in stimulating local people's sustained participation in
tree growing in an area under threatened ownership or illegally squatted.
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5.4.2 Captive actors became contractors
By virtue of their initial position in the project site, farmers at the Lacab Re-
forestation project can be seen as 'captive actors' to reforest their kaingin
farms, while simultaneously raising agricultural crops for their subsistence.
Since the 70s, the project site has been cultivated by migrant farmers from
Ifugao, Cagayan and other Northern Provinces. All were landless peasants
pushed from their original settlements by unequal land rights or population
growth, and tried to find a living in the new place.
The site is considered the community's primary production area, where
both subsistence and cash needs can be met. On average, a fanner has in total
at least five hectares of arable land, the effective area under cultivation for
rice or corn is one half hectare. The remaining portions were all planted with
bananas, papayas, coffee and other subsidiary farm crops for cash needs. Only
a few farmers have paddy ricefields. As such, the project site serves as the
only income option for most of the people. Table 20 presents the average
gross income of a one-hectare kaingin.
Table 20.
Average yearly gross production of 1-hectare kaingin at Lacab Reforestation site
(Personal Interview, 1993)












year-round production for market
one season; mainly for home use
one season; for market & home use
year-round production for home use
At first, all 12 family contractors resented the conversion of the area into a
reforestation site. Being in the site since the 70s, they feel that land informally
belongs to them, although they claimed to be squatters of the area.
Most of them recalled the punitive measures adopted by the Forestry De-
partment in the mid-70s to curb the increasing upland encroachment in the
area. With such traumatic experiences in mind, the 1989 introduction of refor-
estation within the kaingin area was perceived by them as a signal of a re-
newed struggle over the land.
Contrary to their fears and uncertainties, there was a totally different social
climate compared to their oppressed condition in the 70s. Instead of ejection,
they were recruited as contractors within their respective landholdings inside
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the newly declared reforestation area. With this approach, they sensed the go-
vernment's sincerity to involve them in forest development. This pacified
their doubts concerning the uncertainty of their continuous stay in the area. In
principle, they willingly cooperated with DENR project management not be-
cause of the cash incentive for tree planting. Beyond the cash remuneration
was a bigger goal they wish to aspire for, i.e., land tenure security.
5.4.3 Building on what works
It was not difficult to start the project despite the farmers' illegal occupation
of the area. This can be attributed to the participatory strategy adopted by the
project manager, which included the following elements:
a. Contracting according to initial spatial position
Normally, the DENR determines what areas are allocated to individual contrac-
tors. However, in Lacab, each of the 12 farmers already positioned in the area
was awarded at least five-hectares according to his initial spatial location and
landholding size. It was classified under family contract since there was no
displacement or alteration of original farming position which would have cre-
ated tension among the participants.
b. Allowing continuous usufructing in the area
One factor that convinced farmers to cooperate was the assurance that they
could continue using the land for short-term cropping. However, interplanting
between tree seedlings is encouraged instead of pure short-term subsistent
cropping. In fact, all of the farmers regarded their farmholdings as theirs by
usufruct ('de facto') because of the site improvements they introduced. Le-
gally ('de jure'), however they recognized it as public domain and a part of
the forest zone.
c. Allowing farmer's choice of reforestation species
In most reforestation areas planting Gmelina arborea was recommended be-
cause it is fast growing and adaptable especially in marginal areas. However,
the farmers chose the slow growing species Pterocarpus indiens or Swietenia
macrophyla instead. They also spaced the seedlings 6 x 6 meters rather than 3
x 3 meters. Their main consideration for a long gestation period tree species
with farther spacing was to prolong their usufructing on the land.
d. Introducing the FLMA concept
At first, some participants were reluctant to plant trees on their farmlots be-
cause of the paid arrangement offered to them by the DENR. Some asked,
'Why does the government pay us for the work done in our farmlots, if it has
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no intention of assuming control over the area when the trees have grown to
maturity ?' However, when they understood the government's long-term in-
tention of eventually turning over the project to qualified contractors through
FLMA, their doubts and fears were pacified.
e. Adopting participatory and contextualized management
Another factor that sustained participation was the good working relationship
with the project management. All of the contractors had high confidence to
the manager in the way he implements the project.
The official reforestation plan is said to be a highly prescriptive 'blue
print', emanating from the top. It is the operational standard for all projects-
from the type of species to the cost estimates. However, sensing the difficulty
of pursuing a predetermined plan in a site that has been occupied by migrant
farmers, the manager allowed some adjustments consistent with the local farm-
ers' development options.
Likewise, plans and directives from the central office can also be modified
if needed, based on the contractors' prerogative. According to the partici-
pants, their freedom to choose the tree species and the kind of spacing
strengthened their sense of control and right of use over the area.
In principle, the flexible project management style, e.g. allowing partici-
pants to define their own options according to their need is critical and has
minimized the use of unnecessary instruments to induce participation. Deter-
mining what will motivate them to comply should be the basis of prescribing
the incentive for participation. Giving the people the freedom to define their
own options for their needs and problems within the limitations of a tree
growing framework, is a stronger incentive than cash.
5.4.4 Planting trees to gain rights
Tree planting was more of an aspiration to establish property right over the
site than an activity driven by cash needs. This is seen in the way the contrac-
tors perceived the project (Tables 21 and 22).
Participants who aspired for project ownership in the future attributed their
successful performance to their desire to attain FLMA. Only a few (17 percent)
thought they might be ejected because of their relatively low performance.
The fear of not meeting the government's expectation and being ejected from
the area motivated them to work diligently. However, a majority of them (83
percent) claimed that the project belonged to them and expressed no reason
for not making it successful. Although a few doubted their ownership they
still viewed the trees they planted as theirs.
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Table 21.
Participants' perception and attitude towards the project at Lacab Reforestation Pro-
ject (Personal Interview, 1993)
Perception/attitude Respondents Percent
(N=12)
1. Trees planted will be theirs 12 100
2. FLMA as a means to strengthen their legitimate position 12 100
in the area
3. Preference for property right to cash payment 12 100
4. Willing to interplant reforestation seedlings even with- 12 100
out payment
5. Willing to maintain the project even without payment 12 100
6. Determined to pursue FLMA 12 100
7. Strong sense of project ownership 10 83
8. Desire to introduce fruit bearing trees in their farmlots 10 83
9. Desire to clear more fanning areas and willing to inter- 6 50
plant tree seedlings even without payment
10. Entertain the possibility of ejection from the site 2 17
All of them were willing to interplant seedlings and maintain them even with-
out payment. Their strong sense of ownership made them consider introduc-
ing fruit trees as a permanent crop aside from the reforestation species.
Half of the participants (50 percent) were also willing to encroach adjacent
public areas and plant reforestation seedlings without payment in order to in-
crease their usufruct area. Most of them can dispense with payment, claiming
that the 'work was done anyway in their own farmlots'.
As to their motivation in planting and maintaining the trees in their respec-
tive farmlots, a majority (83 percent) expressed intention to establish a legiti-
mate claim of ownership over the area (Table 22).
Table 22.
Contractors' primary motivation of tree planting in Lacab Reforestation Project
(Personal Interview, 1993)
Primary motivation Number of respondents Percent
1 . Establish legitimate right of use and future
ownership over the area
2. Cash incentive
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Not one mentioned the environmental benefit as a consideration for growing
trees on their farmlots. Only two (17 percent) were motivated by direct cash
incentive from participating.
The high score for environmental concern in Table 12 means that the con-
tractors are concerned about their environmental problems and that they know
the value of trees. The zero score for soil and water conservation measures on
Table 22 means that this is not their primary motivation to do reforestation
but more as a secondary motivation. A majority regarded growing trees as a
means to gain full rights over the site, rather than its importance in meeting
their cash needs or for environmental protection.
Although all of the contractors recognized their need for additional cash
from the project, they did not consider this as their main source of subsistence
(Table 23).
Table 23.
Contractors' view and regard of the income from the Lacab Reforestation Project
(Personal Interview, 1993)









Important but not a necessary condition for
active participation
Used it for buying clothes
Used it for home improvement
Satisfied with the amount received
Used it for buying home appliances
Used it as a supplementary source of subsis-
tence
Used it for children's schooling




















Most participants used their income for their children's schooling, buying
household appliances, clothing and improving their houses. Only five (42 per-
cent) used the cash earnings as supplementary income to buy food and other
basic necessities for the home. As to the level of satisfaction, a majority (83
percent) felt good about the amount they received, despite the long delays.
From this observation, it appears that even without cash incentive, tree
planting and protection could still be sustained in this situation because there
was a greater drive for the farmers to do it beyond just direct payment. Estab-
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lishing tenurial right was more important to farmers than the future produce
or the project's direct cash earnings.
5.4.5 Dominant factor s of project success
The project consistently performed well over the three-year contract period. It
is highly qualified for FLMA. After three years, it obtained an ICM rating
higher than 85 percent for seedling survival and average tree height of two (2)
meters for long gestation species. The exemplary performance was attributed
to the following factors:
a. Contractors 'pressing need for arable land
The project area has been cultivated by the participants prompted by their
strong need for more arable land to cultivate. Contracting was done 'on-site'
or 'in-place' without altering or displacing farmer's initial spatial position and
landholding size in the area. In addition, the contractors were encouraged to
continue farming the land and to adopt intercropping between the seedlings.
As they cleaned and cultivated the land for annual cropping, the same care
was given to the seedlings since these were intercropped with their main
crops. Therefore, seedling maintenance and protection could still have been
sustained even without payment.
b. Participants ' low dependence on project's earnings
Almost all participants were not dependent on the income of the project. Their
performance was not conditioned by the regularity or availability of the cash
incentive. Although they recognized the importance of the paid labour as ad-
ditional incentive, they did not regard it as an end in itself. Some of them were
willing to plant forest seedlings in other unopened and undeclared areas for
reforestation without payment if it would extend their practice of usufructing
in these areas.
c. Assurance of future property right
After learning the provision of the FLMA (a 25-year forestland stewardship),
the contractors were more encouraged to participate in seedling protection
and maintenance. Being confident that the produce from the project will be
theirs under FLMA, they became also interested in the future use of the trees
planted.
A strong sense of project ownership was felt by majority of them even
prior to their participation in the project. Through FLMA, they were confident
to gain greater ground for assuming legal right over the area someday. Some
planned to turn the project into agroforestry as an intermediary farming sys-
tem towards tree fanning.
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d. Hazard-controlled area
Grassland fires rarely occurred even during dry season. All year round the
area was under cultivation, making it free from grassland fire. Likewise, the
strip of bananas planted along the peripheral boundaries and even inside the
project sites served as firebreaks when major fires would occur.
Since almost all of the contractors are locally-based, a strong cooperation
in plantation protection became a communal concern. As a part of the local
regulation, open grazing was strictly ban and fire fighting was a must for ev-
ery household in the community.
e. Creative and participative project management style
The farmers could have resisted the DENR's attempt to convert the area into a
reforestation project, considering their long use of the site. However, the cre-
ative and participative project management approach which allowed them to
continue usufructing in the area boosted their morale. It also gave them the
prerogative to choose the tree species they wanted to interplant between their
subsistent crops. This recognition of their priorities and options gave them a
true feeling of owning the project thus making them active participants.
5.4.6 The sustainability of contractors 'participation
Although the farmers have cooperated actively during the three-year contract
reforestation despite the project's cashflow problems, what assurance is there
that they will continue to do the same after awarding the FLMA to them ? How
will they subsist during the transition period when farming is no longer feasi-
ble because the trees would have grown too high? Will the farmers not de-
stroy the trees in favour of short-term cropping? Is FLMA a sufficient condi-
tion for farmers to engage in a long-term tree growing activity? What are
some institutional mechanisms and incentives necessary to ensure farmers'
sustained positive attitude towards tree growing?
To address these questions, the following conditions appeared to be cru-
cial incentives for the sustainability of contractor's participation in tree plan-
tation establishment and maintenance.
a. Provision of stronger tenurial arrangement
The lack of tenurial security coupled with the long-term nature and high risk
of tree farming constitute major constraints to private investments in govern-
ment tree growing programs. Most participants in Lacab when asked about
tenurial preferences opted for privatization over FLMA. According to them,
under FLMA, the land still belongs to the government. When they associated
government's inability to fully protect public forest from illegal encroach-
ment, contractors felt sceptical about their exclusive ownership over the
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planted trees under FLMA. According to them, since FLMA is just a leasehold
agreement, its term is limited and undependable since administrative action
could cancel it anytime. Also, it cannot be used as collateral for loans from the
bank, owing to its unbankable nature.
To resolve contractors' tenurial insecurity, arable portions of the forest-
land should be privatized. However, their usage should be strictly for forestry
production but can be intercropped while the seedlings are still young and
short. It should start as a stewardship contract and then progressively be ele-
vated to stronger tenurial security as the farmer will continually maintain and
develop the area into farm forestry.
Tenurial security is regarded as crucial because other sustainability condi-
tions build on this premise. These other conditions are discussed individually
in the following text.
b. Introduction of agroforestry technology package
To ensure that the contractors will continue to protect the growing trees when
short-term cropping will no longer be feasible, helping them recognize the
importance of trees on soil and water conservation through agroforestry sys-
tem would provide further incentives for them to protect the project. Since
this technology can address both household's direct food and cash needs, it is
regarded as a good livelihood transition from short-term subsistent to pure
tree cropping.
c. Creation of wood market
One reason why participants usually do not regard the project's produce as a
future economic asset is because no one had assured them of immediate and
sure markets. Poor farmers are risk-averse. They cannot afford to gamble their
limited resources. Without assurance of immediate markets for their tree
products, it is unlikely that they will make the long-term investment. Contract
tree growing is one way to lessen farmers' risk besides the creation of sure
market and assurance of price security.
d. Provision of other financial incentives
There should still be a continuous financial incentive (in the form of paid la-
bour) be given to the contractor especially during the transition phase until
such time the agroforestry farm can provide him the sustained cash. Also, pro-
duction loans shall be made available to him in the future to defray his over-
head costs for plantation maintenance and protection up to the harvestable
stage. Furthermore, the vulnerability of the forest plantation to fire and insect
infestation makes crop insurance a necessary back-up instrument. Such an
insurance would reduce tree growers' risk of losing his entire investment of
time, labour and financial resources.
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5.4. 7 Towards farm forestry
Although the Lacab reforestation is successful during the three-year period of
seedling establishment, this however, is not a guarantee for sustainability to-
wards farm forestry. In summary, the success of the project during the three-
year contract period was triggered by the following factors: 1) contractors'
perceived possible DENR's sanction for project failure, 2) DENR management's
recognition of the 'on-site' participants' usufruct practice over the project
site, 3) DENR's approval of other land use combinations, 4) recruitment of
'on-site' contractors 5) participants' above subsistence level, 6) contractors'
pressing need for farmland, 7) contractors' enterprising attitude, 8) good site
arability, and 9) project's proximity and accessibility.
These aforementioned factors are not sufficient to sustain contractors' mo-
tivation towards tree farming. Considering the varied constraints and uncer-
tainties related to tree growing, a package of incentives from the planting to
the harvesting stage is needed. Various types of incentive should be offered
and the applicability of each incentive or a combination in each stage of the
project should be examined.
Furthermore, the DENR should work out practical measures to demonstrate
the compatibility and mutual enhancement between short-term subsistence
and tree cropping. This is to encourage the farmers to integrate tree growing
in their farming system. Furthermore, the government should allow the pri-
vatization of some arable portions of forestlands for exclusive forest produc-
tion purpose to attract the private sector to invest in industrial forestry.
5.5 In-Depth Case Analysis of Villa Meimban
5.5.1 Introduction
As part of the overall upland development strategy, contract reforestation was
envisaged to address both concerns for environmental rehabilitation and so-
cioeconomic upliftment of the rural poor. This was based on the assumption
that unless poverty is mitigated, conservation efforts would likely fail. The
poor are naturally more concerned about their immediate food needs than
about conservation goals. In this context, local participation cannot be ex-
pected without direct immediate benefits from tree planting and protection on
public lands.
However, wage or cash payment alone is not a sufficient condition for sus-
tained and quality participation. If not given promptly or regularly, it can be
counter productive especially when participants are directly dependent on the
project's earnings for subsistence.
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The Villa Meimban reforestation illustrates how project implementation
using paid labour as instrument for environmental action can either build or
spoil 'on-site' participants' attitude towards tree growing. The regularity of
labourers' payment affects level of participation. This was exemplified by the
fluctuating reforestation performance appeared to be associated with the con-
tinuous and later on an interrupted cash flow experiences of the project. Also,
quality participation depends on seasonal changes of the year which deter-
mine farmers' best use of their time in making a living. Participation is high
during droughts and lean months because no better income option is available
in the community than the project in such times. However, participation is
conditional and erratic when the farming season comes.
This in-depth investigation of the Villa Meimban project explains why
locally-based subsistent farmers' participation fluctuates despite being under
contract.
5.5.2 The quest for sustainable cashflow
Villa Meimban is a remote upland community, isolated from the nearest trad-
ing centre of Cordon by streams of water cutting across the main road near the
community. The frequency of incoming vehicles is limited to a few times a
week only because of the rugged and steep terrain, which requires a special
type of jeep to make the trip. During the rainy season, the road is impassable
and people have to walk 10 to 15 kilometres to reach Cordon.
Farming boomed in the 70s because of the good harvest from the newly
opened kaingin site. Most households found no difficulty making a living in
this new settlement. But life became harder as arable land shrank because of
the growing population towards the 90s. Coupled with the declining soil fer-
tility, a farmer could hardly obtain 60 cavans of corn grain compared with the
yield in previous years, which amounted to 120-150 cavans (Personal Inter-
view, 1993).
Corn, banana and vegetable production comprise the main sources of farm
income. But even during high production, farmers earn little because the gate
price of their products is almost 80 percent lower than the prevailing market
price. One surprising aspect of this community is its total integration into the
market economy, despite its isolated location. The community's lifeblood is
cash. People raise corn, vegetables and bananas for market. In return they pur-
chase rice, canned goods and other household commodities with the money
they earn from farming.
However, farming is not always feasible and profitably gainful. During
prolonged droughts, some farmers are forced to migrate to other areas in
search for non-farm jobs. Others prefer charcoal production as an alternative
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income source. Table 24 presents the various income sources of farmers in the
community before the reforestation project came to the area.
Table 24.
Income options of an average farmer in Villa Meimban prior to the introduction of
the Reforestation Project in 1987 (Personal Interview, 1993)












seasonal; depends greatly on a favou-
rable climate
income option during dry season and
long drought period
3. Non-farm job P 4,000 seasonal and intermittent
The whole area has been part of the ISFP since 1984. Increased farm produc-
tion through improved upland farming technology is the goal of the ISFP. Dur-
ing that period, farmers were encouraged to adopt the Sloping Agricultural
Land Technology (SALT) for soil conservation and sustainable farm produc-
tion. Many responded when cash was introduced to motivate farmers to con-
struct hedgerows or rockwall terraces. However, after the incentive was with-
drawn, they returned to traditional farming practices and forgot about hedge-
rows and terraces. Even worse, new kaingins were opened, clearing the
remaining tree cover in the area.
The local people have been clamouring for sustainable means of liveli-
hood to be able to cope with low harvest during uncertain times. According to
them, farming and charcoal making cannot provide for all of their cash needs
because timber stumps and fallen logs are getting scarce. This is coupled with
declining soil fertility, exacerbated by climatic uncertainty. There was also no
employment from outside to provide a sustainable and adequate income for
the whole year.
5.5.3 Cash Payment: incentive for participation
The Contract reforestation project in 1988 came at the right time. For three
successive years, farming had produced little because of a long drought.
Farmers depended entirely on the project for their income during this period.
Each interested farming household could participate in the project with an
estimated price of P 20,410 per hectare to reforest, for the whole three-year
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contracted period (Table 25). Of this sum, approximately P 16,724 was spend
on the hiring of labour.
Table 25.
Income estimates for labour per hectare to reforest (DENR Memo Circular No. 04
Series of 1990)


















Total P 13,852 1,436 1,435 P 16,724
For a five-hectare project, P 71,345 can be earned in three years for labour
alone (Table 26). The cost for a hectare at the first year cannot automatically
become the unit basis to infer the cost of a five-hectare contract since the
economy of scale operates in this case. During the first year, a farm household
could realize an income of P 56,985, in the second year: P 7,180 and in the
third year: P 7,180 or and average yearly income of P 23,781. This is a good
income for an average upland family.
Table 26. Estimated yearly earnings from labour payment per project size


























These income estimates however, merely served as an operational guide for
DENR in budgeting the total cost of the program. In practice, only 55 percent
of the total contract payment, or P 39,587 from the P 71,345, accrued to the
contractor for a five-hectare project (Table 27).
110 TREE GROWING ON DIFFERENT GROUNDS
Table 27.










Nursery operations and seed-
ling establishment
Maintenance & protection for
the first year
Maintenance & protection for
the second year
































The actual average yearly income for three years amounted to P 13,195 as-
suming that a contractor only received P 39,587 for the whole contract period.
All participants were angry. Even more frustrating was waiting for six months
to a year to be paid. According to them, they could have cooperated well with
the project management being the only readily available income source for
the community in hard times. However, with delayed payment they could not
endure to stay longer since they had to search for quick income option for
their daily subsistence.
In terms of work load, reforestation required more man-days than kaingin




Estimated workload in a reforestation project required per hectare (DENR Memo Cir-
cular No. 04, Series of 1990)
Activity
1 . Nursery activities
2. Plantation Establishment
- strip brushing
- digging & pulverization of soil
- transport of seedlings
- planting
3 . Maintenance & Protection
- ring weeding































Estimated workload hi a one hectare kaingin farm per cropping season (Personal
Interview, 1993)
Activity Month No. of man-days
1. Clear Brushing





















Ground preparation and seedling establishment in the first year are the main
bulk of the work in reforestation. The remaining two years are spent for patrol
works and replanting if necessary.
A majority of the participants mentioned the dilemma of allocating their
time and labour for farming when the rainy season came. Droughts or dry sea-
son posed no problem because farming is not feasible during such period. As
such, there is more time budgeted for the project than during farming season.
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Attending to their kaingins or ISFP farms took priority and received greater
attention. The fanners also viewed the project's activities as something that
could be postponed.
In other words, income from reforestation became the main source of sub-
sistence in bad times, but just another income option during favourable season
for farming. This perception affected the quality and sustainability of partici-
pation in the project. In the end, farming was given full priority in the good
season, whereas in the dry season or during droughts, participation depended
on the regularity of project payment.
Examining the over all performance of the policy instrument for partici-
pation, it seems that the project failed to consider how its incentive (paid la-
bour) would fare with other economic options. The following subsection illu-
strates the opportunity conscious nature of small farmers, e.g. shifting from a
lesser to a more profitable option when the opportunity arises.
5.5.4 The rise and fall of a modelproject
The first two years of operation marked a good start for the project. Partici-
pants were highly motivated to work and there was a spirit of voluntarism,
especially during fire fighting activities. Seedling survival reached 90 per-
cent, a rarity in the area's history of reforestation. With this significant ac-
complishment, it was declared the best reforestation project in Cagayan Val-
ley Region in 1988 (Personal Interview with Project Manager, 1993).
Although there was a remarkable increase in the number of participants
between 1989 and 1991, the number declined over time (Table 30). This size
of work force included both contractors and the labourers. The significant
drop in participation especially in 1992 and 1993 stemmed from the com-
bined effect of good weather conditions and participants' resentment towards
the project.
According to most respondents, the first two years of the project were con-
sidered profitable. Payment for the first year, e.g. the full 60 percent of the
total contract price was released and bolstered the confidence and motivation
of participants. In the following years, the condition totally changed. Pay-
ments were delayed, aggravated by many anomalies in the project implemen-
tation. Most participants believed that they were being cheated by the project
managers, contractors and DENR field personnel.
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Table 30.
Status of fanners' participation in the Villa Meimban Contract Reforestation


































problem of payment started
peak of inactivity; moving out to other
places
farming resumed under favourable
weather
farming booms
However, the resumption of farming in 1992 was also an important reason to
leave the project. Out of the 35 participants interviewed, 18 (51 percent) men-
tioned that farming was their priority during that year (Table 31). About 16
(46 percent) said they discontinued their participation because of their resent-
ments towards the project.
Table 31.
Factors of the declining participation in the Villa Meimban Reforestation Project
(Personal Interview, 1993)
Cause for project inactivity Number Percent
Priority to farming









The remaining 24 participants in 1993 said they had difficulty in performing
their regular tasks in the reforestation project during the peak of the farming
season.
The reduction in the workforce since 1992 had resulted in heavy setbacks
in the project. Premature abandonment and even deliberate burning of the
seedlings by disgruntled members followed. Table 32 presents the extent of
burnt area in the project which coincided with the problematic years, when
participants' departure from the project peaked.
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Table 32.
Extent of burnt area at the Villa Meimban Reforestation Project from 1988 to 1993
(Personal Interview, 1993)
Year Dropped Burnt area Remark
out (ha)
1988 0 0 Good performance; became a model project
site
1989 0 2 Long drought period
1990 20 30 Problem of payment started
1991 21 112 The peak of movement to other places in
search of stable jobs
1992 15 132 Farming resumes and less attention is given to
patrol works
1993 11 138 Farming is gaining more importance as the
weather is improving, together with a declin-
ing project's cashflow
Participants who still hoped to receive complete payment of their contract
remained in the project. However, their participation was intermittent.
This one-time model project turned into a problematic case, as farming
began picking up again. Abandoned reforestation sites were reverted to
grassland cover. Project management activities were scaled down to just a
monitoring routine for the remaining surviving area. The vast burned area
appeared to be unredeemable and some farmers tried to convert certain porti-
ons into kaingins. Tropical grasses, particularly the Sacharum and Criso-
pogon species once again started to dominate the area. All that remained were
burnt saplings of Gmelina arborea, a reminiscence of the millions of pesos
invested in the project over the past years.
Assessing the project's impact, its environmental and socioeconomic
goals have failed. Participants have not reached entrepreneurial status and
their socioeconomic condition had not been alleviated. The farmers continued
the cyclic shift from one subsistence pattern to another as they could not avail
of regular payment from the project and they were also dependent on the pre-
vailing climatic conditions.
5.5.5 Project earning's effect on participants
At some point, income from the project helped participants meet their cash
needs when farming and other livelihood options were not feasible. Many
participants commented, 'It became our main source of bread in those crucial
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times when simply nothing could be grown in our land. ' The lack of a stable
means of subsistence prompted farmers to cling to the project as a last income
alternative (Table 33).
Table 33.
Socioeconomic profile of an average farmer in Villa Meimban Reforestation
Project (Personal Interview, 1993)
Parameter Features
1. Farming system Rainfed; erratic rainfall pattern
2. Subsistence diversity Limited: farming & charcoal making
3. Subsistence stability Low; declining & unpredictable
4. Dominant farm crop Yellow corn
5. Household economy Market oriented; cash exchange
6. Average household income/year P 20,000
7. Subsistence level Barely subsistence; marginal food
Although the project's income helped farmers meet their food needs during
the drought periods, their socioeconomic condition remained unchanged. Of
the 35 active and inactive participants interviewed, a majority claimed that
they spent their earnings primarily for food (Table 34).
Table 34.
Respondents' actual use of income from participating in the Villa Meimban Refor-
estation Project (Personal Interview, 1993)














Only 2 (6 percent) mentioned that they used part of their income as farm in-
puts for buying pesticides and fertilizers for their cash crops. Since the in-
come they received merely served as a contingency during those periods of
long droughts, a majority of the participants claimed that they were not better-
off today than five years ago (Table 35).
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Table 35.
Respondents' assessment of their present socioeconomic status with reference to
five-years ago at the Villa Meimban Reforestation Project (Personal Interview,
1993)













All 35 respondents viewed the income from the project as an end in itself.
Likewise, they preferred being hired as project labourers with continuous
payment planting and maintaining trees rather than pursuing the Forest Land
Management Agreement. The majority of them had reasoned their lack of in-
terest in tree farming. According to them, they were not interested in the pro-
ject site for intercropping since they could just squat or clear new areas for
subsistent farming. This is coupled with the semi-arability of the project site
which is not suitable for short-term subsistent cropping. Table 36 summarizes
farmers' perception, motivations and level of level of participation in Villa
Meimban reforestation project at the end of the project period.
Table 36.
Farmers' perception, motivations and level of participation in Villa Meimban Re-
forestation Project (Personal Interview, 1993)
Parameter Features
1. Degree of dependence on income High especially during dry months and crop
from the project failures
Basic source of subsistence especially in hard
times
Food and farm inputs
- Increases direct dependence on the project
- Ruins actor's initiatives
Conditional, circumstantial and intermittent
Regularity of sustained cashflow
7. Intervening factor to sustained Farming activities during wet season
participation
8. Project performance over time Successful at the start, when cashflow was
high and regular
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5.5.6 Doing more harm than good
The concern for immediate income more than the prospect of future owner-
ship over the project negatively affected the level and quality of project in-
volvement among participants, as seen in the following behaviourial tenden-
cies and practices:
a. Conditional participation
Participation was low when there was no immediate payment. However,
whenever DENR field personnel assured them that the release of payment was
eminent, all of them resumed the maintenance and protection activities until
another long delay.
Some participants only performed a particular activity which should have
been done much earlier to comply with the DENR requirements for the release
of their payments. For instance, firebreaks should be constructed during sum-
mer because of the chance of grassland fires. However, some constructed
them during rainy season because of the condition that 'no payment for no
firebreaks'. In other words, everything had become conditioned by payment,
even though the activity was no longer essential at the time of its execution.
b. Transactionalparticipation
There were participants who performed activities just tantamount to what was
paid at that particular period. The 'no pay, no work' mentality was deeply
ingrained in their minds. As such, they were extremely conscious that every
activity should be equally compensated.
c. Haphazard performance
Farmers often transplanted immature seedlings to beat the targeted number of
seedlings and hectarage to be planted. Likewise, areas not thoroughly brushed
and cleaned were planted just to comply with the specified time set by DENR.
Worse than that, most contractors limited the application of fertilizer to the
young seedlings so that they could increase their profit margin.
d. Interrupted participation
The 'off and on' participation of most farmers was not intentional. According
to them, they make the most of every opportunity to provide added income for
their families. When a sudden call for labour came for short-term or daily
wage off-farm jobs, most grabbed the opportunity, while postponing the work
in the project. Similarly, during rainy season, all of the participants have to
attend to their farm first. At times they no longer had time to work in their
project because of the mounting work load on the farm as they tried to cope
with the availability of rainfall. Occasionally, when there was a field inspec-
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tion scheduled by DENR field personnel, participants doubled their time trying
to cope with both farm and reforestation activities. However, normally, farm-
ing and other immediate earning options took priority.
e. Premature abandonment of the project
Delayed payment and undercompensation posed doubts on the project's real
intention of helping the participants' economically. Some of the marginally
poor participants prematurely abandoned their areas and went back to char-
coal making. Others went out to other places in search for work. A number of
them simultaneously worked on the project while seeking off-farm jobs, like
carpentry work, charcoal making or gardening from time to time.
The need for immediate cash kept them from staying on the project. Some
commented, 'it is not worth spending our time and energy to something that
cannot ensure us of our immediate daily need.' In short, the search for sus-
tained daily income during lean months greatly affected consistent involve-
ment in the project.
f. Deliberate burning of the project
Although nobody had claimed the responsibility for causing grassland fires in
the project area, most participants believed that some of the incidences were
deliberately set by disgruntled members (Table 37).
Table 37.
Respondents' perception of the causes of the previous grassland fires at the Villa



















g. Concern for cash more than project ownership
Almost all participants did not have a sense of deeper involvement in the pro-
ject. This was manifested by their poor involvement in the project. Their lack
of interest in pursuing FLMA made them complacent about maintaining and
protecting the project. Even though payments were delayed, they could have
still continued maintaining the project while waiting for the rains to come for
farming. However, they regarded completely the project as source of immedi-
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ate livelihood and ignored the prospect of owning it in the future through
FLMA. One of their reasons for their disinterest in FLMA was the long gestation
of tree crop coupled by the poor arability of the project site for intercropping
of fruit trees. Also, land for farming seemed not to be a pressing need for the
farmers, since almost all of them kept on opening new kaingins for subsistent
cropping. In short, what mainly motivated them to participate was the cash
incentive for tree planting in the reforestation project.
5.5.7 The factors of project f allure
From this case study, it seems that the socioeconomic objective of the pro-
gram has overridden the concern for forest renewal. Although the project has
provided employment it has not raised the participants' entrepreneurial capac-
ity however. It merely filled their cash needs during bad times and the worse,
it deepened their direct dependence on the project.
At the beginning there was a good reforestation performance when project
payment was very regular. This was also in time with the long drought, in
which the locally-based farmers had no choice but to participate actively in
the project as a last resort for their means of subsistence. However, the fol-
lowing years were characterized by erratic and problematic releases of con-
tract payments which prompted most all 'on-site' participants to go back to
farming at that time when the climate got better. Their participation signifi-
cantly dropped. Those who remained had intermittent project involvement in
favour of farming.
From this analysis, it appears that regularity of payment is a critical con-
dition for sustained participation among below subsistent farmers. This holds
true whether in a bad or good season of the year but most especially in hard
times. During the rainy season, the interference of farming with project activi-
ties especially in the second and third years is no longer critical. The last two
years are intended for patrol works against grassland fires. But during the
wet-season, the risk of grassland fire is extremely low. Thus, simultaneous
farming could never have become a problem if project payment would have
been regular.
Furthermore, community cooperation against fire could have been
enhanced because all participants were locally-based. However, the inability
of the DENR to remit regularly labourers' payment spoiled the initial good per-
formance of the project. Also, the problem of late payments could have been
circumvented if there were rich contractors in the community. Almost all par-
ticipants were below the subsistence level.
In conclusion, the project failed not because of the negative site conditions
but mainly due to the management failure of providing the participants the
needed cash incentive promptly and regularly. However, on the overall as-
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sessment, it appears that the following factors have all contributed directly or
indirectly to the failure of the project, namely: 1) DENR's failure to release
contract payments promptly and regularly, 2) project management's marred
image which ruined participants' confidence of expecting more future pro-
jects, 3) participants' marginal economic condition, 4) absence of rich con-
tractors who could have paid meantime their labourers' wages, 5) partici-
pants' low farming need, 6) contractors' lack of enterprising attitude, and 7)
poor site arability.
5.6 Iii-Depth Case Analysis of Maguirig
5.6.1 Introduction
As became apparent in the results of the exploratory investigation in Section
5.2, the yearly burning of the reforestation project in Maguirig was allegedly
attributed to conflicting land claims over the project area. Most farmers subtly
allowed the encroachment of their farmlands by the Forestry Department in
exchange for employment in the original reforestation project established in
the area in 1978. Reforestation performance at the beginning was claimed to
be high when the project employed local residents in the community.
There were several tree growing schemes that succeeded the original re-
forestation project later on. The dispute over land rights was overlooked as
the local people continued to benefit from the project's earnings. However,
when the Contract Reforestation was introduced in 1990 on the same site, the
bias recruitment of participants in favour of outsiders kindled the local peo-
ple's unrest over their lands.
Some local participants would like the project to continue, but the majority
was calling for its closure. In the later years, no substantial accomplishment
occurred. Some of the early occupants felt the growing need to cultivate their
occupied farmlands again. The conflict over who had the legal claim over the
area made many other interest groups speculate over the project site.
The aim of this in-depth investigation of the Maguirig case was to probe
further how the situation came about. The fact that there was an initial coop-
eration between the community and management in the past despite existing
tenurial overlaps in the site posed some doubts in the way the current refore-
station project was being implemented.
5.6.2 History of the land conflict
At the beginning of the government's regular reforestation in 1978, the Pro-
ject Manager subtly included private lands in the project area. He convinced
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the farmers to plant trees in their private lands. In return, he promised them
employment from tree planting and maintenance in the project. Also, he as-
sured them that 'the land would still belong to them and that the only interest
of the Forestry Department was tree planting in the same site'. The realization
of a large project area resulted generally in a considerable funding, thus open-
ing a greater opportunity to squander it for personal gain.
This subtle usurpation of private lands was reinforced by subsequent tree
growing projects in the same site under varying management regimes (Table
38).
Today, the area is still maintained by the DENR while the local people still
are hopeful that some day their lands will be reverted to them. Some of them
consider to resume farming in their occupied lots by the project, while others
have already started to clear some portions for short-term subsistent cropping.
Worse still, a greater portion of the project is abandoned and turned into a
communal grazing area.
Table 38.
Chronological transformation of the tenurial status of the Maguirig Reforestation
Project site from 1950 to 1990 (Personal Interview, 1993)
Year Tenurial/project regime Reason
1950s 'Alienable & Disposal' Released for private titling
1978 Communal Tree Farm Community tree growing as a reforestation
scheme employing original land claimants
1985 Integrated Social Forestry Awarding of stewardship contracts to interested
occupants but not necessarily the original legal
claimants of the area
1987 Regular Reforestation ISF was unsuccessful and the area was reverted
to public tree growing project
1990 Contract Reforestation The regular project turned to contract reforesta-
tion as the most recent tree growing scheme on
public lands
5.6.3 Recruitment of the wrong actors
Under the first reforestation project in the area, the local people were hired as
daily wage labourers from 1978 up to the end of the 80's. This was a trade-off
for allowing the project to operate in private farmlands.
However, in 1990, the contract reforestation was introduced with a new
project management. The historical precedence of employing local people
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was violated with the recruitment of more 'off-site' participants than the local
residents (Table 39).
Table 39.
Percentage of local and non-local participants at the Maguirig Reforestation Project
(Personal Interview, 1993)
















About 76 percent of the total participants came from the outside. The majority
(85 percent) were subcontracted labourers who were daily wage earners,
moving from one place to another searching for off-farm work during dry sea-
son.
Although there were few local contractors recruited, their areas did not
coincide according to their original spatial position in the site.
Table 40.
Economic profile of an averaged hired labourer of the Maguirig Reforestation Pro-
ject (Personal Interview, 1993)
Parameter Features
1. Farmholding Almost all are under tenancy
2. Farmholding size One hectare
3. Rainfall pattern Erratic; distinct dry and wet
4. Farming system Rainfed and irrigated
5. Diversity of subsistence Rice fanning & wage labour
6. Dominant livelihood Rice fanning
7. Stability of major form of subsistence Stable
8. Annual household income P 24,000
9. Level of subsistence Barely above subsistence
10. Average household size Seven
Although the area is predominantly a farming community, most farms are un-
der tenancy. Local farmers do not really gain much profit from rice farming
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because of the cost of production besides the exorbitant interest of the loans
they use in fanning. As such, many of them try to supplement their farm earn-
ings with other income options available in the community. Table 40 presents
the economic profile of an averaged hired labourer of the project.
Most of the project contractors, on the other hand, are financially stable.
Those from the outside were already in cash surplus level and were among the
very influential people in the locality. Table 41 presents the income status of
both 'on-site' and 'off-site' contractors.
Table 41.
Annual income distribution of contractors at the Maguirig Reforestation Project
(Personal Interview, 1993)


























The great number of 'off-site' participants has put the project in a poor stra-
tegic position. All of the subcontracted daily wage labourers from outside
were sedentary workers always searching for off-farm jobs. When grassland
fires occurred, one could not reckon on them because of their distance and
intermittent presence in the area.
The exclusion of most local residents created animosity towards the pro-
ject. In the past, local people voluntarily participated in fire fightings. But
now, they became passive and indifferent. Some speculated that a number of
fire incidences were deliberately set by local people who resented the project.
5.6.4 Tree planting for what?
The awarding of most contracts to outsiders had a purely political reason.
Most of those who were awarded with contracts were related to the project
manager either by blood or extended affiliation. The Local Government Unit
was the only local organization that obtained a contract. However, even in the
way the Barangay Captain chose her members, there was nepotism in favour
of her close kin and officers of the village.
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The subcontracted labourers viewed their project participation as a form of
intermittent employment. Their tenure was temporary, and all that they
wanted was the financial compensation for their work.
The local contractors shared the same view. They joined the project not
because they saw the importance of trees in the community but simply for
financial gain. Even after knowing the provisions of FLMA, they were not in-
terested to pursue it because of their prior knowledge about the conflicting
status of the area. 'Off-site' wealthy contractors joined the project and in-
tended to speculate the site for pasture area in the future. Some were moti-
vated to provide additional income to their entrusted men through the project.
Table 42 shows the motivation of contractors towards the project.
Table 42.
Contractors' motivations for joining the Maguirig Reforestation Project (Personal
Interview, 1993)
Motivation Contractors (N= 15) Percentage
Local Outsider
1 . Income for employment
2. Land speculation










About 40 percent of the contractors perceived that the project will be turned
over to the government, while 47 percent believed it will belong to the con-
tractor (Table 43). Those who viewed the project as government's property
mainly participated for cash.
Table 43.
Contractor's view of project ownership at the Maguirig Reforestation Project (Per-
sonal Interview, 1993)
Motivation Contractors (N= 15) Percentage
Local Outsider
1 . It will belong to the government
2. It will belong to the contractor










Among the local contractors, most of them were inhibited to introduce site
developments in the area. According to them, 'No matter how much they de-
sire to interplant other tree crops in the area, they are always prevented by
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their preconceived notion that the land is not theirs. ' On the other hand, the
outside contractors believed that if they could comply to the government's
requirements for FLMA, they would have a good chance to keep the area for 25
years under the forestry leasehold agreement. However, their failure to recruit
'on-site' labourers did not spare their projects from frequent grassland fires.
They were demoralized after their areas got burned. However, this did not
affect their confidence of getting new contracts in the future because they re-
garded themselves as friends or close associates of the regional or local DENR
top officials.
5.6.5 The breakdown in property regime
Originally, a portion of the project site was classified as private agricultural
lands as many of the local people claimed. Most of them still have a legal title
which they obtained in the early 1950s. In principle, the project had occupied
both private lands and public lands.
There was not so much a problem in the first reforestation project because
the 'on-site' participants that time were assured of their property rights over
the site. With the successive shifts of projects in the later years, local partici-
pation gradually diminished as the new project managers recruited more out-
siders than insiders. Consequently, community cooperation was difficult to
attain especially during fire fighting activities.
Most of the contractors claimed that most fire incidence in the area were
deliberately caused by local people (Table 44).
Table 44.
Contractors' view of the causes of grassland fires at the Maguirig Reforestation Pro-




















Most of them claimed that it was purposive, and stemmed from the need to
produce continuously fresh new shoots from the grasses for their animals (Ta-
ble 45). Although some viewed burning of grasses as an inevitable phenome-
non in the area, all believed that it could have been prevented from encroach-
ing the entire reforestation project, if local people had been contracted.
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Table 45.
Contractors' view of people's motive of setting fires in the Maguirig Reforestation
Project (Personal Interview, 1993)
Primary motivation of burning
1 . Out of resentment










Today, the abandoned portion of the project site turned into an open grazing
area. The few patches of surviving seedlings were those that were being main-
tained by the local contractors.
Tracing the gradual breakdown of local ownership claims, over the site
(i.e., from private to communal to open access resource), the community peo-
ple were in a dilemma of what to do next with the project. Accordingly, even
though the land belonged to them legally, if the government wanted to re-pos-
sess it for a community project, they were willing to waive their rights. How-
ever, because of the presence of outsiders with a disguise motive over the
land, the local people began to loose confidence on the contract reforestation
project's intention in the area.
Prompted by fear of eventual displacement, the original claimants con-
sciously tolerate open grazing even in their one-time private lots. They pre-
ferred to see the land turned into a community property rather than to turn it
over to private individuals from outside the community. According to them,
they would be in a stronger political position, if the whole community would
unite as one for the protection of a common resource rather than each individ-
ual fighting for his own claim.
But in practice, grazing is not an exclusive right of the local people.
Because of the dispute of ownership claim, some land speculators and 'free-
riders' took advantage of the situation by treating the site as an open access
resource.
In short, the gradual breakdown in property regime over time has not only
worsened the tenurial status of the area, but it has also decreased the prospect
of reforestation success in the site. 'Off-site' contractors often complained
about the rampant practice of grazing in the area that caused severe damage to
the newly planted seedlings. Followed by periodic grassland burning, they
felt helpless to abate such episodical environmental hazard.
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5.6.6 Confronting local people's option
Although most of the local residents felt bad about their not being hired as
contractors, they were still confident to regain their rights over the land. Many
of them also entertained the possibility of joining the project in the future.
Table 46 presents the views and future options of respondents randomly se-
lected as regards to the status of the project in the area.
Table 46.
Local people's views and options regarding the land use in the Maguirig Reforesta-
tion Project (Personal Interview, 1993)








Revert the area to private land
Maintain the area for grazing
Cancel the reforestation project
Continue the project and hire local people
Prefer the area for agriculture














All respondents would like the see the disputed area be reverted into private
property of the original claimant. However, all of them also expressed the
need to maintain the area as a communal grazing site. The majority saw two
possibilities for the project. One option could be its cancellation as suggested
by 84 percent of the respondents. Reasons stemmed from the project's failure
to employ more local people than outsiders. Another option was to continue
the project as supported by 72 percent, on the condition that only local people
were hired.
When asked about their plans for the old-aged standing trees planted dur-
ing the early reforestation project, a majority wanted to maintain some of
them and clear the arable portions of the site for subsistent farming. Others
preferred to clear the whole area for planting fruit trees (Table 47).
Those who wished to resume fanning regarded the standing trees on their
lots as belonging to the DENR. According to them, they would not mind if the
government would receive income from the entire tree crop as long as they
could regain their farmlots. Some wanted to plant fruit trees instead of forest
trees.
Three local contractors were not interested in pursuing FLMA, even if their
projects would qualify. They gave as a reason the lack of tenurial security
over the land they presently maintained for the project. In the future, they
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said, they would prefer to work again as contractors and possibly pursue
FLMA if the area to be awarded to them is free from disputes and has a good
soil. To gain additional land rather than interest in future tree produce was
what motivated them.
Table 47.
Local people's plan in case the project site will revert to private land (Personal Inter-
view, 1993)
Future plan Respondents (N=50) Percent
1 . Maintain some trees and convert the ara-
ble portion for cash crop production
2. Clear some portions for fruit trees







5.6.7 Factors of project failure
The poor project performance in the area was mainly attributed to the dra-
matic change in local people's attitude towards the management. In 1978, fire
fighting was a voluntary communal activity. Despite the subtle inclusion of
their private lots in the reforestation area, they still cooperated because all of
them were hired as labourers. Today, the lack of communal involvement in
fire protection stemmed from three main factors.
First, the new project management failed to sustain the established local
cooperation through its bias recruitment of labourers in favour of outsiders.
Because the majority of the participants were 'off-site', they were only inter-
mittently present. They are not available during fire fighting activities. The
community people on the other hand were indignant towards the manager. As
such, they became apathetic and indifferent towards the project.
Second, the recruitment of more outsiders reinforced local people's appre-
hension about the tenurial status of their occupied lands. Being not contracted
to do reforestation, they feared the possibility of losing their land rights the
moment the project would turn to FLMA. This feeling of land right insecurity
could be one basis of local people's deliberate burning of the project as many
claimed.
Third, the failure of the project management to set sanction for poor pro-
ject performance has spoiled the initiatives and strivings of the outside con-
tractors for a better performance. Being rich and influential, they exploited
the politically infested Forest Bureaucracy in the region. As such, their strong
influence gave them no incentive to strive well in their performance because
of their confidence that they could avail of future projects just the same. Fur-
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thermore, they could have hired local labourers or defrayed meantime their
labourer's wages to keep them from premature exit, thus saving the project.
In conclusion, the project failed not because of the initial land tenure con-
flict in the area, but mainly due to the contract reforestation project
management's inability to build on the already existing community cooper-
ation. This was mainly attributed to the following intervening factors: 1)
management's low recruitment of 'on-site' participants, 2) its non-recogni-
tion of the usufruct/tenurial rights of the local people, 3) its delayed release of
contract payment, 4) its non-provision of sanctions for poor performance, 5)
contractors' non-payment of their labourers' wages meantime, 6) their lack of
enterprising attitude, 7) labourers' marginal economic condition, 8) site's
problematic tenurial status, and, 9) its inaccessibility to 'off-site' participants.
5.7 Analysis of the Bottomline Motivation of Actor's
Participation
This section presents the bottomline of contractor's sustained participation in
seedling maintenance and protection in the first three-year period of the con-
tract reforestation projects. It also highlights the relevance of the various suc-
cess conditions and variables associated with project performance.
5.7.1 Project performance variables
Based on the results of the exploratory investigation, there are eight condi-
tions associated with contractor's sustained participation in seedling main-
tenance and protection in Cagayan Valley, namely:
1. Intercropping: the contractor's subsistent or cash crops interplanted in the
same project site apart from the tree crops;
2. Financial Situation: whatever the contractor's income source is, it should
be above the subsistence level;
3. Aspiration for Good Track Record: the contractor hopes to get also future
project contracts for a good performance;
4. Assured Access/Property Rights: the contractor's present usufruct or te-
nurial right over the site is recognized or that he is being assured of a fu-
ture project ownership;
5. Interest in Other Related Tree Uses: the contractor's expressed interest on
some future land use development prospects in the project site or tree uses
and benefits derived from other than wood products;
6. Prior Awareness of the FLMA: contractors' initial knowledge of the FLMA
concept and provisions;
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7. Good Working Relationship with DENR: refers to the casual and close inter-
action between contractors and DENR project management;
8. Sense of Community Cooperation: local residents' voluntary participation
in fire protection and strict regulation of open grazing inside the project
site.
The above mentioned conditions were subjected to Chi-square for the test of
significance. Table 48 shows the results of the Chi-square test. A 2 x 2 table
was constructed to calculate their Chi-square values (Appendix 2). The square
blocks were build up on one axis 'High/Low Performance' and the other axis
the factor Present/Not Present, which is filled in with the number of contrac-
tors.
Table 48.
The results of the Chi-square test for the various success conditions for sustained











Interested in other related tree uses
Financial situation
Assured access / property right
Sense of community concern
Aspire for good track record
Prior awareness of FLMA






























5.7.2 The relevance of the success conditions
Based on the results of the Chi-square test conducted, there appeared to be six
dominant variables consistently recurred in all of the four case studies investi-
gated. These variables referred to as success conditions to contractor's sus-
tained participation in seedling maintenance and protection are as follows: 1)
intercropping between seedlings, 2) interest in other related tree uses, 3) good
financial situation of participants, 4) assured access or property right, 5) com-
munity cooperation, and 6) aspiration for good track record. Although these
conditions are not independent from each other, they all seem to give their
own contributions to success or failure.
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To illustrate the relevance of these six success conditions, their individual
bearing on seedling maintenance was examined as the two successful projects
(Lacab and Salinas) were being contrasted to the two problematic ones (Ma-
guirig and Villa Meimban). The success conditions are all present in the suc-
cessful projects but not in the unsuccessful ones. The presence or absence of
the success conditions forms the basis of the analysis.
a. Intercropping between seedlings
1. 'Successful Projects'
The opportunity of intercropping simultaneously in the project site gave
greater chance for the planted seedlings to be taken care of by participants. In
Lacab, the presence of farmers' main subsistence and cash crops in the site
prompted them to clean regularly and conduct patrol works in the project. As
they cultivated and cleaned the field interplanted with corn, upland rice, cof-
fee, banana, papaya, root crops, and vegetables, they did ring weeding on the
growing seedlings simultaneously.
In Salinas on the other hand, farmers who interplanted mango (Mangifera
indicd) between the Gmelina seedlings did periodic weeding and cleaning to
save both species from grassland fires. Few contractors who have farms adja-
cent to the project area and which are situated within the arable portions prac-
tised intercropping.
2. 'Unsuccessful Projects'
Although intercropping was one stipulated provision in the contract, the Ma-
guirig and Villa Meimban contractors did not practice it despite the good soil
condition of some portions of the project sites. The existence of local claim-
ants over the project area discouraged both 'on-site' and 'off-site' contractors
to intercrop despite its good arability in Maguirig.
In Villa Meimban, there are some arable portions in the project site that
can be farmed. The contractors however, found no interest to do intercropping
since all of them claimed to have a vast farmholding to cultivate.
b. Interest in other related tree uses
1. 'Successful Projects'
Most contractors in Lacab ambitioned agroforestry as an intermediary
farming system when intercropping would no longer be feasible. Their con-
fidence to qualify for FLMA triggered further interest in maintaining the trees
they planted for future uses.
The rich contractors in Salinas took the burden of defraying meantime
their labourers' wages as often as project payments were delayed. Motivated
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by strong desire to turn the area into silvipastoral use under FLMA, they strived
to keep their work force intact through meeting their labourers' cash needs.
Many local pasture lease owners in the area indicated their willingness to dis-
perse heads of cattle to interested project participants. This arrangement en-
couraged even the subsistent contractors to strive for FLMA.
The Rational Peasant Theory applies in this context since farmers (in La-
cab) were open to innovation despite the uncertainties they may face ahead. In
Salinas, the rich contractors were regarded as rational problem-solvers con-
cerned with both their own interests and how to address the needs of others in
order to achieve a mutually acceptable outcome.
2. 'Unsuccessful Projects'
Although the rich 'off-site' contractors in Maguirig perceived the planted
trees as important component for homestead in the future, this ambition was
subdued by the overlapping tenurial status of the site. Coupled with their far
distance from the area, they were not sure whether or not they could protect
the growing trees later on from local firewood gatherers.
Contractors in Villa Meimban expressed no interest in tree farming or any
other use of the project. Their concern was focused most on the direct cash
income from the project. They did not yet sense the importance of growing
trees for their household consumption, having much confidence that the near-
by shrublands would still be able to meet their future needs. In other words,
they were not enterprising to view tree growing as an investment for future
benefit. Also, they perceived the project as government's possession. Being
hired only to plant trees at the site, they feared that they might not share in the
harvest of the tree produce in the future. This behaviour observed in both
problematic projects coincided with the Risk-Averse Theory claiming that
rural farmers often minimize the subjective probability of the maximum loss.
c. Financial situation of contractors
1. 'Successful Projects'
Although most of the family contractors in Lacab are all subsistent fanners,
they were not desperately dependent on the project's income for subsistence.
The produce from banana, vegetable, corn and upland rice sufficiently meets
their food and cash needs. They regarded earnings from the project as addi-
tional household income for housekeeping expenses other than food.
The majority of the participants in Salinas are above subsistence level.
With the dual or multiple livelihoods of most, this cushioned them from the
effects of the project's late payments. Earnings from the project however
served as capital savings, tuition fees for children's schooling and for buying
farm implements or farm production inputs. Rich contractors defrayed mean-
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time poor labourers' wages to surmount DENR's failure to keep up with its
financial responsibility. Participants not desperately dependent on the project
for subsistence remained up to the last year of the contracted period even
without immediate compensation.
2. 'Unsuccessful Projects'
Most contractors in Maguirig are rich. Their labourers, however, are practi-
cally all itinerant daily wage labourers always in search of jobs that could pro-
vide them immediate cash earnings. Similarly, the Villa Meimban partici-
pants are marginally poor with unstable sources of subsistence. If farming
was feasible, they temporarily abandoned the project but tended to depend on
it for subsistence during lean months and drought periods. Almost all labour-
ers in both projects prematurely deserted their contractors when payments
from the project got delayed for eight to twelve months or even longer. In
Villa Meimban, some participants went back to charcoal making, others
sought jobs outside the community. The rich contractors did not mitigate the
cash flow problem of their poor labourers in Maguirig. The latter sought other
off-farm jobs in other places.
The trend in these two study sites revealed that if projects' earnings pri-
marily used for subsistence, participants' sustained involvement in seedling
protection and maintenance was unlikely. When project payments were de-
layed, they looked for other work that could give them immediate earnings.
d. Assured access or property right
1. 'Successful Projects'
Contractors in Lacab had strong sense of ownership over the project site.
Having their cropland at the same time, they aspired for security of tenure in
the area. At first, they were just concerned in maintaining their usufruct, a
condition that could not warrant long-term interest in tree growing. Since
farming the area predominated over contractors' interest on trees, mutilating
or burning the plantation when intercropping will no longer be feasible. This
was the reason why they opted for Pterocarpus indicus and Swietenia macro-
phyla (long gestation species) instead of Gmelina arborea (a fast growing
species) to prolong their intercropping in the area. They used wider seedling
spacing of 3 x 3 meters instead of 2 x 2 meters to maximize the area culti-
vated. However, when they learned later the provisions of FLMA, 25 years for-
est leasehold arrangement, this motivated them to continue protecting and
maintaining the seedlings.
In Salinas, all successful contractors expressed the intention to proceed to
FLMA. Their ambition to gain property right over the site through FLMA en-
couraged them to perform well in the project. Even before learning about the
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FLMA instrument, however, some contractors have already presumptuously
asserted ownership rights by planting fruit trees in between seedlings. Others
started exploring the prospect of integrating livestock production. Still an-
other one constructed peripheral fencing, being confident that the FLMA in-
strument will be awarded to him.
2. 'Unsuccessful Projects'
Both 'on-site' and 'off-site' contractors in Maguirig did not ambition to pur-
sue FLMA, although it could have been the appropriate opportunity to gain a
renewed legal claim over the disputed area. There were two reasons for their
disinterest for FLMA. First, being just a stewardship agreement which can be
revoked any time by administrative action, the FLMA was viewed as inade-
quate. Second, the local contractors were doubtful of the applicability of the
instrument in the area. The presence of local legal claimants in the community
discouraged them to opt for FLMA. According to them, FLMA could reinforce
their previous claims if they were contracted 'in-place' i.e., according to their
spatial land location in the site.
In Villa Meimban, contractors found no incentive applying for property
rights over the project area. They claimed that acquiring a landholding is not
problem to them because they can just clear an area on the vast open public
domain.
e. Aspiration for good track record
1. ' Successful Proj ects '
Contractors in Lacab perceived their eventual ejection from their usufruct
area once they fall short of DENR's reforestation performance requirements.
They had in mind the danger that outsiders might be contracted later on if they
could not satisfy the project management's standard. The contractors associ-
ated this possible eventuality with the sanction they earlier experience with
government's punitive measures in the 70s. In effect, this further reinforced
their striving for a good project performance despite no regular DENR pay-
ments.
The performing contractors in Salinas on the other hand, believed that
their success in the first project would eventually draw more contracts for
them in the future. The psychological sanction and incentive to gain more
benefits heightened contractors' motivation of performing well in Lacab and
Salinas respectively.
This supports De Groot's (1992) concept about the quest for honor or pres-
tige ('honoris') and economic gain ('homo economicus') as among the three
moral bases of investment decision.
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2. 'Unsuccessful Projects'
The rich 'off-site' contractors in Maguirig did not feel any possible sanction
as a threat for longer project involvement. According to them, they can easily
avail of future contracts from the program through their friends and political
connections in the forestry bureaucracy.
In Villa Meimban, government's failure to release contract payments on
time ruined contractors' confidence towards the project. Participants no lon-
ger expected the possibility of more contracts to be awarded in the future.
Most of them reasoned out, 'if the government cannot pay us now, why ex-
pect more project contracts to come'. There was no incentive to aspire for
good project performance since participants were not certain whether or not




In Lacab, farmer-contractors evolved a local regulation among themselves to
cooperate with one another in protecting the project from stray animals. This
was possible because almost all of them are residing in the same farming
community. Furthermore, they realized the importance of the project in pro-
tecting the watershed that continuously sustains the irrigation water for rice
farming.
This self-induced local cooperation among contractors in Lacab and to
some extent in Salinas contradicts Olson's logic of collective action theory in
one aspect. Contrary to his emphasis of the need for outside intervention to
bring about collective action, a communal compliance in fire protection and
observance of open grazing restriction in both sites are practiced through vol-
untary cooperation.
2. 'Unsuccessful Projects'
Community cooperation was not evident in Maguirig because the greater ma-
jority of the participants came from outside. Unlike in the past, when the la-
bourers of the project all came from the community, fire protection was a
communal activity. Today, the local residents ceased to participate voluntary
in fire fighting activities. Worse still, they were allegedly blamed for the
causes of most grassland fires in the area lately.
Although the Villa Meiban participants were all locally-based, community
cooperation failed because participants themselves had low regard to the pro-
ject. Overwhelmed by resentments over late payments and under-
compensation, practically all of them prematurely deserted the project. When
there were fires nobody cared to stop them, even if they had the chance to ar-
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rest it. They reasoned out the futility of risking their life for a project which
did not compensate them fairly and regularly for their work.
5.7.3 Determinant f actors of the success conditions
Based on the results of the in-depth investigation in the Cagayan Valley case
studies, the determinant factors of the success conditions were identified.
With respect to the site's characteristics, the following determinant factors
are:
a. site arability (soil, climate and physiography);
b. accessibility (distance and ease of reaching the project site from the con-
tractor's residence);
c. status of property regime (tenurial status of the site).
With respect to contractor's characteristics, the following determinant factors
are:
a. subsistence level (degree of food or cash security);
b. farmholding need (striving for land to cultivate or pressing need for more
arable land to cultivate);
c. meantime payment of labourers' wages (contractor's practice of tempor-
arily lending cash or in kind goods to project labourers in the absence of
DENR regular and prompt payments);
d. enterprising attitude (a characteristic of having initiative, foresight, busi-
ness inclination, exploratory nature, and risk in new ventures).
With respect to project management's characteristics, the following determi-
nant factors are:
a. assurance of project prospects (a promise of future projects for the con-
tractor or assurance of his secured stay in the site as a condition for good
project performance);
b. promptness of DENR payment (regularity and timely release of participant's
contract payment);
c. recognition of usufruct or tenurial right (respect for 'on-site' participant's
or local farmer's claim over the land within the domain of the project
area);
d. approval of other land use combinations (allowance for other tree crop
combinations or future physical site developments);
e. recruitment of 'on-site 'participants (hiring of local people or farmers who
are positioned in the site).
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5. 7.4 Comparative evaluation between successful and unsuccessful
projects
The six success conditions not inherent in a given project are dependent on
the combined effects of site's, contractor's and project management's char-
acteristics. To further differentiate successful from unsuccessful projects, it is
interesting to examine how the success conditions are determined by the criti-
cal determinant factors in each site.
The two successful projects are not really different in all aspects from the
two unsuccessful ones. They were chosen on the basis of their contrasting
performance but with comparable constraints or opportunities. What differ-
entiates one project from the other was their varying project management
characteristic.
Table 49.
















6. Aspiration of good
track record
arable in some areas (o)*
enterprising contractors (o)
enterprising contractors (o)







'on site' recruitment of
participants (s)

















no prompt release of pro-
ject's payment (s)
low farm need (c)
no enterprising
contractors (c)
no prompt release of pro-
ject's payment (s)
no prompt release of pro-
ject's payment resulted in
loss of confidence in
project's future (s)
* o = success opportunity; c = success constraint; s = project management steering effect.
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Salinas was contrasted to Villa Meimban because both have similar site set-
tings. The relevant site features include: moderate soil arabiliry, fire prone
area, good site location and accessibility, and clarity of property regime. Their
difference however, lies on the type of contractors and participants. Salinas'
contractors are relatively better-off contractors and most participants are more
economically stable than those in Villa Meimban. In both sites, the partici-
pants were all locally-based, a strategic success factor from project manage-
ment's view.
Table 50.




















approval of other land use
combination (s)
High farm holding need (o)
enterprising contractors (o)





high farm need (o)
recognition of usufruct
practice (s)















no prompt release of pro-
ject's payment (s)
no meantime payment of
labourer's wage
conflicting site property re-
gime (c)
not easily accessible to
outsiders (c)
'off-site' recruitment (s)
'no sanction' feelings of con-
tractors due to DENR's
subservience
' o = opportunity; c = constraint; s = management steering effect.
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Likewise, Lacab was matched with Maguirig because both areas shared com-
mon characteristics as follows: arable site, precarious property regime of site,
remote but accessible, and fire prone. In Lacab however, contractors were
'on-site' and have been usufructing in the site prior to the introduction of the
reforestation project. While in Maguirig, the previous occupants of the project
area were denied of their privilege to participate in the project in favour of
outsiders. However, both projects were considered problematic in terms of
clarity of property regime. The initial presence of local people currently
claiming or usufructing in the sites is considered a nuisance or constraint for
project success from the standpoint of management.
To illustrate the effects of site's, contractor's and project management's
characteristics on project performance, Tables 46 and 47 show the interplay
of the different critical determinant factors for each success condition. As a
guide, only those critical factors which are primarily responsible for initiating
or triggering participant's response towards a situation are included in the
listing. Both constraints and opportunities are present in the successful and
the not- successful projects. However, for the successful projects, only the
determinant factors creating opportunities for success were presented in Ta-
bles 49 and 50. Likewise, those factors creating constraints hold true for the
unsuccessful projects.
5.7.5 Critical relevance of the determinant factors
The six success conditions identified in this contrast analysis are dependent
on various determinant factors which are further classified into three major
groupings referred to as project's background settings: site, contractor's and
project management's characteristics.
To understand the relevance of these variables to project success, the same
successful and unsuccessful projects were compared and contrasted as fol-
lows:
Set A: Between Salinas and Villa Meimban
As mentioned earlier, the two projects have comparable site features. In Sa-
linas, the cash surplus condition of most contractors or the above subsistence
level of most labourers could be viewed as opportunity for project success.
This is an opportunity because it cushioned participants agony of directly de-
pending on the delayed project's income. But this opportunity could have
been spoiled if there was no further incentive offered for deserving contrac-
tors. Since subsistence needs are not the bottomline of contractor's participa-
tion, the management was able to build on the opportunity by providing as-
surance of future project prospects to good performing contractors. Eventual-
ly, most rich contractors defrayed meantime their labourers' wages to prevent
their work force from premature disintegration. Thus, they were able to obtain
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a high ICM rating for the three successive years which will qualify them for
the FLMA.
On the other hand, in Villa Meimban, the below subsistence level condi-
tions of both contractors and labourers were considered as constraints. Being
desperately dependent on the project's earnings, the regularity of payment
was crucial in sustaining participants' project involvement. However, the
management was not able to mitigate this. Instead, it reinforced this negative
setting by unintentional delays of contract payments. This resulted to the pre-
mature abandonment of the project. There could have been a good chance for
the project to succeed because all participants were locally-based.
This interaction between the site, contractor's and management's settings
is shown in Fig. 3.
Set B: Between Lacab andMaguirig
The Lacab and Maguirig projects have similar characteristics in terms of site
arability, site proximity to contractors and problems of squatting or the pres-
ence of claimants over the site. In Lacab, the area is a forest zone but under
cultivation by migrant farmers prior to the introduction of the project. The
Maguirig's condition is worse where there is overlapping of land tenure and
the local residents were claiming the area as theirs. However, the condition in
both cases was regarded as a constraint for effective project management.
In Lacab, however, the project management was able to mitigate such con-
straint by its deliberate recognition of the usufruct practice of the farmers po-
sitioned in the site. They were contracted to reforest their own piece of farm-
holding without interrupting their farming livelihood. In short, there was 'on-
site ' or 'in-place ' recruitment of participants.
The clearly different management intervention however made the project
in Maguirig a total failure. It suffered from lack of community cooperation.
However, prior to the contract reforestation, the earlier tree growing project in
the area claimed to be better in performance than the current. There was a
strong community cooperation in fire fighting activities because all project
participants were locally-based.
This good beginning of local people's involvement was not sustained by
the new management. Instead, of 'on-site ' or 'in-place ' recruitment of con-
tractors, more outsiders were hired than the local people. Here, there could
have been a good chance of project success if the new management had built
on the already established community cooperation.
From these case studies, the initial site setting or contractor's features are
not what matters most in the sustainability of tree growing on public lands.
Although they are important factors in defining the opportunities and con-











Schematic diagram showing the steering effect of project management characteristics
in building on the opportunity or reinforcing the constraint set by site and contractor
characteristics in Salinas, Lacab, Villa Meimban and Maguiring reforestation projects
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The site's and contractor's features are regarded as the given factors. They
may either be positive or negative in nature and magnitude. The project man-
agement on the other hand takes the critical role of either enhancing or sup-
pressing the negative or positive attributes of site's and contractor's settings.
It can spoil or build on the generated opportunity. Also, it can mitigate or re-
inforce the constraint resulting from site's and contractor's settings. In princi-
ple, the management intervention is the steering determinant factor that turns
the generated opportunity or constraint to success condition.
5.7.6 Conclusion
Based on the four case studies in Cagayan Valley, the following conclusions
can be drawn:
1. High seedling survival was attributed to any or combined effects of the
following success conditions: 1) contractor's practice of intercropping be-
tween seedlings, 2) contractor's expressed interest in other related tree
uses, 3) good financial situation of participants, 4) contractor's assured
access or property right over the site, 5) contractor's aspiration for good
track record, and 6) community cooperation.
2. The six success conditions were dependent on the various determinant fac-
tors derived from the combined effects of three major project background
settings, namely: a) site conditions, b) contractor characteristics and c)
project management interventions. Under site conditions the following
determinant factors are: a) arability, b) accessibility and c) status of prop-
erty regime. For contractor's characteristics, the determinant factors are: a)
subsistence level, b) farmholding need, c) enterprising attitude, and d)
practice of paying meantime labourers' wages. The project management
interventions are: a) assurance of future project prospects, b) prompt re-
lease of DENR contract payments, c) recognition of usufruct or tenurial
right, d) approval of other land use combinations with tree growing, and e)
'on-site' participants recruitment.
3. The site and contractor's settings are the given determinant factors that
define the opportunities or constraints to project success.
4. The project management interventions are the steering determinant factors
because they can either enhance or suppress the opportunities or con-
straints to bring about the desired project outcome.
5. It is well possible that a good opportunity will still lead to project failure if
the management interventions spoil it. Also, a constraint may well turn out
into project success if the management interventions can mitigate the neg-
ative attributes of the site or/and contractor's settings.
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6. The project management interventions should adjust to the prevailing site
and contractor's settings. In line with this proposition is the need for a con-
textualized reforestation field plan and incentive system for tree growing
on public lands.
Landslide at the Sta. Fe. Nueva Viscaya road exacerbated by inadequate
vegetative cover at the mountain top
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A Contract Reforestation Project aimed at both concerns for
environmental rehabilitation and socioeconomic livelihood for the poor
A billboard in one of the reforestation sites in Cagayan Valley high-




A typical landscape targetted for reforestation in Cagayan Valley
Philippines
Inspection of an unbrushed Imperata-dommzted reforestation area prone
to grassland fire
A closer look at the planting site under a thick Imperata cover
Replanting an old reforestation site destroyed by grassland fires in
the past
The raging grassland fire that threatened to wipe out the entire plantation
of mixed species along the Cordillera Mountains
Validation Study
Contract reforestation lasts only three to four years. Afterwards, the govern-
ment issues another agreement to interested contractors for a longer tenurial
phase of project participation. This succeeding phase of the contract reforesta-
tion is referred to as the Forest Land Management Agreement.
The FLMA concept however, became only known in the third year but
some contractors did not even hear about the instrument at all. Hence, at the
very start, the general thinking of most participants about the reforestation
program was more in terms of obtaining immediate profit from tree planting
rather than deriving benefits from long-term tree management (Korten, 1993).
This observation also surfaced out in the two problematic case studies in
Cagayan Valley and even in many field studies conducted earlier (ANGOC,
1992; Tagana, 1992; Soriano, 1993). However, what is more striking was that
there were a number of contract reforestation projects that succeeded apart
from the financial motivation. It is interesting to further examine the factor of
difference between successful and not-successful projects in a larger scope.
Considering the diverse geographical settings in the country, the findings
of the earlier four case studies in Cagayan Valley are still rather a narrow base
to make a conclusion. It is important therefore to extend the study, and to vali-
date whether or not the results also hold true for projects in other regions in
the country.
In this regard, five additional reforestation projects in other regions in the
Philippines were investigated with the following research objectives:
1. to validate whether or not the six success conditions for high seedling sur-
vival in Cagayan Valley (e.g., practice of intercropping, interest in other
related tree uses, good financial situation of contractors, assured access or
property right, aspiration for good track record, and community coopera-
tion) would apply as well in other regions in the country;
2. to evaluate contractors' future project options after their three-year con-
tract reforestation expired.
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Figure 4.
Location map of the five successful reforestation projects for the validation study
taken from the other five regions in Luzon, Philippines
VALIDATION STUDY
6.1 Selection of the Five Additional Study Sites
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The additional project sites were taken from other five regions of Luzon is-
land having the characteristics as follows: 1) obtained at least 80 percent seed-
ling survival and an average plant height of two meters at the third year pe-
riod, 2) the three-year contract period was over, and 3) diverse environmental
and socioeconomic settings. In this validation phase, two different sets of pro-
jects were chosen as case studies, based on participants' site proximity. The
first set consisted of two projects with 'on-site' participants (i.e., contractors
and labourers). The second set consisted of three projects with 'off-site' con-
tractors but hired locally-based labourers and original occupants of the project
area. The stratification was coincidental and it further broadened the basis of
comparing the future project options between successful 'on-site' and 'off-
site' contractors. Most importantly, it provided the appropriate background in
determining the positive factors related to 'off-site' contractors' ability in sav-
ing their projects from grassland fires.
To assess the performance of these projects, a total of 32 successful
contractors were interviewed in the five sites. The object of inquiry focused
on contractor's motivations that had sustained their participation in the pro-
ject. Their future project options were also confronted to infer the social
acceptability of the new instrument (FLMA) in transition.
Informal and unstructured interviews were carried out. Likewise, field vis-
itation followed after to assess site quality and identify other intervening fac-
tors to project success. Table 51 and Fig. 4 present the geographical locations
of the five additional study sites.
Table 51.
Geographical locations of the additional five successful reforestation projects for
case studies
Project site Province Region Contract
1. Sta. Marcela Kalinga Apayao Cordillera Autonomus Region Family
2. Bugallon Pangasinan Ilocos Region Community
3. Labney Tarlac Central Luzon Family
4. Cavinti Laguna Southern Tagalog Region Community
5. Virac Catanduanes Bicol Region Community
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Table 52.
Brief description of Sta. Marcela, Labney, Bugallon, Cavinti, and Virac Reforesta-
tion Projects, 1994




1. Marcela CAR - arable public land, fire prone 4
participants were all 'on-site'
landless or with limited landholding
the project site was under usufruct
practice of intercropping
participants are subsistent farmers
participants have a strong sense of project
ownership
2. Labney Central - arable public land, fire prone 15
Luzon - concurrently under usufruct
participants were all'on site'
- practice of intercropping
not dependent on the project for subsistence
participants have strong sense of project
ownership
strong participation of the Local Goverment Unit
marginal and fire prone area 6
presence of squatters
most contractors were 'of-site' but hired
locally-based labourers and local occupants
most contractors are big landholders
some contractors are cash surplus and all of them
have at least one stable source of
subsistence
4. Cavinti Southern - good soil but poor physiography 3
Tagalog - contractors were 'off-site' but hired
locally-based labourers
contractors have rice fields
contractors have other income sources
the site was perceived by contractors as critical
watershed
5. Virac Bicol - good soil but poor physiography 4
presence of squatters
contractors were 'of-site' but hired locally-based
labourers and local occupants
contractors have rice fields
contractors have other stable source of income
pratice of intercropping by local occupants
contractors perceived the area as a critical
watershed
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6.2 Brief Characterization of the Study Sites
A Rapid Rural System Appriasal was conducted to obtain the general feature
of the study sites. Table 52 presents a capsulized description of each study
site.
Table 53.
Success conditions present in the Sta. Marcela, Labney, Bugallon, Cavinti, and
Virac Reforestation Projects, 1994
Project Critical determinant factor Relevant succes condition




'on-site' recruitment of participants
allowance of communal resource use
high farmholding need
recognition of usufruct practice
contractors have enterprising attitude
'on-site' recruitment of participants
allowance of communical resource
use
high farmholding need
recognition of usufruct practice
contractors have enterprising attitude
'off-site' contractors hired 'on-site'
labourers
meantime payment of labourers'
wages by rich contractors
assurance of future project prospect
'off-site' contractors hired 'on-site'
labourers
meantime payment of labourers'
wages by rich contractors
participants are above subsistence
level
assurance of future project prospect
community cooperation
practice of intercropping
sense of present project
ownership




sense of present project
ownership










aspiration for good track re-
cord
5. Virac 'off-site' contractors hired locally
based labourers
allowance of communal resource use
meantime payment of labourers'
wages by labourers and local occu-
pants
most participants are above subsis-
tence level




aspiration for good track re-
cord
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6.3 Project Success Conditions
Based on the results of the exploratory investigation conducted in the five
additional projects in other regions of Luzon, the various success conditions
were identified (Table 53).
6.4 Determinant Factors of Project Success
Based on the results of the in-depth analysis conducted in the five projects in
other regions of Luzon, the various determinant factors to success were iden-
tified (Table 54).
Table 54.
Determinant factors of success in Sta. Marcela, Labney, Bugallon, Cavinti, and
Virac Reforestation Projects, 1994
Determinant factor Sta. Labney Bugallon Cavinti Virac
Marcela
1. Site Context
- arability x x
accessibility x x
property regime x
not a DENR declared
watershed area x x x
2. Contractor characteristics
far above subsistence level x x x
farmholding need x x
meantime payment of labourers'
wages x x x
enterprising attitude x x
allows communal resource use x x
3. Project Management
Characteristics
assurance of future project prospects
promptness of funds' release x x x
recognition of usufruct or
tenurial right x x a a
approval of other land use
combinations with tree
growing x x b b
recruitment of contractors 'on-site' x x c c
x = the presence or applicability of the determinant factor or having an effect on the project
a = contractors allowed local occupants in the area to continue their usufruct practice
b = contractors allowed local occupants in the area to intercrop between tree seedlings
c = 'off-site' contractors recruited 'on-site' labourers and local occupants in the area
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6.5 Critical Relevance of the Success Conditions
The following success conditions appeared to have bearing on the five addi-
tional projects under investigation. The six conditions may not necessarily be
present all together in a project. However, in most cases, they complemented
one another.
6.5.1 Intercropping between seedlings
Site arability and good physiography encouraged Sta. Marcela and Labney
contractors to intercrop between seedlings. With their big need of farm-
holdings, they considered the project area as their croplands. Some contrac-
tors in Labney have rice fields just at the lower side of the project area. To
maximize the use of the project site, they planted fruit trees in between the
seedlings. Those who intercropped claimed to have the burden of always
looking after the project because other crops were also planted in the same
site.
In Bugallon, the soil is totally not suitable for intercropping. In Cavinti,
contractors complained of the narrow seedling spacing of 2 x 2 meters which
discouraged them to interplant perennials. On the other hand, in Virac, the
poor physiography limits interplanting of short-term subsistent crops. Mi-
grant farmers in the area however, were able to plant abaca and banana be-
tween seedlings.
Besides the site's arability and accessibility factors, contractors in these
three projects had not ambitioned to intercrop in the site since they have other
big farmholdings in their respectives communities.
6.5.2 Interest in other r elated tree uses and benefits
Apart from intercropping fruit trees between seedlings, Labney contractors
expressed their need for the project as watershed protection. Because of the
watershed function, the contractors did not expect income from the trees as
timber products. However, they saw additional uses, compatible with the
watershed function for communal source of fuelwood, forage, housing and
post materials.
Future local use of the trees dominated Sta. Marcela contractors' consider-
ation for maintaining the project. Although they claimed to have benefitted
from the project's cash earnings, also the long-term use of the trees as source
of fuelwood, housing materials for their children, and other wood needs was
said to be of much value to them. The contractors' foresight on the anticipated
uses of the trees added greater incentive for them to continue protecting and
maintaining the seedlings even without regular payment.
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The 'off-site' contractors of Bugallon, Cavinti and Virac expressed no in-
terest in tree crops. The long gestation period coupled with market uncertain-
ties for timber and wood products made them doubt about the profitability of
tree farming as a future project option. In Cavinti and Virac, contractors per-
ceived from the very start the impossibility of cutting the planted trees upon
maturity because the project is for watershed protection. Knowing their con-
tracts covered a critical watershed area, they do not expect to gain direct bene-
fits from the trees they planted in the future. In this context, it appears that the
behaviour of the contractors in these three projects reflects that of the Risk-
Averse Theory.
6.5.3 Good financial situation of participants
Project participation among local people in Bugallon, Cavinti and Virac could
be sustained because most of them were not directly dependent on cash from
the project. They were not pressed hard by urgency for immediate payment
since their subsistence was not tied with their earnings from the project. Al-
though payments were late, they still found an incentive in working because
of cash needs for their children's schooling and for household uses other than
food needs.
Some contractors in Bugallon and Cavinti loaned money from other
sources to meet the needs of labourers for their children's tuition fees and
other related needs during school openings. In Virac, contractors used per-
sonal funds to pay partially some labourers who indeed were depending on
the project's earnings for their subsistence. Both labourers' high subsistence
level and contractors' willingness to pay meantime wages of their members
when they needed most prevented the whole project work force from blowing
off during prolonged project fund delays.
In one instance, the rich contractors in these projects were risk-averse as
regards to making long-term investment in tree growing. However, their abil-
ity to circumvent their labourers' difficulty of depending on DENR irregular
payments seemingly reflects the claim of the Rational Peasant Theory that
rural farmers are indeed creative in solving problems of resource allocation.
The contractors in Sta. Marcela and Labney were not cash sufficient.
However, they were not dependent on the project for their subsistence. They
viewed income from reforestation as additional incentive to farming the site.
Hence, they could endure late payments without influence on their attitude
towards maintaining and protecting the seedlings they planted.
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6.5.4 Assured access or property right over the site
Sta. Morcela and Labney participants felt no threat with the presence of the
project in the area. Being positioned there prior to the coming of the project,
they claimed to be the righful owners of the site. Even before learning about
the FLMA concept, they regard the project as theirs because it is within their
usufruct areas. The effect of upholding local people's usufruct practice over
the project sites all the more fostered their participation in seedling protection
and maintenance in both projects.
In contrast, having much landholdings and stable income sources, the
Bugallon, Cavinti, and Virac contractors had no future plan to acquire the
project area through the FLMA in the future.
6.5.5 Aspiration for a good track record
Earning a good track record motivated contractors in Bugallon, Cavinti and
Virac to perform well in the project. Most of these contractors have estab-
lished a good rapport with the local DENR field office, because they are highly
esteemed in the community. Aside from DENR's assurance of giving more
projects for succesful performance, they strive hard for excellence because
they felt being put in the public eye. They were convinced to get another
three-year reforestation contract because they perceived their performance as
successful.
This success condition was not evident in Sta. Marcela and Labney. In
contrast to Lacab in Cagayan Valley, Sta. Marcela and Labney contractors felt
no threat of displacement from the area. They claimed that they were the orig-
inal people who opened the area and would not allow outsiders to take over
their settlement.
6.5.6 Community cooperation
The strong community participation in fire fighting activities both in Sta.
Marcela and Labney enabled the projects to survive grassland fires. Accord-
ing to the Barangay officials (village leaders) in Labney, 'the community is
morally obliged to protect and maintain the project because the future bene-
ficiaries will not only be the participants but the whole community'. The lo-
cals recognized the importance of the projects in improving the hydrology of
the area that will sustain the free flow of water for paddy irrigated rice pro-
duction. On the other hand, in Sta. Marcela, the common tribal origin (Ka-
linga) of most participants enhanced greater communal concern in protecting
the project from possible damage. This community commitment was made
possible because contractors in both sites assured the local people of their fu-
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ture access to gather fuelwood, fencing materials and other tree related needs
under certain conditions.
Such spontaneous support expressed by the communities in the project
sites reinforces Wade's (1987) findings that if the collective benefits from
participation is high, the local people tend to cooperate voluntarily in protect-
ing a common resource. This observation contradicts Olson's logic which
emphasizes so much the importance of state intervention or the imposition of
selective rewards and punishment to those who cooperate and free-ride
respectively as means to achieve collective action.
This type of social unity among local people was also evident in Bugallon,
Cavinti and Virac as claimed by the contractors. They attributed this commu-
nity cooperation to the recruitment of local residents and farmer-occupants in
the sites. In addition, the local hired labourers found incentive to continually
work in the project because their cash needs were being met by the rich con-
tractors despite DENR late payments.
6.6 Contractor's Response to FLMA
This section describes contractors' responses towards FLMA in Sta. Marcela,
Labney, Bugallon, Cavinti and Virac (Table 55).
6.6.1 FLMA as a futur e project option
Contractors in Sta. Marcela and Labney expressed desire for FLMA
upon learning the provisions during the field interview.
In both projects, usufructing has been practiced even prior to
reforestation because of the good soil condition. In Sta. Marcela, the
participants were more interested on land rights than tree tenure. They
viewed the trees as communal property but they will like the land to be
under individual stewardship.
Participants in Labney on the other hand ambitioned to carry on
with the project even without payment. Apart from watershed consider-
ation, they also wanted to develop the area into agroforestry farm.
The strong sense of ownership, current productive use of the sites and the
projects' future value to the participants attracted them to pursue FLMA. Most
of them viewed the instrument to legitimize their claim of ownership by posi-
tion (de facto) over the area. However, they attributed the sustained project
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squatting 4
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intercropping not feasible 3
uninterested in tree crop 3
cannot ensure full property
right over land & trees 3
inaccessible 3
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area 4
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right over the trees 4
uninterested in tree crop 4
timber market insecurity 4
6.6.2 Contractor's constraints in pur suing FLMA
Contrary to the assumption that contractors would maintain the project even
after the three-year contract payment expires thru FLMA, successful contrac-
tors in Bugallon, Cavinti and Virac had entirely different views and future
project options. Practically all of them expressed rejection to FLMA. Their dis-
interest on the instrument stemmed from the following perceived conditions:
Firstly, the contractors lacked confidence on the property right provisions
of the instrument. According to them 'forest land stewardship does not really
ensure absolute right of ownership both for the land and trees'. They further
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argued, 'the fact that the land still belongs to the government, there would be
no assurance that it could really restrain other people's access to the area, just
like squatting or poaching in public forest'.
Along with their lack of confidence on the tenurial provision of FLMA, the
presence of illegal occupants in their project area was regarded as a threat to
them. Although some hinted private titling as an option, a majority, found no
incentive in doing so. Site physiography as perceived by them is not suitable
for short-term cropping.
Secondly, most contractors are 'off-site' occupants of the area. Their in-
ability to protect and maintain the project is a major obstacle. Also, most of
them reasoned out their having farmholdings in their respective communities
which would compete with their time and attention.
Thirdly, their present livelihood seemed more stable to them than tree
farming. Pessimistic about the future timber market, most of them were skep-
tical about the profitability of tree farming. The long gestation period plus the
risks associated with forest tree crops and contractors' old age contributed
more to their prejudice over FLMA.
Fourthly, the poor arability of the sites limits subsistent and cash cropping,
especially in Bugallon. Also, in Cavinti, contractors complained about the
waterlogged condition of the area. In Virac, contractors knew before hand
that logging would not be permitted later on in the project area since it is with-
in a critical watershed. In short, contractors had no intention to further main-
tain the projects. Among their constraints include low confidence on FLMA's
provision, geographical remoteness, market insecurities, and site condition.
As regards low farmholding need, they found no incentive of maintaining the
area after their contract expires. They preferred another three-year reforesta-
tion contract to FLMA as a future option.
The following conditions appeared to have association with contractors'
considerations for FLMA:
a. Site quality
The arability of the area as determined by soil quality and physiography moti-
vated 'on-site' farmers to pursue FLMA. Farming ranked top in the list of pos-
sible uses of the project site.
b. Accessibility
Contractors' geographical proximity to the project is another consideration
for FLMA. 'Off-site' contractors signified no ambition to pursue FLMA in re-
mote and inaccessible project areas. They perceived the difficulty to develop
the site if it is far from their main residence. However, for the 'on-site' partici-
pants, accessibility and their current use of the land stimulated them to pursue
FLMA.
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c. Initial property regime
Contractor's choice for FLMA was also determined by the initial tenurial status
of the site. The presence of illegal occupants in the area prior to the introduc-
tion of the project discouraged them to pursue the instrument.
d. Market security
The fear of no ready wood market in the future also discouraged contractors
to consider FLMA as an option. This is coupled by their uneasiness to endure
the long gestation period of tree crops. The absence of other back-up financial
incentives such as production loans, crop insurance and tax exemptions were
perceived by most contractors as limitations of the current national reforesta-
tion program to attract private investment.
e. Landholding need
Farmers in bad need of landholdings viewed FLMA as a means to acquire addi-
tional area for farming. Their striving for arable land especially if it concur-
rently under cultivation superseded all other considerations for the instru-
ment.
f. DENR prescribed the forestland use
Contractors' prior knowledge of the DENR predetermined forestland use of the
project area tended to limit their option for FLMA. In areas initially declared as
critical watershed like the case of the old project sites, contractors believed
that reforestation projects under this land use classification cannot be turned
over to private individuals for production or farm forestry. This condition
however, is site specific.
h. Reforestation scheme
The type of species and seedling spacing also interfered with contractors'
choice of other future land use combinations. Prescribing the species and
seedling spacing as was the practice DENR limited contractors' development
options and only reinforced their perception that the project belongs to the go-
vernment.
6.7 Analysis
The Sta. Marcela and Labney projects resembled Lacab project in Cagayan
Valley. Contractors in both projects were initially positioned in the area
which could have posed a potential problem to the project. Instead, of relo-
cating the local occupants, the manager contracted them to reforest the area
and encouraged them to continue their farming activities. There are three
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management interventions which sustained contractors'participation in seed-
ling maintenance and protection: 1) recognition of usufruct practice, 2) ap-
proval of other land use combinations, 3) 'on-site' recruitment.
Boosting contractor's confidence with assured access or property right
over the project, further motivated them to do intercropping between seed-
lings, expressed their interest in other related tree uses, and had strong com-
munity cooperation in fire protection. Fig. 5 in the succeeding page illustrates
this interaction.
On the other hand, what sustained contractors' project participation in
Bugallon, Cavinti and Virac was their striving for a good track record in the
hope to obtain more future project contracts. This aspiration for good track
record as a goal motivated them to work out community cooperation. Since
most of them were outsiders, they recruited locally-based labourers. In addi-
tion, the rich contractors, out of their own funds paid regularly their labour-
ers' wages meantime during delayed releases of DENR fund. A good financial
situation appeared to be an ideal complementary attribute of the contractors.
They were able to withstand delayed DENR payments and to sustain their la-
bourers' working moral by defraying meantime their wages. The most crucial
determinant factor that stimulated contractors' sustained project participation
was the management's assurance of future project prospect for successful
performance. Fig. 6 in the succeeding page illustrates this interaction.
Furthermore, sustained seedling protection and maintenance does not nec-
essarily require all success conditions to be met. In the case of Sta. Marcela
and Labney projects, 'assured access/property right' is indespensable because
other success conditions build on it. For Bugallon, Cavinti and Virac projects,
both 'good financial situation of participants' and 'aspiration for good track
record' are two crucial conditions that would lead to a very important success
condition (i.e., 'community cooperation').
From these findings, project success is dependent greatly on the manage-
ment intervention. This confirms the earlier findings in Cagayan Valley about
the management function as the steering determinant factor for both site's and
contractors' settings to bring about the desired project outcome.
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SEEDLING SURVIVAL
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Figure 5.
Schematic diagram showing the prominent role of the project management character-
istics in affecting assured access or property right as the bottomline condition for con-
tractor's sustained participation in Sta. Marcela and Labney reforestation projects
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SEEDLING SURVIVAL
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Figure 6.
Schematic diagram showing the promènent role of the project management character-
istics in assuring contractors of future incentives which triggered their sustained par-
ticipation in Bugallon, Cavinti & Virac reforestation projects
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6.8 Summary and Conclusion
On the basis of the findings in the five additional projects, as well as the re-
spondents of 32 prospective FLMA holders, the six identical success condi-
tions obtained from the two successful projects in Cagayan Valley (e.g., 1.
intercropping between seedlings, 2. interest in other related tree uses, 3. partic-
ipant's good financial situation, 4. assured access or property rights over the
project, 5. aspiration for good tract record, and 6. community cooperation) are
also present in the second set of successful projects in other regions. How-
ever, not all of them are present in all successful projects. Rather, it seems that
one factor is dominant, with one or more of the other in a more subsidiary or
reinforcing role. This brings us to the conclusion that the successful projects
in the second set of investigation can be classified into two distinct types,
namely:
1. Project stirred by aspiration for property rights:
Examples of this type are the Labney and Sta. Marcela projects. The 'assured
access or property rights' appeared to be the bottomline that triggered the
other success conditions, e.g., intercropping between seedlings, interest in
other related tree uses and community cooperation.
2. Project stirred by aspiration for good tract record:
Examples of this type are the Bugallon, Cavinti and Virac projects. The aspi-
ration for a good track record dominates the motivations. The good financial
situation of the contractors reinforces this motivation, while the same relative
wealth also gives them the capacity to carry it out the meantime payments of
the wages, which in turn enhances the community cooperation.
Likewise, the 12 determinant factors to success identified in the earlier case
studies were also evident in the five additional successful projects investi-
gated, namely: 1) site's arability, 2) site's accessibility, 3) site's property regi-
me, 4) contractor's subsistence level, 5) contractor's farmholding need, 6) con-
tractor's practice of paying meantime labourers' wages, 7) contractor's enter-
prising attitude, 8) management's assurance of future project prospects, 9)
management's practice of prompt release of funds, 10) management's recog-
nition of usufruct or tenurial rights, 11) management's approval of other land
use combinations, and 12) management's recruitment of 'on-site' partici-
pants.
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Two more factors were identified in this study, namely:
1. DENR prescribed the forestland use (i.e., the initial intended use of the site;
predetermined by the government whether for watershed or for production
forestry).
2. Allowance for future communal resource use (which means that the con-
tractor is also willing to allow the local people to gather forest products or
use the project site under certain conditions in the future).
All the success conditions and the determinant factors in Cagayan Valley pro-
jects are relevant in the five additional projects in other regions in the country.
On FLMA acceptability, there was a divided response among successful
contractors. Those with high farm holding need and are concurrently usu-
fructing in the project site, FLMA appeared to be a good instrument to
legitimize their continuous stay and activities in the area. For the rich and
landed 'off-site' contractors, FLMA appeared to be a less attractive incentive
for sustained tree growing livelihood. Among the other back-up incentives
appeared to be essentially important to sustain private individuals' interest in
farm foresty are: market security, production loans, crop insurance, stronger
tenurial arrangements, and other incentives.
7
Investigation of Spontaneous Tree
Growing
Reforestation in the Philippines is normally associated with employment
generation because people are paid to plant trees on public lands. Among
other things, the sustainability of such paid labour-induced reforestation
depends greatly on the government's ability to finance the activity continu-
ously and promptly.
The poor results of using wages as instrument for participation in the past
led to the introduction of other incentives. In other words, the government has
been exploring other possibilities to make people plant trees. This approach
however, resulted in both good and bad outcomes. Although a number of
good projects were established, the majority however were not successful.
Evidence from unsuccessful projects includes the many incidences of deliber-
ate burnings of plantations prompted by the participants' need for continuous
employment from the project.
Apart from government reforestation programs, also spontaneous tree
growing activities do exist at the household or farm level independent from
outside support. Unfortunately, these have hardly been considered in design-
ing reforestation strategies (Olofson, 1980; Eder, 1981; Wiersum and Veer,
1983).
Nonetheless, such spontaneous activities may well illustrate the presence
of determining factors of successful tree growing at the farm level. Such in-
formation may be combined with knowledge about why farmers participate in
government-sponsored projects to provide a stronger basis for designing a
better reforestation program. Therefore, in this chapter, a number of spontane-
ous tree growing initiatives will be described.
The purpose of this extended investigation is to learn from the farmers'
experience of growing trees apart from government support and to validate
the success conditions obtained from the nine government projects.
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Figure 7.
Location map of the four spontaneous tree growing activities through farmers'
initiative
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7.1 Discovery of Observation Sites
The discovery of each observation site was just incidental. While assessing
the government projects, information about the existence of small tree grow-
ing activities by private individuals was obtained. These were then included
in the research. The main consideration was the glaring contrast observed
between the government and farmers' tree growing performance, as the latter
had been noted in the same setting during the course of the data gathering in
the nine case studies. Fig. 7 presents the geographical location of each obser-
vation site.
7.2 Brief Description of the Four Observation Sites
Table 56 presents the main features of the four observation sites while the
next section presents a detailed description of each.
7.2.7 Site 1: Quibal, Penablanca, Cagayan
Quibal, Penablanca, Cagayan is a firewood gathering community at the foot-
hills of the Sierra Madre Mountain Range in Northeastern Luzon, Philippines.
Originally, it was a kaingin farming community in the 60s.
Progressively declining farm productivity, however, prompted farmers to
switch to firewood extraction. Carabao logging began in the early 70s. As a
result, most households subsisted on fuelwood and timber sales.
Over time, the community's dependence on timber and firewood sales ex-
erted much pressure on the remaining forest in the area. In the 80s, timber
gatherers began to feel the difficulty of maintaining the previous level of their
wood extraction. A cutting moratorium was imposed by the then Bureau of
Forestry and forced most timber gatherers to seek other livelihood options.
Table 57 presents the timber gatherers' responses to the growing problem of
resource scarcity.
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Table 56.
Brief characterization of the four observation sites on spontaneous tree growing by
individual fanners, 1994
Site Feature
1. Quibal - firewood gathering community
farmers shifted to firewood gathering due to low farm yield on
their kaingin
firewood sales provide mainly the farmer's cash needs for
subsistence
- intensive carabao logging and firewood gathering threaten to
deplete the long-run resource supply
2. Maguirig - farm-based tree growing inside an unsuccessful reforestation
project
the tree growers are local farmers who refused to let their pri-
vate farmlands be reforested by the government program
- the woodlot provides household fuelwood
- farmers cultivate rice field under tenancy in adjacent areas
3. Nagtimog - farmers cultivate some portions of the abandoned reforestation
site
- farmers have limited farmholdings in other public areas adja-
cent to the project site
- the farmers were able to establish a 7-ha Gmelina arborea
plantation alongside short-term intercropping even without cor-
responding DENR payment for tree planting
- ownership right over the trees was provided to the farmers
informally by the DENR
4. Timmaguab - tree growing integrated with farming
farmers have started growing trees hi their Imperata dominated
private abandoned lands mainly for household use
the presence of local market for fuelwood and other wood prod-
ucts later on provided additional incentives for farmers
most farmers have other productive private farmland in adjacent
areas
The majority of the carabao loggers who used to fell big diameter timber
ceased to operate while some sold their chainsaws. Others shifted to firewood
extraction since this does not require quality-size timber to be sustained.
For the majority of the firewood gatherers, the scarcity of the fuelwood did
not threaten their livelihood. Although their production level declined, they
never considered moving to a new site. They instead started raising Leuceana
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leucocephala and Gmelina arborea in their backyards or farmlots in anticipa-
tion of the impending fiielwood scarcity (Pasicolan and Paguirigan, 1993).
Table 57.
Timber gatherers' production constraints and options resulting from diminishing
forest resource in Quibal
Resource user Production constraint Development option
Carabao - scarce supply of commercial- - going back to farming
logger size timber - renting chainsaw to fulltime
- growing distance of the forest firewood gatherers
- cutting ban - shifting to firewood
extraction
Firewood - increased resource competition - going back to farming
gatherer - growing distance from the re- - planting fast-growing trees
source for fuelwood
- high labour input - making forest clearings
When asked about the feasibility of putting up a community forestry project
in the area, almost all the interviewees preferred farm forestry over commu-
nity forestry. They said that it is easier to organize family labour than that of
the community. Second, when it comes to land and tree rights, they claimed
that it is easier to work out a benefit sharing arrangement within the house-
hold than at the community level. They suggested, however, that the govern-
ment should delineate an adequate planting area for each household and
should provide security of tenure as well.
7.2.2 Site 2: Maguirig, Solana, Cagayan
Mang Casimiro, an 80 year-old farmer of Maguirig, Solana, Cagayan success-
fully established a woodlot in his 3-hectare farm. Aside from him were two
other farmers who resisted the Forestry Department's attempt to include their
private lots for reforestation in 1975. Today, their tree farms inside the aban-
doned problematic government reforestation project stand as a case against
'government-driven tree growing project' in the community.
Most of the residents were not able to develop tree farms in their land-
holdings because they allowed the Forestry Department to take over their
farms for reforestation. According to them, they 'were persuaded by the em-
ployment offered to them as labourers of the project'. Also, they were told
that 'the land still belonged to them and the Forestry Department's concern
was just to plant trees'.
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Over the years, other government projects have been implemented one
after the other in the same site (e.g., from Regular Reforestation to Integrated
Social Forestry then to Contract Reforestation). This resulted in overlapping
tenure over the area (see Section 5.6 about Maguirig Reforestation Project).
While public tree planting has been going on in the project for several
years, Mang Casimiro also planted fast growing trees in his small farm for
household use. According to him, the seedlings he planted in 1978 were all
obtained from the nearby government reforestation project.
Although farming was his main occupation, he simultaneously planted
Gliricidia sepiwn, Leuceana leucocephala and Gmelina arborea and some
fruit trees such as jack fruit, mango and citrus in his lot. Today, even though
the trees have grown, he has still space to plant com, mungbean and vegeta-
bles for home consumption. He also plants banana, papaya, pineapple, sweet
potato, cassava and other root crops as subsidiary farm crops.
He claimed that the woodlot meets his yearly needs for household fuel-
wood and fencing materials. He further cited the regenerative capacity of his
oldest trees in continually spreading out new seedlings in other portions of his
farm. Because of this, he does not need to do direct planting any more. All he
has to do is protect the trees from grassland fire.
Today, the almost 200-hectare government contract reforestation project
in the same site stands barren and abandoned. The residents could hardly see
any surviving tree to remind them of their one-time project involvement.
Most farmers felt bad about what had happened to their farmlots occupied by
the project as they noted the glaring contrast in Mang Casimiro's and the two
other farmers' woodlots.
The success story of Mang Casimiro simply suggests the importance of
secured property rights as a condition for spontaneous tree growing in areas
where there is conflict of land claims at the start.
7.2.3 Site 3: Nagtimog, Diadi, Nueva Viscaya
Nagtimog is an upland fanning community, seven kilometres away from the
main town of Diadi, Nueva Viscaya. Bounded by networks of creeks, it is not
accessible to jeepneys during the rainy season.
A regular reforestation project was introduced in the community in the
early 70s. Most of the local people planted trees to earn an income, while si-
multaneously growing vegetables. However, the project did not last long be-
cause of inadequate funding for protection and maintenance. Being in a fire
prone area, the project experienced yearly grassland fires which were be-
lieved to be either deliberately or accidentally caused by outsiders and by res-
idents (see Section 5.5 about Villa Meimban Reforestation Project).
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The area became an object of land speculations by local farmers after the
project management abandoned the site. Most were reluctant, however, to
farm it, knowing that the area was still a DENR project site. For many years the
site laid idle while some farmers kept on clearing new areas for kaingin.
The coming of contract reforestation in 1989 raised most farmers' expec-
tations of resuming the government-sponsored tree planting in the commun-
ity. However, adjacent communities, not this area, were selected as contract
reforestation site.
This gave the farmers the idea of cultivating the abandoned project site. At
first, only two farmers applied for usufruct access over the area on the condi-
tion that they should simultaneously reforest it without corresponding pay-
ment. In return for their voluntary efforts in tree planting, DENR assured them
tenurial rights over the trees they planted.
The farmers cultivated the area for short-term crops in the first year. Later,
they started interplanting trees between their main crops. In other clear por-
tions they simultaneously planted short-term and tree crops together. This
scheme, according to the farmers can restrain grassland fire if the area is al-
ways kept under cultivation.
The farmers claimed that after five years, the Gmelina arborea they
planted in between their main crops had grown to a height that discouraged
intercropping underneath. This prompted them to move to another portion of
the site. The good soil condition of the site motivated them to informally ap-
ply for more usufruct areas for farming. Also, being confident of their rights
over the trees they planted, they gained added incentive in protecting and
maintaining the project. The seven-hectare plantation now stands in striking
contrast to the adjacent problematic contract reforestation project in Villa
Meimban.
These successful and no-cost reforestation activity opened the prospect of
rehabilitating the long-abandoned project area. More and more farmers
expressed desire to farm the site's other unoccupied portions under the same
institutional arrangement. They suggested that the government should organ-
ize the community for possible replication of the successful tree growing pio-
neered by their two fellow farmers. According to them, they would actively
grow trees even without wages as long as they had formal tenurial rights.
7.2.4 Site 4: Timmaguab, Sta. Ignacio, Tarlac
Timmaguab, Sta. Ignacia, Tarlac is a rice farming community but growing
trees for household needs has become an integral part of the residents'
farming system. Not far from the area are reforestation projects that contin-
ually got burned down and prematurely abandoned by participants.
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However, small farm-based tree growing activities using little capital have
been carried out by the farmers for some time on their Imperata-dominated
private lots. The trees are raised to improve soil nutrients, provide fiielwood,
fodder, fruits, and household fence posts. Lately, most tree growers get added
income by selling the wood products to the market.
Trees were usually grown to establish peripheral boundary fencing.
Today, the growing demand for wood products has heightened farmers' inter-
est to plant more trees. Tree growing has become a source of supplementary
household income.
This farm-based tree growing was new to the community. In 1987, a new
occupant in the area introduced agroforestry on his 6-hectare idle land. After
three years, many of his neighbours started following his example. Today,
about eight out of 25 farmers in the community have established woodlots on
their private lands.
Most of the farmers had established woodlots of Leuceana leucocephala
and Gliricidia septum. They also allowed naturally occurring species like
Vitex negundo, Albizzia procera, Philiostigma malabarica, and Pithe-
celobium dulce to increase in density. In addition, they planted such fruit trees
as Sandoricum koetjape, Anona mauricata, Anona squamosa, Mangifera in-
dica along with some citrus and short-term crops.
Table 58.

















Tree growing prompted by fiielwood shortage and
cash needs
Woodlot resulting from farmer's sense of owner-
ship over the land and the trees planted
Voluntary tree growing in abandoned government
reforestation site with short-term farming as trade-
off
Farm-based tree growing for small household use
The farmers claimed that aside from benefitting economically they also grow
in experience through constant experimentation on their woodlots. Observing
the increase in biomass through natural regeneration process, they realized
that tree growing can proceed even without much labour or capital. What they
only need to do is to protect and maintain existing trees. Nature does the rest
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of the work. They also learned that the more plant species they introduced, the
fewer was the occurrence of natural pests in their farms.
Two factors encouraged the farmers to grow trees. One, they knew that the
produce will accrue to them. Second, they needed fuelwood and other tree
products to use at home and to sell to the market. Table 58 presents the dis-
tinct features of each site's tree growing efforts.
7.3 The Critical Determinant Factors and the Success
Conditions
Based on the results of the exploratory and in-depth investigations, Table 59
shows the determinant factors and success conditions for farmers' sustained
participation.
Table 59.
Determinant factors and success conditions in the four spontaneous tree growing
efforts by individual farmers, 1994
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7.4 The Relevance of the Success Conditions
Four of the six success conditions identified in previous analyses of govern-
ment reforestation projects also appeared relevant for spontaneous tree grow-
ing activities by individual farmers. Two conditions did not apply (i.e., 'aspira-
tion for good track record' and 'community cooperation'). However, a new
success condition was identified which appeared critical for spontaneous tree
growing (i.e., wood products market prospect). This condition indicates the
current demand for wood or future market certainty.
This section presents the relevance of each success condition as it applies
to certain cases.
7.4.1 Practice of intercropping
Farmers in Nagtimog successfully raised Gmelina arborea voluntarily in the
abandoned project site after many government attempts in the past failed. By
simultaneous intercropping with corn, peanuts and mungbean on rotation, the
tree seedlings had been spared from grassland fires in the past. The farmers
constructed fire lines and planted banana as firebreaks to protect both farm
crops and seedlings from fires. Both soil arability and the need for more crop-
lands prompted fanners to cultivate the project site.
This type of farmers is said to be risk-takers, enterprising and creative.
Their attitudes resemble the farmer's being described in the Rational Peasant
Theory.
Farmers in Maguirig and Timmaguab adopted wide tree planting spacing
that enabled them to intercrop fruit trees between the forest species. Aside
from this mixed-stand, they also established woodlots along the peripheries of
their farmlots. Intercropping is not feasible in Quibal because the farmlots are
under fallow and most farmers have shifted to firewood gathering as a main
livelihood.
7.4.2 Interest in other related tree uses
Fuelwood for domestic or market consumption was apparently the common
consideration for almost of the five sites, particularly in Quibal. In Timma-
guab and Maguirig, farmers recognized the role of the Leuceana leuco-
cephala and Gliricidia sepium leaves in nitrogen fixing. According to them,
the fast increase in biomass exhibited by the species helps in soil building and
enriching. The same observation was claimed by farmers in Nagtimog regard-
ing the green compost coming from Gmelina arborea interplanted between
their farm crops. Also, in Timmaguab and Maguirig, the leaves and pods of
Leuceana leucocephala served as feeds for goats and hogs. The enterprising
INVESTIGATION OF SPONTANEOUS TREE GROWING 173
attitude of the farmers led them to value the other potential uses of trees that
further increased their interest to grow more trees. This kind of trait is high-
lighted in the Rational Peasant Theory (Section 3.1.4).
7.4.3 Good financial situation of farmer s
The high food security of farmers in Maguirig, Nagtimog and Timmaguab
enabled them to invest part of their time in tree growing activities. Having
other sources of subsistence, they were not compelled to devote their time
fully to earning their daily food needs. With other farmholdings providing the
main subsistence and cash needs, the fanners regarded their tree farms as a
part-time project.
In Quibal, however, most farmers were desperately dependent on their
daily fuelwood sales as a means of subsistence. Their striving to extract more
fuelwood amidst declining supply prompted them to shift back to farming or
establish their own woodlot. A number of those totally dependent on the re-
source started raising Leuceana leucocephala and Gmelina arborea in their
backyards and abandoned farmlots.
7.4.4 Assured access or property right
Farmers in Quibal, Maguirig, Nagtimog, and Timmaguab had spontaneous
and sustained interest in growing trees because they were certain that the fu-
ture produce or benefits will accrue to them. In Nagtimog, DENR's provision
of usufruct and tree tenure conditioned farmers to grow trees even without
payment. The Maguirig and Timmaguab cases on the other hand, illustrate
how security of land ownership alone motivated farmers to give great care to
the trees planted, in contrast to the unsuccessful public tree planting in adja-
cent areas (see Maguirig in Section 5.6). In Quibal, tree growing was done on
public domain. The long stay of farmers in the area, however, gave them a
sense of ownership by position. As such, they were confident that the trees
they planted belonged to them. Contractors' sense of ownership over the trees
combined with their enterprising attitude made tree growing spontaneous and
sustainable.
7.4.5 Wood products market prospect
Selling fuelwood is the source of people's livelihood in Quibal. Firewood
constituted the major source of household cooking energy in the vicinities.
Also, in Tuguegarao, the capital of the Cagayan Valley Region, bakeries, ho-
tels and restaurants, blacksmith shops and other small-scale industries contin-
ually depend on fuelwood from Quibal for their cooking or heating needs.
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Threatened by the decreasing supply of the resource due to intensive extrac-
tion over the years, some firewood gatherers have started planting Leuceana
leucocephala and Gmelina arborea in their farmlots for future sales.
In Timmaguab, self-sufficiency in fuelwood and other tree uses for
household needs was the farmers' main reason for planting trees. The grow-
ing local demand for fuelwood and fencing materials, however, motivated
farmers to plant more trees in their farmlots.
In both sites, the wood market evolved from local consumers' pressing
need for fuelwood and other tree products rather than being created by the
Local Government. The farmers' enterprising attitude plus market opportun-
ity sustained tree growing.
On the other hand, marketing wood products was not mentioned by
farmers in Maguirig, and Nagtimog as a motivation for growing trees. Their
main concern was subsistent and cash cropping in the land more than any
other consideration.
7.5 Analysis
Unlike the previous case studies under DENR tree growing projects, farmers in
Quibal, Maguirig, Nagtimog and Timmaguab were more self-motivated than
the reforestation participants with cash incentives.
In government reforestation, the project management functions as the
steering determinant factor to success (Figs 3, 5 and 6). Spontaneous tree
growing, however, is different. It is the individual fanner's enterprising char-
acteristic which generates the impulse. The farmer either makes use of the
positive attributes of the site setting or induces project management to affect
the critical requirements for spontaneous participation (Fig. 8).
For instance, no government incentive motivated the farmers to grow trees
in Timmaguab. Nevertheless, five success conditions were evidently present
in such a case, namely: 1) practice of intercropping, 2) farmer's interest in
other related tree uses, 3) his assured access or property right over the trees
planted, 4) his good financial condition, and 5) wood products market pros-
pect. Farmers' spontaneity was triggered by their 'enterprising attitude'. This
attitude was nurtured by their being above 'subsistence level' and having a
landholding clear of legal incumbrances (or clear status of property regime).
Both Quibal and Timmaguab farmers were market-driven. Tree growing
becomes their livelihood pattern and could even be their main source of sub-
sistence as in the case of Quibal.
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Schematic diagram showing the prominent role of farmer characteristics as the steer-
ing determinant factors to spontaneous tree growing success in Quibal, Maguirig,
Nagtimog and Timmaguab
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On the other hand, the Maguirig and Nagtimog farmers, pressed by their need
for land to cultivate had induced DENR project management to grant them ac-
cess or rights over the reforestation site. Assured of their access or property
right over the land and trees, they were able to establish a woodlot simulta-
neous with subsistent farming even though no government incentives were
provided to them. Again, it was the farmers' 'enterprising attitude' coupled
with their high 'farmholding need' that spurred the initiative to grow trees.
Four success conditions identified in government projects also proved rel-
evant to the spontaneous tree growing activities, namely: 1) intercropping
between seedlings, 2) interest in other related tree uses, 3) good financial situ-
ation of participants, and 4) assured access/property right.
Two conditions, however, did not apply (i.e., 'aspiration for good track
record' and 'community cooperation'). This is logical since no external pres-
sure forced farmers to grow trees, except their own initiative prompted by
need for the resource. Also, community cooperation is not relevant since tree
planting is done in private or usufruct areas. Tree maintenance and protection
is a household task more than a community concern. However, one condition
that was not so evident in the earlier studies (although it was perceived as one
reason for the low FLMA acceptability). However, one condition that was not
so evident in the earlier studies (although it was perceived as one reason for
the low FLMA acceptability) is the availability or prospect of a good wood
market.
Farmers' 'assured access/property right' over land or/and trees appeared to
be the bottomline for other success conditions to build on. Without which, all
other success conditions cannot hold. Furthermore, the six success conditions
may not necessarily be all present to bring about the desired outcome. How-
ever, assured access/property rights turned out to always be relevant to all
four cases.
7.6 Conclusion
Based on the results of this extended validation study, four of the six success
conditions previously identified under government projects proved also rele-
vant to the spontaneous tree growing activities. These are as follows:!) inter-
cropping between seedlings, 2) interest in other related tree uses, 3) good fi-
nancial situation of farmers, and 4) assured access/property rights. Two suc-
cess conditions did not apply, i.e., aspiration for good track record and com-
munity cooperation. Another success condition, however, appeared very cru-
cial to spontaneous tree growing, i.e., wood products market prospect.
In all cases, the farmer's 'enterprising attitude' was the main compelling
force for voluntary action. His status 'above subsistence level' and the clarity
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of the 'property regime' of his land served as the economic and legal bases,
respectively for his voluntary action in tree growing.
Under a government-initiated program, the project management functions
as the steering determinant factor to reforestation success. In spontaneous tree
growing activities, however, it is the farmer's attributes which play the promi-
nent role. In short, spontaneous tree growing is an individual-driven initiative
which can work with limited or even without direct government incentive.
In practice, this type of tree growing activity, although small scale, could
be regarded as more sustainable than the current government's reforestation
program using paid labour as instrument for participation. However, to make
it sustainable and widespread, market incentives appeared to be a very
powerful drive, alongside with other institutional incentives.
8
Synthesis of Findings
Reforestation in the Philippines is an old program, having started as early as
1916. With its long history, all the accumulated experiences of the years
could have ushered the program into a sustainable state. Although adminis-
trative revamps have marked the Forestry Bureaucracy with nearly every
change in the country's national leadership, there still has been no significant
improvement on the efficiency of the country's reforestation program.
As more recent policy instruments are being tried, the best tree growing
system should have theoretically already been evolved. In practice, the gov-
ernment is still exploring various schemes towards a more sustainable system.
This chapter brings together the research findings from nine government
reforestation projects and four voluntary tree growing projects by individual
farmers, investigated in an attempt to derive a general diagram of the factors
relevant to a sustainable tree growing system in the Philippines. It tries to
identify the conditions for successful and sustainable tree growing based on
the experiences of both good and problematic projects. Also, it highlights sev-
eral factors of high seedling survival in the successful project sites.
The study was primarily based on an in-depth analysis of several sites,
comparing successful and unsuccessful projects. Such an in-depth approach
was directed to the identification of core factors of project success and failure,
but with limited possibilities of a statistical testing of the results. After con-
trasting the successful and unsuccessful projects, two more independent field
investigations were carried out to validate the findings of the first set of case
studies. A tree growing model was derived, resulting from the successful ex-
perience of both government projects and spontaneous tree growing activities
by individual farmers. The model has thus a broad basis and is supposed to
have a significant predictive power to guide future reforestation plans in the
Philippines.
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8.1 Data Formation
This section describes the sequential process of data formation and how it de-
veloped into a general model for tree growing. There were four phases of data
gathering:
8.1.1 Phase 1: Literature survey
A broad survey of various case studies on tree growing projects in some de-
veloping countries and in the Philippines was conducted. It identified five
bases or motivations for successful tree growing as follows: 1) household use,
2) income from tree product, 3) land right security, 4) management arrange-
ment, and 5) soil conservation. Also, seven policy instruments commonly
used by government program to sustain tree growing on public lands were
identified, namely: 1) cost-benefit sharing arrangement, 2) paid labour, 3)
subsidies and tax exemption, 4) loans and credits, 5) market incentive, 6) land
tenure, and 7) access to future produce.
8.1.2 Phase 2: Contrast analysis
Two successful and two unsuccessful projects in Cagayan Valley were com-
pared and analyzed. These were assessed under two stages of field observa-
tion, namely, exploratory investigation and in-depth investigation.
Stage I: Exploratory Investigation
During this stage, the success conditions for contractor's sustained participa-
tion in seedling maintenance and protection in Cagayan Valley were roughly
examined. Table 60 shows the results of the exploratory investigation.
Table 60.
Success conditions of the Cagayan Valley case studies, 1993
Unsuccessful
Success condition V. Meimban
1 . Intercropping between seedlings
2 . Interest in other related tree uses
3 . Participant's good financial
situation
4 . Assured access / property right
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Stage II: In-Depth Investigation
In this stage, three project background settings were analyzed to identify the
determinant factors of the success conditions. These were broadly categorized
into:
1. Site Characteristics - the project's physical, biological and tenurial set-
tings.
2. Contractor Characteristics - the contractor's socio-economic condition,
project perception, motivations, future options, inherent traits and cultural
background.
3. Project Management Characteristics - the government's or DENR's man-
agement schemes and interventions, including program implementation,
policy instrument and field personnel attitudes.
Table 61 shows the results of the in-depth study in Cagayan Valley highlight-
ing the determinant factors of success.
Table 61.
Project settings and the corresponding determinant factors in the Cagayan Valley
casestudies, 1993
Broad categorization of background Differentiation of the various determinant
settings factors
1. Site Characteristics - good arability
- proximity and accessibility
- clear status of property regime
2. Contractor Characteristics - above subsistence level
- with farmholding need
- meantime payment of labourers ' wages
- enterprising attitude
3. Project Management Characteristics - assurance of project prospects
- promptness of DENR payment
- recognition of usufruct / property right
- approval of the land use combinations
- recruitment of ' on-site ' participants
8.1.3 Phase 3: Validation study
Five other successful government reforestation projects in other regions of the
Philippines were investigated to validate the applicability of the determinant
factors and the resulting success conditions in the Cagayan Valley case stud-
ies. The 12 determinant factors and six success conditions previously noted
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all recurred in the five additional projects. Two new determinant factors were
also identified (i.e., 'DENR prescribed the forestland use' under site character-
istics, and 'allows communal resource use' under contractor characteristics).
Table 62 shows the cumulative progression of the determinant factors and
success conditions in the two sets of field observation.
Table 62.
Validation of determinant factors from Cagayan Valley successful case studies in
other regions in the Philippines, 1994. The numbers refer to the number of projects






















clear status of property regime
DENR prescribed the forestland use
Contractor Characteristics
above subsistence level
with farm holding need
meantime payment of labourers' wages
enterprising attitude
allows communal resource use
Project Management Characteristics
assurance of future project prospects
promptness of DENR payment
recognition of usufruct/tenurial right
approval of other land use combinations

































































8.1.4 Phase 4: Investigation of spontaneous tree growing activities
Four spontaneous tree growing individual farmers were the test samples in
validating the relevance of the success conditions and the determinant factors
found in government-sponsored reforestation projects. Four of the six success
conditions also appeared present in the spontaneous tree growing activities.
Two conditions did not hold true: 'aspiration for good track record' and 'com-
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munity cooperation'. However, one new success condition was added among
the list, i.e., 'wood products market prospect' (Table 63).
Table 63.
List of all success conditions from the 11 successful case studies, 1994.
The numbers refer to the number of cases in which the factor was present














































Also, not all determinant factors recurred. Under site characteristics, 'DENR
prescribed the forestland use' did not apply. Of five project management de-
terminant factors, only one recurred (i.e., 'recognition of usufruct/tenurial
rights'). The provision of 'wood products market prospect' seemed to be a
strong stimulant for private tree growing as in the case of the spontaneous tree
growing. Three of five determinant factors under contractor's characteristics
were found relevant (e.g., 'above subsistence level', 'with farmholding need'
and 'enterprising attitude'). Table 64 presents the complete list of determinant
factors from all 11 successful case studies.
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Table 64.
List of all determinant factors from the 11 successful case studies, 1994. The num-
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provision of market security
assurance of future project
prospects




approval of other land use
combinations





































































General diagram showing the relationship between determinant factors and success
conditions
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( Steering Determinant Factors )
Figure 10.
Conceptual diagram for successful tree growing projects in the Philippines (Pasicolan,
1995)
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8.2 Model Formation
The determinant factors and success conditions in Tables 60 to 64 were col-
lated to form a tree growing diagram. Fig. 9 below shows the relationships
between determinant factors and success conditions. A distinction was also
made between the given determinant factors (i.e., related to the site and con-
tractor characteristics) and the steering determinant factors of project man-
agement characteristics. From this relationship an optimal tree growing model
for the Philippine reforestation program was derived (Fig. 10).
8.3 Interpretation of the Model
The model represents a total picture of the success conditions and their
determinant factors in the early phase of a tree growing project. High seedling
survival was taken as the final measure of project success. The model identi-
fies the conditions that can sustain participants' involvement during the first
three-year period under contract reforestation. Afterwards, the Forest Land
Management Agreement, a 25-year leasehold contract replaces the paid la-
bour arrangement as an incentive for longer project participation. Thus, the
model is relevant only in the seedling establishment phase of government tree
growing projects.
The model had three major elements, namely: 1) direct requirements for
seedling survival, 2) success conditions and 3) determinant factors.
From the first observations, two factors seemed crucial to seedling sur-
vival: soil quality and seedling protection and maintenance. The first one is
important but seemed not as crucial as the second because successes were also
obtained in stony grounds or soils with exposed parent materials. In practice,
the success of tree growing seemed to depend greatly on people's direct ef-
forts and sustained interest in the project. In all cases, this becomes the bot-
tomline of project success as it measures the degree of people's participation
in the project. Seedling protection and maintenance, however, in turn ap-
peared to depend on seven success conditions (Table 65).
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Table 65.
The seven success conditions for sustained seedling protection and maintenance in
the nine government and four spontaneous tree growing projects in the Philippines
Condition Description
1. Wood products The presence of a current demand for wood of fu-
ture market certainty (i.e., in raw form, lumber,
poles, post, fuelwood, and for other domestic and
industrial uses)
2. Aspiration for good track Contractor's striving to gain DENR' s confidence in
record the hope of obtaining more project contracts in the
future. It could also mean striving for good project
performance to prolong usufruct over the site
3. Contractor's good financial Whatever the contractor's income source, it should
condition provide income above the subsistence level
4. Intercropping between Planting of short-term of perennial crops (e.g., com,
seedlings upland rice, vegetable, coffee, papaya, banana, etc.)
in between reforestation seedlings for subsistence
and/or cash
5. Assured access / tenurial Indicates present usufruct or land tenure security
right over the project site. It could also mean expressed
aspiration to assume future ownership over the pro-
ject
6. Interest in other related tree Contractor's current intention to pursue other future
uses tree use prospects under FLMA (e.g., short-term
intercropping of subsistence or cash crops, silvi-
pastoral use, fuelwood, other wood products, water-
shed protection for local benefits, or other commu-
nal tree-related uses)
7. Community cooperation Residents' voluntary participation in grassland fire
protection and strict regulation of open grazing
rules inside the project area
The seven conditions are regarded as the sustainability requirements during
and beyond the three-year period of contract reforestation. They are derived
from the combined effects of the three interacting components of the project
setting, namely: site characteristics, contractor characteristics and project
management characteristics. Each of these components consists of many de-
terminant factors which contribute to one or more of the success conditions.
In Fig. 10, all the arrows from the determinant factors are directed to the
success conditions to mean the latter's dependence on the former. The heavy
convergence of arrows in a success condition, however, does not connote the
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degree of requirements needed for that condition. Rather, it conveys the many
possibilities to attain it. Also, it does not mean greater relevance because
some conditions with less arrows are critically important as well (see Section
8.5). However, the more conditions present, the greater likelihood for success.
The content of the different success conditions can be grouped into three
broad categories, i.e., financial, tenurial and social (Fig. 10). Associated with
the financial incentives, are the following success conditions: 1) contractor's
good financial situation, 2) aspiration for good track record to obtain more
future project contracts, and 3) wood products market prospect. These three
conditions are directed towards improving contractor's income.
For tenurial incentives, the following success conditions are associated: 1)
intercropping between seedlings, 2) interest in other related tree uses, and 3)
assured access or property right. Only 'community cooperation' falls under
the social category.
Interestingly, the three sets of success conditions for the contractor's sus-
tained participation correspond to the three types of incentive system that the
project management can introduce or affect to promote sustainable tree grow-
ing in the countryside (see Fig. 10). These incentive systems with their
corresponding possible management schemes are:
1. Financial incentives: Provision of more cash flow and compliance with
previously stipulated terms of agreement in the delivery of existing con-
tract payment for participation such as the following interventions:
a. provision of market security
b. assurance of more future project prospects
c. promptness of DENR contract payment
2. Tenurial incentives: Exploring the viability of tenurial arrangements and
other property right instruments for participation, including:
a. recognition of usufruct and tenurial right
b. approval of other land use combinations
3. Social incentive: Recruitment of 'on-site' contractors and labourers forms
the primary basis of a community-based resource management system. If
project participants are not locally-based, it will be very difficult to attain
community cooperation. It is important to emphasize the critical relevance
of this incentive because the long-term survival of tree growing on public
land depends greatly on community cooperation in fire fighting and strict
regulation of open grazing inside the project area. The community will
generally not participate, unless they can benefit economically and so-
cially from the project.
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8.4 Criteria for Evaluation
This section aims to show how the success conditions were empirically de-
rived from the results of the field study.
As previously mentioned, the sustainability of contractor's participation
may depend on at least one or more of the seven success conditions. This sec-
tion presents the empirical basis of this claim. It gives an outline (an ap-
proach) for determining the possible occurrence or absence of the success
conditions by rating the number of positive and negative background factors
for each condition.
In the actual assessment exercise, these success conditions carry either a
yes or no score, which indicates whether they are present or absent in the pro-
ject. On the other hand, the determinant factors have either a positive or nega-
tive value or may not be applicable at all depending on the given project con-
text.
Since one success condition could be a product of more than one determi-
nant factor, often both the positive (+) and the negative (-) values come to-
gether. As a rule, the final score for the success condition is determined by the
net result, after summing the positive and the negative background factors.
However, the more positive factors are present, the greater the likelihood
the success condition will occur. Likewise, the opposite holds true for the
negative frequency.
In instances where the number of positive is equal to the negative factors,
the value or sign of the most critical factor is considered. A critical factor is
one with the most relevant or weighted effect on the contractor. There is no
specific critical determinant factor set in a general way, because it varies from
one project context to another.
In the succeeding pages, the criteria of rating the determinant factors of
project success are presented in Table 66. Also, in Table 67, the survey results
of the 13 tree growing projects and activities are presented and collated. Fur-
thermore, in Table 68, the seven success conditions were rated for their fre-
quency of occurrence in the contrast analysis, validation study and in the in-
vestigation of spontaneous tree growing activities.
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Table 66.
Criteria for rating determinant factors to project success



















some portions are ara- good soil and physi-
ble ography
remote but can easily
be reached by 'off-site'
participants
public land with mi-
grants positioned in the
area even prior to the
project
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192 TREE GROWING ON DIFFERENT GROUNDS
C. Project Management Characteristics
10. Provision of none
market
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Table 68.
Frequency of recurrence of the seven success conditions in the three sets of case
studies on tree growing projects in the Philippines
Setl(N=4) Set2(n=5) Set3(n=4)








2 negative 2 positive (All successful) Tree growing
Wood products - 2
market prospects
Aspiration for 2 3
good track record
Contractor's good 2 5 3
financial situation
Intercropping be- - 2 2 3
tween seedlings
Assured access/ 2 2 4
property right
Interested i n other 2 2 3
related tree uses
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8.5 The Relevance of the Different Success Conditions
Based on the contrast analysis of the first two successful and unsuccessful
projects in Cagayan Valley, it was first presumed that six success conditions
should be present for project sustainability. 'Wood products market prospect'
is excluded because it does not yet exist or has not yet been anticipated in
government projects. However, further study conducted in other regions re-
vealed that this is not always the case. From the tallied results in Table 67, it is
clear that the seven conditions were all negative for the unsuccessful projects
and generally positive for the first group of successful ones. However, some
of the additional successful projects and the spontaneous ones appeared to
function with fewer positive conditions, yet were still successful. On the over-
all rating, the success conditions for government reforestation in order of
highest frequency are:
a. community cooperation and contractor's good financial situation;
b. aspiration for good track record;
c. assured access/property right, intercropping and interest other related tree
uses.
On the other hand, the success conditions for spontaneous tree growing pro-
jects, in the order of the highest frequency are:
a. assured access/property right and contractor's good financial situation;
b. intercropping and interest in other related tree uses;
c. wood products market prospects.
The difference in the order of significance in success conditions between gov-
ernment and spontaneous projects reveals their distinctly different back-
grounds. In this regard, it is interesting to examine closely the overall rele-
vance of each success condition based on its effects in all case studies.
8.5.1 Wood products market prospect
Based on the present case studies, wood products market prospect seems im-
portant only for spontaneous tree growing activities. However, in the future it
can also become a powerful incentive for contractors pursuing FLMA in
government-sponsored tree growing projects. In the spontaneous tree grow-
ing, the wood market can become a direct incentive, whereas, in the present
stage of the reforestation program, it has been rather remote. Other basic secu-
rity conditions have to be met first before contractors think of the market as a
drive for sustained participation in government tree growing projects. These
more direct conditions will be discussed in the succeeding text.
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8.5.2 Aspiration for good track record
Aspiration for good track record seems relevant only to government-spon-
sored projects, although it does not apply in all cases. For contractors who are
driven mainly by the desire to obtain more project contracts for greater finan-
cial gain in the future, this condition is important. It appears to be unimportant
if contractors have other considerations for participation apart from the direct
project cash payment, in particular the 'assurance of access/property right'.
On the other hand, in spontaneous projects, farmers do not aspire for good
track records at all. Their voluntary tree growing activities rather stemmed
from direct needs for wood for household and cash income.
'Aspiration for good track record' does not operate by itself. It is rather
complemented by another success condition (e.g., contractor's good financial
situation) which will be explained later on. Although it does not recur very
often in the case studies, it is still regarded as critically relevant in a sense that
it can trigger another crucial success condition (e.g., community cooperation)
on public tree growing (Fig. 6).
8.5.3 Contractor's good financial situation
Contractor's good financial situation topped the list of recurring success con-
ditions, an indication of its overwhelming importance for both government
and spontaneous tree growing projects (Table 60).
In government reforestation activities, cash remuneration is crucial
because the program is premised on two noble goals: environmental rehabili-
tation and improvement of the financial situation of participants through em-
ployment generation. The second objective can be accomplished in three
ways:
a. prompt and regular release of contract payment from the DENR: In practice
however, this factor was not achieved;
b. contractors with cash surplus pay meantime their labourers' wages in
times of delayed DENR payment;
c. the participants derive their subsistence and cash through intercropping
simultaneously in the site. In this way they are less dependent on the direct
cash income from the project.
If none of three possibilities is met, sustained project participation cannot be
achieved since the majority of the reforestation participants are subsistent
peasants in search of daily earnings for their basic food needs.
In this regard the financial situation of the contractors is considered to be
critically relevant, especially in government tree growing projects. Also, such
situation enhances the attainment of two other important success conditions
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(e.g., 'aspiration for good track record' and 'community cooperation'). In it-
self, good financial situation cannot bring about the desired outcome. It has to
be complemented by these two other conditions to trigger project success.
Also for spontaneous projects 'fanner's good financial situation' is of pri-
mary importance. It is a basic condition that warrants farmers to venture into a
risky and long gestation means of livelihood like tree farming. Normally,
farmers with cash surplus or those at least with an economic status above the
subsistence level, have the availability of time and resources to invest in tree
crops. Such investment for them is possible because they are not directly un-
der the pressure of hacking out for their daily subsistence, like the subsistent
farmers do.
8.5.4 Intercropping between seedlings
Although intercropping between seedling is formally allowed in all contract
reforestation projects, in practice, it cannot be done in all cases. It is highly
site specific and it cannot exert an influence by itself. It always goes with an-
other fundamental condition (i.e., assured access/property rights). Although
in both government and spontaneous tree growing it appears as just supple-
mentary to other success conditions, it is still relevant especially in the for-
mer. For instance, participants who simultaneously intercropped in the project
site had a higher threshold for project's cash flow problems. They were cush-
ioned from the effect of delayed releases of government contract payment. If
they did not benefit from this other use of the site, they might have aborted the
project in the absence of immediate and regular payment from the DENR. It is
particularly relevant in cases where 'assured access/property rights' is se-
cured combined with 'site arability'.
8.5.5 Assured access/property rights
Assure access/property right ranked second on the list of most recurring suc-
cess conditions which means that it is nearly always important, except for a
few cases.
In both government and spontaneous tree growing projects, 'assured ac-
cess/property rights' holds the rational basis for other success conditions to
exist. For instance, 'intercropping between seedlings', 'interest in other re-
lated tree uses', 'community cooperation' and perhaps the effect of 'wood
products market prospect' become meaningless, if assured access or property
right is not first secured. Thus, it is regarded as a fundamental and critical ele-
ment for other success conditions to build on. In those government reforesta-
tion projects in which 'assured access/property right' appeared to play no sig-
nificant role in participants' motivation, the critical success condition was 'as-
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piration of good track record'. Both conditions are considered precursor of
other success conditions but in a different motivational setting. The former is
directed to a situation in which the participant is becoming more and more
independent from the government. The latter is directed towards continuous
dependency.
8.5.6 Interest in other related tree uses
This condition is also site specific. It just supplements other conditions. It is
not independent but is always backed up by 'assured access/property right'
both in government and spontaneous tree growing projects. However, in the
government reforestation scheme (in its present form), 'interest in other re-
lated tree uses' is considered to be a precondition for the pursuit of FLMA (a
property right arrangement). Hence, it can be said that 'interest in other re-
lated tree uses' is complementary to 'assured access/property right' in as far
as FLMA is concerned. On the other hand, in spontaneous projects, this condi-
tion is regarded as critically relevant only if tree growing stemmed from direct
household needs and related uses other than cash payment.
8.5.7 Community cooperation
This condition is also similar to 'aspiration of good track record' which de-
pends on the project context. In a government tree growing scheme, it is con-
sidered highly relevant because tree planting is done on public lands. In most
cases it determines the long-term survival of reforestation projects. Although
it appears to be mainly dependent on the site setting or participant's attributes,
in practice it does not occur spontaneously however. Two other conditions
must have to be satisfied first, namely: 'assurance of access/property right
over the project' or 'aspiration of good track record' leading to contractor's
voluntary payment of labourers' wages meantime (Figs 5 and 6). In spontane-
ous tree growing however, 'community cooperation' is not relevant since it is
carried out on private or usufruct areas. As such, the needed care and protec-
tion for the trees are rather a household's responsibility.
8.6 Conclusion
In conclusion, four success conditions appeared to be the most critically rele-
vant on participants' sustained project involvement. These are in the order of
significance: 1) good financial situation of contractors, 2) assured access/
property right or 3) aspiration for good track record and 4) community coop-
eration.
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8.7 The Project Background Settings
The project background settings were broadly categorized into three types: 1)
site characteristics, 2) contractor's features and 3) project management char-
acteristics. The interactions or blending of these three settings determine the
occurrence of the success conditions in tree growing projects.
The site features comprise the biophysical and tenurial aspects of the pro-
ject, while the contractor's features constitute the immediate socioeconomic
setting. The project management characteristics represent the program imple-
mentation scheme or institutional setting.
The site's and contractor's characteristics set the opportunities or con-
straints to project success. These are regarded as the given background factors
that have either positive or negative attributes. Both settings or their com-
bined effects determine the range of possible project outcomes. They provide
the climate for project success or failure. However, the project management is
the crucial background setting because it either harmonizes or spoils the ef-
fect of both site and contractor's features.
In other words, it is not the site or the contractor's setting that matters most
in a project, but rather the type of management intervention. It is well possible
that a success opportunity will lead to failure, if it is spoiled by the manage-
ment intervention. Similarly, a negative site or contractor's setting can still
turn into a success, if the management intervention mitigates such constraints.
Thus, it can either build on or ruin a given opportunity or it can either mitigate
or reinforce a given constraint.
In this way in a government reforestation, the project management func-
tions as the steering determinant factor of project success. There are instances
that it mitigates a negative site setting and yet resulted in a project success.
However, in most cases, it did the opposite and resulted in low performance,
despite the positive site and contractor's settings. On the other hand, in spon-
taneous tree growing, the farmer's features play the prominent role. In two of
the four observation sites, the DENR project management became subservient
to the local farmers' whims and options which resulted in a good outcome.
Although in this example there was no deliberate government's effort that
was evident, still, it can play a very important role in rationalizing spontane-
ous tree growing at the farm level. By way of legislation or provision of insti-
tutional incentives (such as wood market securities, production loans, crop
insurance, tenurial arrangements, etc.), private tree growing can become at-
tractive to small farmers.
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8.8 The Determinant Factors
In total, 15 determinant factors appeared to have a bearing on the seven suc-
cess conditions. Some of these are not as critical as the others. However, each
factor has its own distinct contribution. To highlight their relative importance,




This factor supposedly ranked top most in relevance under site characteristics
because it is directly linked with seedling survival. However, if it is assumed
that project sustainability primarily depends on people's activity, arability
factor becomes significant only when intercropping is practised by the con-
tractor. Also, it can become a motivation to aspire for assured access/property
right over the project in the future. However, by itself, it cannot trigger the
two aforementioned success conditions. It is always associated with other in-
tervening determinant factors, such as: 1) with contractor's farm holding
need, 2) clear site's property regime, 3) project management's recognition of
usufruct/tenurial right.
2. Proximity and accessibility
This factor is the alter equivalent of'on-site' or 'in-place' recruitment of par-
ticipants which can trigger community cooperation. However, in itself, it can-
not result into such success condition. It must be backed up by more critical
determinant factors such as 'promptness of DENR payment' or at least contrac-
tor's practice of 'paying meantime their labourers' wages and 'recruitment of
'on-site' participants'. Site proximity or accessibility also influences contrac-
tor's option to aspire for 'assured access or property right' over the project in
the future.
3. Status of property regime
This is a critical factor that determines contractor's current option (i.e.,
intercropping) and future plan (i.e., aspiration for assured access or property
right) over the site. Although conflict of tenurial status is not common in most
reforestation sites, it is crucial in a sense that it validates the relevance of other
factors such as; 1) site arability, 2) site proximity and accessibility, and 3) con-
tractor's enterprising attitude.
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4. DENR prescribed the forestland use
This factor which defines the possibilities for production or protection for-
estry is site specific and is not as crucial as the others. However, it gives no
option for the contractor to aspire for assured access or property right over
the project or limit his interest in other related tree uses. For instance, if the
contracted project site has been delineated by DENR as part of a critical
watershed area, definitely it cannot be turned over for FLMA in the future.
8.8.2 Contractor characteristics
1. Subsistence level
This factor defines the financial situation of the contractors. It is only rele-
vant when the condition for participation is exclusively tied to participant's
interests in project's cash earnings. In instances wherein DENR payments were
delayed as in the past, it played a very critical role in sustaining both contrac-
tor's and labourers' project involvement. However, by itself, it cannot inde-
pendently a success condition. It functions rather as the contractor's economic
basis for making future options or determining the extent of his current pro-
ject participation.
2. Farmholding need
This factor is directly linked with the contractor's practice of intercropping
and with his aspiration for assured access or property right over the project in
the future. However, it is affected by other site factors like 'site arability', 'sta-
tus of site's property regime' and 'DENR prescribed the forestland use'.
3. Meantime payment of labour er s ' wages
Although this meantime payment of labourers' wages was not a prescribed
contractor's obligation, its practice proved to be effective in fostering com-
munity cooperation. It is regarded as one of the very crucial determinant fac-
tors to success because it can surmount the negative effects of other back-
ground factors, such as 'non-recruitment of "on-site" participants' and 'non-
promptness of DENR payments'. This factor is either induced by or associated
with the other success conditions, namely: aspiration for good track record,
contractor's good financial situation, and interest in other related tree uses.
4. Contractor's enterprising attitude
This is another critically relevant factor, in particular, for spontaneous tree
growing activities because it triggers farmer's interest in other tree related
uses and enables him to respond to wood products market prospect. In gov-
ernment reforestation projects, it is closely linked with contractor's aspiration
for assured access or property right over the site. But this factor, by itself, it
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cannot do anything. It must be backed up by other factors such as partici-
pant's 'above subsistence level', having 'high farmholding need', 'good site
arability', and 'clear status of site's property regime'.
5. Willingness to allow future communal resource use
This factor is one basis for community cooperation because it provides access
for the local residents to benefit from the future produce of the project. How-
ever, its applicability has yet to materialize in the future. As such, it is not as
relevant now as the other factors.
8.8.3 Project management characteristics
1. Provision of market security
This factor appeared to be one basis for the sustainability of some spontane-
ous tree growing activities. Although it was not deliberately created through
government's initiative, individual farmers responded very actively to tree
growing to meet local market demand for wood. In the current government
reforestation program, wood products market prospect has not yet been intro-
duced. As such some prospective FLMA holders were reluctant to assume lon-
ger project involvement, for fear that they might lose in the end, if there will
be no sure future wood market.
2. Assurance of future project prospects
This factor was not deliberately expressed by the project management. How-
ever, in some instances, it was used to condition contractor's motivation to
perform well in their first contracted project. It is only relevant for contractors
who aimed at making a good track record in order to gain more future project
contracts. This factor has a short-range effect on contractor's motivation, and
it tends to make him continually dependent on the government.
3. Promptness of DENR payment
Of the six management determinant factors of project success, this is the most
critical factor because the sustainability of participants' project involvement
in the present program set-up was premised on the direct cash incentive they
expected to gain. Its relevance is directly linked with two other success condi-
tions of great importance, namely: improvement of the financial situation of
the contractors and community cooperation.
4. Recognition of usufruct or tenurial right
For successful reforestation to take place on squatted public lands, recogni-
tion of the usufruct or tenurial right of the local occupants is a strategic and
wise approach. This also holds true for areas with overlapping tenurial
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regime. Such factor is closely associated with 'recruitment of 'on-site' partici-
pants'. Also, its relevance is directly linked with the following success condi-
tions: 1) contractor's practice of intercropping, 2) his aspiration for assured
access or property right and 3) community cooperation.
5. Approval of other land use combinations
This factor proved to be relevant for contractors who signified beforehand
their plans to further develop the project site in the future. However, this fac-
tor cannot be applied, unless it is backed up by another management interven-
tions, i.e., 'recognition of usufruct or tenurial right' of contractors. Two suc-
cess conditions are affected by this factor, namely: contractor's practice of
intercropping between seedlings and his interest in other related tree uses.
6. Recruitment of 'on-site ' contractors
This is another most relevant determinant factor because it is the main basis of
community cooperation. In some cases it does not automatically result in
strong community involvement in fire fighting. Rather, it plays a complemen-
tary role with other factors to bring about the desired result. These other fac-
tors are as follows: 1) promptness of DENR payment, 2) meantime payment of
labourers' wages by contractors, 3) contractor's allowance of future commu-
nal resource use, 4) recognition of usufruct or tenurial right of local
occupants. In other words, recruitment of 'on-site' contractors is not suffi-
cient in itself, rather, it only provides the fundamental requirement for the
other aforementioned positive determinant factors to build on.
8.9 Conclusion
In terms of relative significance, based on the current reforestation experience
in general, the order of priority according to highest relevance is as follows:
With respect to the site's characteristics, we have: 1) clear status of prop-
erty regime, 2) good arability, 3) proximity and accessibility, and 4) DENR
prescribed the forestland use.
With respect to the contractor's characteristics, we have: 1) meantime pay-
ment of labourers' wages, 2) enterprising attitude, 3) above subsistence level,
4) with farmholding need, and 5) allowance of communal resource use.
With respect to the project management characteristics, we have: 1)
promptness of DENR payment, 2) recruitment of 'on-site' participants, 3) rec-
ognition of usufruct/tenurial right, 4) approval of other land use combina-
tions, 5) assurance of future project prospects, and 6) provision of market se-
curity.
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With respect to the over all rating, the following determinant factors ap-
peared to have the greatest bearing on project success (in the order of highest
significance): 1) 'on-site' recruitment, 2) DENR prompt release of contract
payments, 3) meantime payment of labourers' wage by the contractors, and 4)
good site arability.
8.10 Relevance of Findings Compared with Literature Study
The field results of the study were reflected in relation to the literature review.
The aim is to compare the success conditions and determinant factors of sus-
tainable tree growing as identified in the present study with those listed earlier
from the literature. Specifically, the objective is to find out whether they may
or may not apply in a more general way.
8.10.1 Motivations for spontaneous tree growing at the farm level
There were three possible conditions or farmer's motivations for voluntary
tree growing at the farm level that apply for all cases, both in the literature and
in the present study, namely:
1. meeting direct household tree needs: Tree growing driven by immediate
felt need for tree products tends to be spontaneous and sustainable even
with none or limited external incentives.
2. cash from wood products sale: Earning an income from home grown trees
provides continuous incentive for tree growers to maintain their
established woodlots.
3. security of land and tree tenure: If farmers are more certain of the benefits
from the trees they planted, they will likely invest in tree crops than if they
are not certain. The degree of land and tree tenurial security is directly re-
lated to farmer's spontaneous interest in tree growing.
Another factor concerns soil conservation. This factor as mentioned in the
literature as a tree growing motivation was not mentioned at all by farmers in
the present study. However, in some government reforestation projects, a
number of prospective FLMA holders hinted the need for trees as watershed
protection.
8.10.2 Incentives for tree growing on public lands
Under the government-sponsored projects, there are four incentive systems
proved to be consistently relevant in the literature for all cases. Two of these
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incentives seemed to have the same effects in the current study. These incen-
tives are:
1. paid labour: This incentive is powerful to stimulate instant and massive
participation. However, by itself, it cannot sustain participation, especially
after it is withdrawn. Worse, it may well become counterproductive if the
participants directly depend so much on it for subsistence.
2. market incentive: The presence of a sure wood market encourages private
tree growing. Its absence or remote creation (although perceived as cru-
cial) will lessen the participants' motivation in public tree growing, even
though if they were assured of benefiting from the project.
On the other hand, two other incentives for public tree growing have different
effects comparing the literature with the present study:
1. land tenure: In the literature study, apart from the positive effect of
secured land right on farmer's confidence in tree investments, some
farmers grow trees to earn rights on lands under dispute. In the present
study however, some participants in one problematic reforestation project
(Maguirig Case) did not take advantage of the tenurial security through the
FLMA. Instead, they deliberately abandoned the project prematurely be-
cause of the conflicting property regime of the site. In practice, the present
tenurial arrangement (FLMA) which the government offers does not suffice
completely the quest of most participants for property right security over
the project.
2. access to future produce: In the literature study, assurance of access to fu-
ture produce from public tree growing increased local people's participa-
tion in tree maintenance and protection. However, in the current study,
some prospective FLMA holders who were assured of similar rights and
benefits were reluctant to pursue the FLMA. They were constrained by the
absence of a sure or ready market.
Five other incentive systems appeared to be relevant in the literature survey
were not validated in the present study because in practice, they are not yet
applied in the projects that were investigated. These incentives are: 1) cost-
benefit sharing, 2) loans and credits, 3) subsidy, 4) crop insurance, and 5) tax
exemption.
8.10.3 Newly identified success variables for sustainable tree growing
on public lands
Interestingly, there were new conditions and motivating factors surfaced in
the study. Some of these are not really new but a variation or an extension of
other already known incentives. These factors are the following:
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1. Aspiration for good track record: some successful contractors of the three-
year contract reforestation project attributed their sustained participation
in seedling maintenance and protection to their aspiration for a good track
record. This goal stemmed from their desire to obtain more future project
contracts. In the long-run however, this can supposed to be unsustainable,
because participation depends greatly on the continuous availability of
future projects.
2. Contractor's initial financial situation: although this condition has noth-
ing to do directly with participation, it is important in the sense that it pro-
vides the economic basis for contractor's investment options in tree grow-
ing. Also, it makes participant's unaffected by the possible problem of ir-
regular project payment from the implementing agency.
3. Interest in other related tree use: tree growing on public lands becomes
sustainable if aside from the cash incentive for participation, contractors
have other interests over the project. To accommodate contractor's other
future development options for the project, a flexible reforestation plan
may well be adopted, which includes the free selection of tree species,
seedling spacing ad incentive system.
4. Community cooperation: this is one of the most critical factors that deter-
mines tree growing sustainability on public lands. Grassland fires are ram-
pant in almost all reforestation areas. Without strong community coopera-
tion in fire protection as well as in regulation of open grazing, the chance
for long-term project survival is slim. In the literature study, this factor
was not given much attention unlike the others. It was only implicitly re-
garded as an important element to abate grassland fires in the past regular
reforestation projects (Section 3.3.3).
Finally, there are a number of determinant factors, the relevance of which are
seldom mentioned in the literature survey, and yet, are critically important in
setting the success conditions for government reforestation projects.
1. Under the practice of intercropping, the determinant factors are: 'site ara-
biliry' and project management's 'recognition of contractor's usufruct or
farming right in the project area';
2. Under the aspiration for a good track record, the determinant factors are:
the 'provision of a future incentive' for good performance or the imposi-
tion of a sanction for problematic performance by the project manage-
ment;
3. Under the contractor's good financial situation, the determinant factors
are: project management's 'prompt and regular release of labourers'
wages', 'practice of paying meantime labourers' wages' by contractors in
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case of late payments from the project and the level of financial situation
of the participant (either 'above or below the subsistence level'); and
4. Under the interest in other related tree uses, the determinant factors: the
relevance of participant's enterprising attitude.
8.10.4 Relevance of the four theoretical bases of farmer s ' response to
tree growing
The four theoretical bases of farmers' response to tree growing described in
the literature survey were also examined with respect to their relevance in
explaining the results of the present field study (see Section 3.1.3 for refer-
ence).
1. Risk-Averse Theory
Throughout the whole study, the Risk-Averse Theory became evidently dis-
played in the attitudes of most poor and non-performing contractors. Their
erratic and conditional participation during the middle and later parts of their
contracts stemmed from fear that they may not be able to receive what they
laboured for as a result of DENR's delayed payments. The relevance of the the-
ory applies especially in finding an explanation for the reluctance of some
successful contractors to pursue the FLMA instrument.
2. Rational Peasant Theory
The application of this theory was more evident in the spontaneous tree grow-
ing activities than in government reforestation projects investigated. Some
enterprising farmers voluntarily raised trees even without government incen-
tives, but mainly driven by their direct needs or by an existing local market
demand. On the other hand, some contractors in government projects were
regarded as 'opportunity conscious'. Often, they made tree growing as a
trade-off to gain or prolong farming access on public lands. Others viewed
successful tree growing as a means to further legitimize their property rights
over the project site. They took the risk of spending meantime personal re-
sources for their labourers' wages during DENR irregular payments in order to
ensure sustained project participation.
Behaving according to the Rational Peasant Theory however, does not
preclude one's tendency to be risk-averse at the same time. This means that a
reforestation contractor can be both a risk-taker and a risk-averse depending
on the situation which he may choose to be either the former or the latter. A
case in point is the behaviour of the rich contractors in Bugallon, Cavinti and
Virac who took the risk of paying meantime their labourers' wages during
DENR's delayed contract payments but disinterested to pursue FLMA because
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of the many uncertainties and some related perceived legal difficulties asso-
ciated with tree farming.
3. Moral Domains Theories
The two analogous theories by Goodin (1982) and Jack and Jack (1987) ex-
plained very well the dilemma confronting the the poor and subsistent con-
tractors and labourers as far as their quality or long-term participation in the
project is concerned. Their employment-driven motive which redounded to a
superficial project involvement during DENR late payments coincided with the
'homo economicus' domain which the two theories regarded as one of the
two modes that every investment decision be based on.
De Groot's (1992) concept of 'honoris' or quest for prestige as another
motivation for a voluntary compliance besides the two others already ident-
ified earlier fits exactly the success strivings of some influential contractors,
partly to maintain a good public image. However, the hidden agenda was to
bait bigger contracts in the future for economic reason. Contrary to the claim
of Goodin (1982) and Jack and Jack (1987) that there is only one possible ba-
sis for every decision made, this logic does not hold for the case of those con-
tractors with dual motivations. In here, De Groot is right in claiming that
things and situations may be treated in one or vaguely more modes rather than
seeing each motivation as incompatible with the others.
4. Olson's Logic of Collective Action
Olson's Logic of Collective Action Theory only applies to a very limited de-
gree in the present study. For one thing the kind of research problem investi-
gated is not a very appropriate case for the theory. It fits more in an open ac-
cess to resource situation wherein the focus of analysis centers on extraction
or utilization activities which is often termed as the incentives or benefits
from participation.
To explain further, in Contract Reforestation in the Philippines, the access
to the incentives or benefits (monetary payments) are preconditioned by se-
lective participation. Only those who contribute physical labour will get paid.
Thus, the selection of participants is based on their physical capacity and
sometimes political acceptability. Furthermore, the limited flow of incentive
(payment) circumscribed the extent of public participation. In contrast to
open logging, access to the incentive is not preconditioned by selective partic-
ipation. There is no screening of resource takers and everybody gets what he
wants according to his capacity. The flow of incentive may continue for as
long as there is still something to extract.
Another reason for the limited applicability of the theory is the vague or
absurd use of the term 'community contract' in reforestation. The term
'community contract' is a misnomer. Although there is supposed to be a col-
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lective level of activities or participation ('de jure') in all aspects of the pro-
ject, in practice, this is rarely taking place in the field ('de facto'). For exam-
ple, people are enlisted as members comprising the community contract with
'de jure' rights to share equitably from the project's payments. However, later
on, they will be treated as daily hired labourers once the contract will be
awarded. The one who heads the group often takes the biggest share of the
contract payment.
An exception to this prevailing misconception however, is observed in a
number of successful projects where there is a voluntary community partici-
pation in fire fighting activities and observance of open grazing restriction.
In contrast to what Olson's presumed to be conditions for the rise of col-
lective action, there was no state intervention nor pressure coming from out-
side that induced local people to voluntary participate in protecting the pro-
jects. His emphasis on the size of the selective benefits or cost (punishment)
as means to discrimate between people who cooperate and who do not as con-
dition for collective action also did not hold for a number of cases in the
study. There were instances wherein the locals cooperate in protecting or will-
ing to assume responsibility in maintaining the reforestation project in the
future even without payment because they realized the watershed value of the
project to the community.
In essence, Olson's Logic of collective action seems to apply strictly to an
'open access to resource' situation. Then, the state plays a crucial role in pro-
tecting the resource.
Implications for DENR Reforestation
Policy
This chapter consists of three sections. The first covers the immediate transla-
tion of the research findings into prospective reforestation strategies and
guidelines. The second one deals with the tree growing organizational aspect,
highlighting the specific function of local actors according to their interests
and resource capacities. The third section focuses on the procedural aspect of
program planning and implementation.
9.1 Proposed Intervention Measures
Based on the integrated research results of the 13 tree growing projects, three
major types of incentive were identified as crucial for the sustainability of the
reforestation program in the Philippines. These incentives are: financial, te-
nurial and social. These three incentives can guide project management to the
highest advantage of the program by proper matching of the management in-
terventions with site and participants' given settings. The management char-
acteristics as the main determinant steering factors of project success play a
crucial role in building on the opportunities or mitigating the constraints gen-
erated by the given site and participants' settings. In discussing these three
types of incentive, all issues and implications are directed towards improve-
ment of project management.
9.1.1 Financial
The financial incentive pertains to the direct and immediate benefits gained
from project participation in the form of paid labour. In most cases, it is the
bottomline that draws people to the tree planting activity in the first stage of
the program, particularly those who are mainly after employment. In the in-
termediary and later stages however, there are in principle other financial in-
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centives aimed at overcoming tree growers' risks and constraints associated
with the long gestation of tree crops. These include production loans, crop
insurance, price guarantees, subsidies, and many more. The use of a financial
incentive, as far as paid labour is concerned has varying effects with respect
to participants' socioeconomic condition and on the way in which the instru-
ment is being applied.
ISSUE No. l:
The type of financial instrument that should be designed and the context in
which it functions best
When using paid labour as instrument for participation, it is important to con-
sider its effect on the actor's motivation and behaviour. This caution applies
in the case of daily-wage subsistent participants who are mainly after pro-
ject's direct cash earnings. The following questions serve as pointers to evalu-
ate the soundness of the instrument's design and application:
1. How can the project involvement of subsistent participants be sustained?
2. What project management strategy could ensure the quality participation
of contractors aspiring for more future project contracts?
3. How can a continuous dependence on project's paid labour earnings be
avoided? A corollary question is 'how can spontaneous tree growing be
encouraged among farmers?'
Proposed Measures/Interventions
For the financial incentive to function effectively, three project management
or government interventions gleaned from the study should deliberately be
executed (Fig. 10). These interventions correspond to the three questions
raised above.
1. Promptness and regularity ofDENR contract payment
The regularity of DENR payment determines largely the quality and consist-
ency of subsistent participants' project involvement. This particularly applies
to 'hand-to-mouth' marginal farmers, for whom the delay of compensation is
a harsh offense. The delay in payment all the more perpetuates social inequity
between those who have already much and those who have little. Participants
who depend directly on the project's income for subsistence will be forced to
opt for other income sources with immediate earnings. On the other hand,
participants who belong to the above subsistence level can endure late pay-
ment often in lumpsum at the end of the year or the whole contract period. If
the marginal farmers are not regularly paid, they might deliberately abandon
or burn down the project.
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It is important to know precisely participants' degree of dependence on the
project earnings and the implementing agency must look for ways to pay the
marginal subsistent labourers on a regular basis.
2. Assurance of future project prospects
Since direct cash earnings can motivate both the rich and subsistent contrac-
tors, further incentives, from their current contract, should be provided as a
reward for good performance.
The contractor's continuous striving for three-year reforestation contracts
should be encouraged, though it runs counter to the long-term objective of
FLMA. The project management should assure contractors of future additional
contracts for good performance. Likewise, those who simultaneously culti-
vate the area for short-term cropping and benefit at the same time from the
project's income should be assured of additional areas to contract.
3. The provision of a market
Although direct cash incentives from the project may provide impetus for peo-
ple's participation, it can also become counter productive if it promotes de-
pendency. One example is the deliberate burning down of forest plantations
prompted by participants' desire for continuous employment in government-
administered regular projects in the past. Likewise, contractors who simulta-
neously farm the area may not be motivated to maintain the growing trees in
the long-run but always would find reasons to clear the site for subsistent
cropping.
The most stimulating incentive in the long-run is the effective demand of
wood. With sure access and a sufficiently high price, participants may be en-
couraged to pursue longer tree growing activities both on private and public
lands.
Under FLMA, a benefit-sharing arrangement between the government and
the contractor is provided for but not a sure market. Contract growing could
be a good strategy to boost tree growers' confidence in the absence of a ready
market. Also, the improvement or provision of a transport system, road net-
works and other infrastructures leading to the market should be addressed by
the government.
Also a market for secondary or minor forest products like fuelwood, char-
coal, animal fodder from multipurpose tree species, medicinal items and other
tree related goods, would encourage tree growing at the farm level. Agro-
forestry can become an attractive farming system, aimed at both meeting
household's cash needs and providing incentives for continually maintaining
the trees up to maturity. In addition, it would relieve the participant from con-
tinually being dependent on paid labour which the project will not be able to
assure in the long-run.
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9.1.2 Tenurial
The tenurial incentive deals with the aspiration for property rights rather than
with immediate monetary benefits from participation. A longer project in-
volvement could also be expected because the participants have a stake in
other present or future development prospects in the site. In most instances,
tenurial incentive can surmount disputes of claim in areas with problems of
access or ownership right at the beginning.
Lessons gained from spontaneous projects underscored the critical impor-
tance of tenurial security for voluntary tree growing activities by individual
farmers. In the case of the present government reforestation program, the
FLMA as a 25-year forestland lease agreement was supposed to address the
tenurial insecurity of tree growers in public lands. However, the responses
appeared to be very different in this respect. Some contractors were still reluc-
tant to pursue a longer project involvement beyond the three-year contract
period. On the other hand, there were some who already asserted a sense of
ownership over the project area even prior to the introduction of the instru-
ment. In addition, some farmers were willing to grow trees in an abandoned
reforestation areas as a pretext for usufruct, even without any formal tenurial
agreement.
ISSUE NO. 2:
The type of tenurial instrument appropriate for each specific site context
Normally, the marginal, degraded and often remote or inaccessible areas are
targeted for reforestation because of the fragile condition besides the high
certainty that these portions are less inhabited by people who may impinge on
the smooth implementation of the project. However, the high cost of mainte-
nance under these conditions usually will lessen the chance of seedling sur-
vival. The objective of the program to mobilize more local people could hard-
ly be attained if reforestation is done beyond participants' easy reach. Given
these predetermined site preferences, the following questions can be drawn:
1. What type of tenurial instrument is best fitted for stimulating tree growing
on open arable public lands?
2. What type of tenurial instrument is best fitted for stimulating tree growing
on arable abandoned reforestation areas?
3. Can forestland be privatized for exclusive tree growing purpose?
4. What is the most appropriate setting or condition for the subsequent imple-
mentation of the FLMA instrument?
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Proposed Measures/Interventions
Two management interventions are relevant in addressing these four ques-
tions: 'the recognition of usufruct or tenurial right (with respect to the first
three questions) and approval of other land use combinations' (for the last
question).
1. Recognition of usufruct or tenurial rights of local people
This can be applied under the following conditions:
a. Granting of usufruct on arable open public lands
On open public lands already occupied by migrant farmers prior to contract
reforestation, 'on-site' or 'in-place' recruitment should be adopted. This
means that there should be no spatial displacement or alteration of farmers'
initial position and farm holding size in the project site.
Reforestating these types of land closely resembles the tree growing objec-
tives of ISFP. However, despite the 25-year Certificate of Stewardship Con-
tract awarded to ISFP participants, this had hardly triggered them to volun-
tarily grow trees on their 5 to 7 hectares farmlot. The farmers still felt in-
secured over their tenure of occupation in area since they regarded the stew-
ardship instrument as having a limited term. Also, it is not bankable since it is
subject to cancellation any time by administrative action (MPFD, 1990).
To resolve this problem of tenurial insecurity in ISFP farms, the following
policy innovations are suggested for spontaneous tree growing to take place:
First: The tenurial status of the farm area could still start from stewardship
agreement; then can be progressively elevated to a more secured tenure as the
participant develops the site with tree crops. This conforms with the Master
Plan of Forestry Development of the Philippines (MPDF) proposal to resort to
privatization as an incentive for the development of sustainable land use sys-
tems in ISFP farms.
Second'. The government should create a wood market and other incen-
tives (such as contracted sale), to make farm-based tree growing a viable sub-
sidiary means of livelihood for tree farmers. Once they recognize the impor-
tance of the wood products both for direct household and cash needs, the par-
ticipants will start desiring to take bigger areas for tree farms.
Third: The government should allow enterprising farmers to extend their
activity over adjacent areas alongside with the provision of more incentives in
kind, like fencing materials, farm animals, production inputs and technical
support. This is in recognition of their creativity and good performance in tree
growing or adopting soil conservation measures in their initial farmlots.
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In other words, reforestation should start with the ISFP farms because in
practice, the participants are 'on-site'. Subsequently, it will spread towards
the less developed and inaccessible areas as the farmers find some institu-
tional incentives for planting trees. By first securing their basic food needs
through increased farm production and subsequently by turning tree growing
as a legal requirement to attain a stronger land tenure, participants would be
encouraged to move farther afield. In contrast to the current thrust of ISFP, tree
growing is merely used as a condition to maintain the stewardship right. Psy-
chologically threatened by eventual cancellation of their stewardship con-
tract, farmers cannot do as much as what they wanted in a piece of land they
were asked to manage. In principle, a superficial tenurial instrument (steward-
ship contract) may only tend to stifle farmers' initiative to grow trees. To re-
verse this effect, tree growing should be used as a means for farmers to gain
stronger tenurial security over the land.
b. Granting usufruct or fanning rights on arable abandoned reforestation sites
'On-site' farmers who are interested to turn abandoned but arable reforesta-
tion sites into croplands should be granted usufruct or a farming permit, on
the condition that they will also interplant forest tree species with the short-
term crops.
Contrary to the proposed DENR policy measure of lumping together all the
tree growing tenurial instruments (such as the ISFP Certificate of Stewardship
Contract, FLMA, Community Forestry Management Agreement, IFMA), vari-
ous tenurial arrangements should rather be continued and strengthened. Dif-
ferent tenurial instruments could give more options for farmers to participate
according to their land use preferences as defined by their resource capacities
or interest and the site quality. The resulting tenurial status of the land should
be adjusted to participants' intended land use. If the type of land tenure can
sufficiently secure private individuals' interest, tree growing as one land use
practice could become a spontaneous activity. However, tree growing as a
disguise motive for farming the area with short-term crops could become su-
perficial in the long-run. There is a probability that farmers will deliberately
destroy the growing trees in favour of short-term cropping when interplanting
will no longer be feasible because of the increasing height of the trees. To en-
sure that farmers will take care of the seedlings towards tree maturity, addi-
tional incentives for continuous seedling protection and maintenance should
be given. Here, agroforestry technology and wood products market prospects
are relevant intermediary incentives towards the promotion of farm forestry.
More importantly, farmers should also be provided with security of tree ten-
ure.
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c. Releasing portions of forestland for private titling
Privatization of forestland (i.e., degraded or understock) should be explored
with the condition that land use will be restricted to production forestry. If this
is feasible, only individuals or groups who are capable and ready to venture
should be granted forestland rights.
This scheme seems to discriminate the poor and may be viewed as similar
to the old forestry practice of favouring the elite in the society. However, the
distinction between those with and without financial capital stratifies the
stakeholders according to their interest in tree growing. Those with capital
will serve as the financiers and at the same time as stockholders of the project.
The poor and subsistent participants, who are more after direct cash income
from participation, may then comprise the labour force. A benefit-sharing
arrangement of the future timber produce should include both financiers and
labourers to ensure the latter's quality and sustained participation. The For-
estry Department has to provide the necessary policy instruments to bring
about a mutually beneficial partnership between the wealthy and rural sector
of the society. With this modality, private funds can be expected to be infused
into tree growing programs. In other words, the actor's financial needs and
resources are matched with his appropriate role in the project. Failure to iden-
tify who has interest in what, how and when in government tree growing pro-
jects will continue to siphon off government funds. This type of benefit-shar-
ing arrangement will be further elaborated in the succeeding second part of
this chapter.
2. Approval of other future forestland use combinations
A flexible reforestation plan is needed if the varied land use options are to be
utilized (such as agrosilvicultural, silvopastoral and multiple use forestry sys-
tems), as envisioned by most successful contractors seeking FLMA. The previ-
ous DENR predetermined reforestation plan tended to limit contractors future
land use options under FLMA. A flexible plan means giving the contractors the
prerogative to choose freely the tree species they want to plant, including
spacing, silvicultural management and intended use of the tree produce.
A reforestation plan should be designed around participants' preferred
land use in relation to tree growing. Contractors must be given the choice to
determine the land use combination under FLMA, except if it is contrary to the
higher societal value of forestry (e.g., for watershed or protected area). In con-
trast, if their preference is not integrated into the overall reforestation plan, it
will be difficult to sustain their interest in the project. Another option is to
award the FLMA right at the start for those who are determined to pursue prop-
erty rights. Here, there is no need for an incentive in the form of paid labour to
stimulate participants to grow trees.
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For those who are intending to pursue a tree-based land use (such as agro-
silvicultural, silvopastoral, agrosilvopastoral, and other agroforestry systems)
in the future, the following incentives are appropriate: 1) provision of techni-
cal assistance, 2) promotion of agroforestry technology, 3) distribution of
fencing materials, 4) introduction of a cattle dispersal program, 5) provision
of improved strains of forage, 5) allowance for a broader choice of tree spe-
cies with flexible seedling spacing, and 6) creation of a market outlet.
9.7.5 Social
The social incentive has never been thought of in the past because of the over-
emphasis on employment generation. Based on the results of this study, how-
ever, 'community cooperation' appeared to be one of the most crucial success
conditions for the long-term survival of tree growing projects on public lands.
Previous studies attest to the fact that community cooperation in fire fight-
ing is a fundamental condition for the project's long-term survival (ANGOC,
1991; Baldwin, 1992; UN AC, 1992).
ISSUE NO. 3:
The search of a social incentive that could sustain community cooperation
Considering the strategic importance of community cooperation, one indis-
pensable condition that demands special attention in program designing is
how to make or revive collective voluntarism as a community norm. The pol-
icy question would be 'what type of social incentive can stimulate community
cooperation in reforestation projects on public lands?'
Proposed Measures/Interventions
There are four management imperatives that can address this question. The
first one comes from the result of the present field study. The three other in-
terventions were gleaned from the literature review, and are validated by the
experiences of the successful development projects of the present study.
1. Recruitment of 'on-site ' participants
This intervention satisfies the most basic requirement for community cooper-
ation. It is crucial because it is the premise of other government initiatives
towards local institution building (e.g., community organizing, leadership
training, consensus building).
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2. Local Management System
The local reforestation management function of the DENR should be com-
pletely transferred to the Local Government Units. However, this should be
done gradually, until the necessary infrastructure for a sustainable self-man-
agement is installed at the community level. The Forestry Department should
provide the needed technical assistance and other logistic supports to enable
and strengthen Municipal and village officials in effectively implementing the
program.
This modality, however, has also some limitations. There is the possibility
of spoiling the project when ambitious local government officials try to use it
as a political tool for gaining influence in the community. Bad experience
with many community contract reforestation projects headed by politicians
and local government officials exemplified this danger. In most cases, the
common cause of project failure under this type of community contract
stemmed from non-payment or unfair compensation of local people. Also, the
limited technical skills of local groups in forestry could add to this danger.
Therefore, there should be some conditions set for transferring manage-
ment responsibilities to the local unit. Among the important elements that
should be present in a local group for project self- management are:
a. a strong internal control that emanates from a broad basis of the group's
decision instead of just coming from one or a few individuals;
b. a strong check and balance mechanism to restrain abuses in the exercise of
authority among local officials;
c. leadership by rotation under certain tenure and strict qualification, and
which is chosen by a vote of confidence from the whole community;
d. a team management set-up rather than a one-man management system;
e. strong communal spirit which views the project as a community property;
f. technical training in managerial, social and silvicultural skills;
g. strong commitment to social equity and environmental cause.
Furthermore, the community should be accountable to the Forestry Depart-
ment for the implementation of the project so that the tasks can be withdrawn
from the local management if the desired performance is not met. In other
words, there should be a mechanism to avoid haphazard project performance
after relinquishing management responsibility to the Local Government Unit.
Another viable modality for local management is a 'resource user's group'
(Cernea, 1992). Examples of this type of management group are: firewood
gatherers, charcoal makers, furniture makers, carabao loggers, pasture own-
ers, wood traders, business groups, cause-oriented local groups, civic organi-
zations, and many more.
Such groups have a more or less homogeneous membership and they are
organized on the basis of a common resource interest or development aspir-
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ation. In a community organization, it is sometimes difficult to define who are
the real beneficiaries of the project. Varied interest groups vie for control over
the resource. Also, the benefit sharing arrangements are often skewed to the
advantage of the influential members of the group. With a 'resource users'
group', these problems can be addressed. However, these groups should still
be directly accountable to the Local Government Unit. In other words, project
management would just be delegated to them because of certain capabilities
that they have. In principle they are entrusted to manage the project not for
themselves but for the greater interest of the entire community. The develop-
ment NGOs could serve as a catalyst in preparing the resource users' groups
for self-management, particularly in the aspect of institution building.
In practice, a well-organized group has the capacity of functioning collec-
tively for a common good. It is important that members have a common insti-
tutional base (consisting of shared norms, values, aspirations and behaviour)
which is the main basis for social unity and the spirit of voluntarism (Fisher,
1992).
3. Benefit Sharing from the Project's Future Produce
Under the FLMA, 30 percent of the project's future revenue will go back to the
government to cover the cost of seedling establishment for the first three
years. To attract local people in protecting the project in long-term, a certain
part of this 30 percent income (i.e., 5 to 15 percent) should be used as a 'seed
money' to create other livelihood projects in the community. It could also
serve as a community fund for loans at a low interest to abate local people's
direct dependence on the 'middlemen'. Other uses may include the improve-
ment of community roads, water system, construction of public buildings,
social halls, schools and related infrastructure as decided upon by the commu-
nity.
4. Allowing Communal Resource Use in the Future
Once the trees reached a certain stage of maturity, controlled grazing and col-
lection of firewood by the local people should be allowed. Experience in
many countries, including the Philippines, showed that local people hardly
cooperated in government tree growing projects in communal areas because
the conversion of a one-time communal grazing area or firewood gathering
site into a reforestation project was usually viewed as a disadvantageous en-
deavour. For this reason, reforestation projects should as far as possible also
satisfy the direct tree or grazing needs of the local people to win their cooper-
ation. However, this kind of project arrangement should always be linked
with the aforementioned interventions (e.g., localized management system) to
avoid the 'tragedy of the commons' (Hardin, 1968).
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Unless a reforestation project on public land is regarded as a common
property by the local people and is being managed or controlled under shared
values or aspirations (communal institution), community cooperation cannot
be sustained apart from government's direct monetary incentives.
9.2 Organizational Aspect
Up to now we have distinguished three types of incentive that appeared to be
crucial for project success, namely: financial, tenurial and social. But there is
still another dimension that has only been considered in a descriptive way and
not in terms of success condition (i.e., the type of project contract or in a
broader sense, the organizational aspects).
In this section, the formal role of the different tree growing actors is high-
lighted with the appropriate blending of needs and interests as defined by
their financial capacities. In addition, this dimension is related to institutional
incentives aimed at strengthening local and private groups' formal role in tree
growing projects.
There are three types of formal organization of tree growing engaged in
reforestation activities in the Philippines: farm-based, community-based and
industry-based (Table 69). The first two types of organization corresponded
to the two current classifications of reforestation contracts that were studied
namely: family contract and community contract. Although the third one was
not studied, equal importance will be given to it because of its high prospect
of making private and rural sectors become partners in tree growing.
Each tree growing organization is briefly described, highlighting the
different actors' roles and resource interest in the project.
9.2.7 Farm-based tree growing
The farm-based tree growing scheme is appropriate on squatted arable pub-
lic lands or abandoned reforestation sites concurrently under cultivation by
migrant farmers. It can also apply to existing ISFP areas. In ISFP, the govern-
ment requires at least 30 percent of the total farm area size to be planted
with tree crops. Short-term cropping is the predominant concern of the
farmers on these types of land. As such, security of land and tree tenure are
the most crucial conditions for sustainable tree growing activities. Agro-
forestry should also be introduced so that the farmer could strive at a com-
bination of tree and short-term subsistent croppings. A wood market must
be accessible or if not in existence yet, it must be provided later on to sus-
tain farmers' interest in tree growing entrepreneurship. One good market
assurance would be in the form of contract growing arrangement with either
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the government or private wood enterprise. Furthermore, continuous farm-
ers' training on entrepreneurship should be conducted to equip them with
managerial skills. This farm-based forestry can be regarded as the most stra-
tegic reforestation approach in the degraded, marginal remote areas; it con-
centrates first on the arable existing or potential upland farms where the
local farmers are.
Table 69.
Proposed modalities of tree growing on public lands in the Philippines, featuring








































































































9.2.2 Community-based tree growing
The community-based tree growing scheme is best applied in communal
sites and public lands considered as critical watershed areas. To harness the
cooperation of the community, both direct cash incentive and benefit-shar-
ing in the future produce of the project are the crucial conditions for sus-
tained local participation. Such a benefit-sharing arrangement can generate
cash revenue that can be used as a communal fund. Future access to tree
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resource use should also be included as one benefit for the community.
Here, the role of NGOs in local institution building is important to install the
needed infrastructure for a community-based resource management system.
The private sector should be given institutional incentives so that it can be
encouraged to invest in the wood market. A sure market would add an in-
centive for community's sustained interest in tree growing. Also, the gov-
ernment should provide the necessary tenurial instruments as well as other
policy measures in support for the local management system. In return, the
Local Government Unit (LGU) or the resource user's group should be ac-
countable to the Forestry Department. This community-based forestry, if it
operates under a strong local institution, can best mobilize the general pub-
lic in tree growing at the least cost.
9.2.3 Industry-based tree growing
The industry-based scheme can best address subsistent participants' needs
for sustained employment from tree growing projects. Since this concerns a
purely profit making and market-oriented investment, private capital will be
infused in the project and the local people can provide the long-term labour
requirements. The role of financial incentives is critical because it is the
bottomline that draws the interest of both the private sector and the local
people to the project. For the private sector, the wood market is a strong
drive for participation, along with the provision of production loans, crop
insurance, tax exemptions, price security, subsidies and other types of finan-
cial incentives. On the other hand, continuously paid labour and a benefit-
sharing arrangement are essentially needed to sustain subsistent partici-
pants' project involvement. The Forestry Department should provide ade-
quate policies and more incentives that could attract many capitalists and
entrepreneurs to the program. In addition, the government could provide
loans and other credit assistance to interested private groups with low inter-
est. At the local participants' level, continuous training should be carried
out to equip them with the necessary technical skills. In principle, this is a
very attractive tree growing scheme from the government's standpoint,
because it can direct the public funds in a very cost-effective way, enabling
both reforestation and employment generation.
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9.3 Procedural Aspects of Program Planning and
Implementation
After dealing extensively with the incentives and organizational issues of
reforestation, there is still another dimension that is of real importance: the
procedural aspects of program planning and implementation. Although it is
not distinctly exclusive from the policy issues directed to affect project
management interventions, in this section, the dynamics of program plan-
ning and implementation are dealt with apart from its policy content. There
are three procedural aspects to be examined here: 1) planning process, 2)
implementation scheme, and 3) learning process.
9.3.7 Planning process
The reforestation program planning was characterized as highly prescriptive
and 'top-down' with predictive outcomes. The field operational guidelines
were all drafted by a special planning team at the DENR Central Office.
These guidelines and directives were derived from professional expert's
views and there was seldom any participation from the local people who are
directly affected or involved in the activity. There were many written mem-
oranda and administrative orders, emanating from the top. Most project par-
ticipants had hardly understood the technical parlance of these guidelines.
Often, plans were based on the available budget for the period rather than
on participants' development options.
Since the upland farmers, community people and other locally-based
participants are envisioned to be more or less permanently and directly in-
volved in the project, their inputs and options should be incorporated in the
plan. Thus, planning should be a two-way process based on government's
objectives and participant's development preferences. Otherwise, if plan-
ning is purely the government's prerogative, project participation is often
misconstrued by the local people as a condition for obtaining a direct pro-
ject incentive. The withdrawal of such an incentive later on will then badly
affect participation if there are no other motivations for project involvement.
However, if the farmers are involved in planning themselves, their partici-
pation becomes meaningful. Their development options in this case are well
attended to in the project. Also, if the community is involved, participation
would become a social responsibility and not only an economic opportunity.
In concept, this prospect seems easy to operationalize. But in practice,
this is a core issue which cannot be solved in a simple prescribed way. The
DENR should adopt a creative way to decentralize the planning process
thereby preferably a step wise approach:
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1. at the highest level, the DENR should start a dialogue with Local Govern-
ment Officials in the province or town level,
2. at the local level, the project managers or DENR field officers should con-
fer with the contractors, and;
3. at the actual field level, the contractors should speak to the labourers and
even to the non-local participants in the community.
9.3.2 Implementation scheme
The program was characterized as structured and target driven. Pressured by
the bank requirements to produce a substantial outcome as condition for the
release of the second instalment of the loan, the DENR set unrealistic objec-
tives beyond its institutional capacity. However, the unanticipated delays of
funding in the end put the program in total disarray. Schedules were not
followed, which resulted in a sharp budget cuts in the succeeding years.
Since most participants were conditioned by cash payment, the delays in
their wages adversely affected their participation.
The problem of late payment could have been mitigated if the program
had a contingency fund or had anticipated such eventuality. In addition,
considering the big bulk of work, the DENR should have coordinated with
other line agencies like the Department of Agriculture, the Department of
Public Works and Highways, the National Irrigation Program, the Depart-
ment of Education and Culture, the Department of National Defense, and
more. This inter-agency collaboration could have even pushed environmen-
tal protection as an important thrust also for the other departments. In addi-
tion, this scheme could have saved the DENR from 'over-burdening', result-
ing in inefficient personnel resource utilization and low program output.
9.3.3 Learning process
The program was carried out on a massive scale without participants'
adequate technical and social preparations. The concern about meeting the
targeted field accomplishments in a given period brought about haphazard
tree planting. Everything was done according to the scheduled plan of activ-
ities, regardless of the quality of the work. The main emphasis centred on
the number of hectares or seedlings planted.
The program should not have suffered so much disaster if contract refor-
estation started in a pilot scale, and gradually expanded nationwide as it
gained experience by trial and error. Moreover, there should be more
emphasis on the dynamics of community involvement rather than just the
target physical accomplishments (Sajise, 1993).
10
Overview and Reflections
10.1 Background and Objectives of the Study
Originally, the study's major objective was to evaluate the performance of
paid labour as a financial incentive for stimulating peoples' participation in
the Contract Reforestation and the Integrated Social Forestry Program in the
Philippines. It attempted to find an empirical explanation of why most par-
ticipants performed differently from what was envisaged in these programs.
In the case of contract reforestation, the deliberate burning and the premature
abandonment of the project by participants in times of delayed payment from
the DENR constituted the main problem. On the other hand, most ISFP partici-
pants were only motivated to build terraces and hedgerows in their hilly farms
when payment was offered for the construction of the soil conservation struc-
tures. When payment ceased the adoption of terracing also stopped.
For the contract reforestation program, there were two specific research
objectives. In the first year of data gathering, the aim was to evaluate the ef-
fect of paid labour on participants' level of project involvement. In the second
year, the effect of shifting from paid labour to the FLMA instrument on partici-
pants' sustained involvement in the project was supposed to be the focus of
the analysis.
For ISFP, the aim in the first year was also to investigate the effect of pay-
ment on participants' motivation for the construction of terraces in their farm-
lots. In the second year, the effect of withdrawal of payment was supposedly
the focus of the analysis.
After the first year of exploratory study however, it was found out that the
implementation of FLMA was held in abeyance. The DENR was still in the pro-
cess of reviewing the implementation guidelines for the instrument. Also, it
was found out that the coming of a bigger program (i.e., Community Forestry)
would soon subsume ISFP and eventually could affect the implementation
strategy. With these unforeseen developments, it was not feasible any more to
carry out the transition to FLMA in the second year and impractical to further
study ISFP.
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This led to a major re-orientation of the focus and structure of the study in
the second year with the following changes and aims:
1. The study discarded ISFP and focused fully on contract reforestation pro-
jects.
2. Instead of analyzing the effect of the transition to FLMA, the various suc-
cess conditions to contractor's sustained participation in seedling protec-
tion and maintenance were identified and characterized. The new aim was
to determine in more detail the contractor's bottomline motivations for
sustained project participation.
3. Instead of analyzing the effect of the transition to FLMA, an extended simi-
lar investigation was carried out in five selected successful projects about
to be turned over for FLMA, in other regions in the country. The aim was to
validate the relevance of the success conditions and their background fac-
tors, as these were identified in the earlier case studies. Furthermore, it
aimed at identifying new background factors or variables to success condi-
tions.
4. In addition, the research was carried out in spontaneous tree growing ac-
tivities by individual farmers. The aim was to validate whether the same
success conditions and the corresponding determinant factors would hold
for the spontaneous tree growing activities as for the government projects.
5. The ultimate and implicit objective of the study was to identify the various
background factors to sustainable contractor's participation in reforesta-
tion projects and to link these to possible project management interven-
tions.
These deviations from the intended initial objectives to the progressively de-
veloped final objectives revealed the following lessons on how to set research
objectives of policy evaluation studies, involving time series observations:
1. There is a need to consult the concerned agency at which the research in-
vestigation is directed to. This is to be kept abreast of the prevailing policy
directions which will affect the later field findings. Failure to do so will
limit the chance of addressing the right issues and problems in the right
time, thus will render the findings outdated. In idiomatic expression it is
like 'hitting a dead horse by a powerful weapon'.
2. The rapid shift and generation of new Forestry Policies in the Philippines
require relatively fast problem-oriented studies with direct results. Long-
term studies may not be useful in the end when the findings generated are
no longer relevant to the current needs of the time.
3. The project objectives are difficult to handle because of the many varying
intervening and disguising background factors affecting the variables un-
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der investigation. Hence, it is not advisable to have a predetermined fixed
set of variables to be studied throughout the course of the study. This im-
plies that adjusting the research scope and focus should not be viewed as a
result of poor planning preparation. Instead, it should be regarded as a
characteristic of a dynamic research process aiming at a maximum rele-
vance.
4. It is important that preliminary findings are directly compared with other
studies of similar or related research objectives. This is to maximize the
utility of the findings in progress where there is a synergistic effect. First,
it can enrich existing information gathered. Secondly, it can help to check
the consistency or variance of one's own independent findings. Lastly, it
can serve as a helpful signal whether or not the research is still progressing
in the right direction.
10.2 Field Inquiry Approach
One distinctive feature of this research work as compared to other past studies
conducted on the same subject is its clear departure from the usual way of
doing field work in a fully predetermined and structured way.
Instead, Vayda's Progressive Contextualization Approach (PCA) in com-
bination with De Groot's (1992) Problem-in-Context (PIC) paradigm were
used as the main field inquiry techniques.
This section describes how the whole process of data formation was car-
ried out using PCA and PIC. To highlight the lessons learned, Vayda's funda-
mental principles served as the bases in evaluating the usefulness of such field
methodologies in this study.
PRINCIPLE 1
Avoid 'priori assumptions'; all human activities should be viewed as rational
in their own context
This principle was not evidently applied at first because of the structured
planning and assumptions were made at the beginning of the field work. As
many disguised variables emerged as the research work progressed, the study
resorted to an exploratory analysis, followed by an in-depth investigation
building on the preliminary findings.
Since the exploratory stage is just a set of preliminary observations, the
type of data need not necessarily be quantitative but can rather be qualitative.
Also, in this step, there should be no fix list of research questions. Instead,
there should be a very general focus to define the range of interesting issues to
be probed in the succeeding set of investigation.
230 TREE GROWING ON DIFFERENT GROUNDS
The in-depth investigation on the other hand should have research ques-
tions that are much more precise, structured and appropriate, i.e., direct to the
core issues under study. The aim is to probe the validity of the earlier findings
and to determine the context of actor's project behaviour. Here the various
background factors determining actor's bottomline of participation are to be
identified and examined. Since this aims to a real background analysis and a
validation exercise, the data needed should be quantitative. However, this was
not sufficiently acknowledged at the beginning of the study.
For this reason, field plans should be flexible or dynamic and must be
guided by the context of the subject under study. However, there should be a
clear research structure to follow right from the start which may possibly
change as the field inquiry progresses with new realities which later may re-
quire some adjustments in the research plan.
PRINCIPLE 2
Set no fixed system boundary and pursue the 'element of surprise'
This principle led to the discovery of equally interesting aspects of the study
that were not initially conceived in the research plan. The first one is the wid-
ening of the scope of relevant factors influencing actor's behaviour. In the
beginning of the study, the influence of the contract payment was seen in iso-
lation. In fact, there had been too much bias on the negative effect of 'paid la-
bour', as a result of the DENR's late releases of project fund. As the study pro-
gressed however, many factors appeared to have effects on the performance
of the financial instrument for participation. More interestingly, the financial
incentive was sometimes even overshadowed by the other conditions to sus-
tained project participation. This led to the broadening of the scope of the
analysis from just one incentive (i.e., paid labour) to other success conditions
for sustained participation, and a re-evaluation of the potentials of the paid
labour as it has also positive results if applied under proper conditions.
Another example was the extension of the field investigation to the spon-
taneous tree growing activities. The idea of studying the spontaneous projects
was first entertained when one non-participant of the Villa Meimban refores-
tation project happened to mention successful tree growing activities of his
uncle outside the government-sponsored program in an abandoned reforesta-
tion site in a nearby village. The principle of 'pursuing the element of sur-
prise' became the instigating drive to visit the site on the following day. This
aspect of including the spontaneous projects in the analysis was further rein-
forced by De Groot's 'look for and enhance contrast' principle. While the
problematic government reforestation projects were being investigated, at the
very same location there appeared a number of successful tree growing activi-
ties at farm level. Such contrasting features evident in spontaneous tree grow-
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ing activities became later on the focus of analysis in the study of the differ-
ence between government-initiated and voluntary tree farm projects.
PRINCIPLES
Start with the 'problematic or unusual' activity as a unit of analysis and then
shift from one unit to another as the context of the problem under investiga-
tion progresses.
At first, the study made use of paid labour as the main focus of analysis. In
fact, this was because of the preconceived bias about the bad effect of this fi-
nancial incentive on local people's level of participation in the past.
The effects of late payments had been amplified by almost all contract re-
forestation projects in the country. However, studying the consequence of late
payment, or in general the effect of cash incentive on actor's participation
seemed to contribute less to the already existing information. What was more
interesting, was the good number of projects which were affected by the same
cash problem but were still performing well.
This led to a shift in the unit of analysis, i.e., from the financial instrument
to the problematic or desirable activity. With this, other factors of sustained
participation came also within the scope of the study in a much more balanced
way and not only as just conditions affecting the performance of the financial
instrument. In addition, it opened the perspective of different management
tools and interventions, apart from the financial aspect for promoting partici-
pation.
In De Groot's Problem-in-Context Analysis, the participant's destructive
behaviour (i.e., deliberate setting fire on the planted seedlings) was treated as
the resultant of a chain of multiple actors' motivations and options. By further
examining their links, this located the most critical factors determining the
resulting actor's behaviour. For instance, at an instant thought, one can easily
condemn the participant allegedly involved in deliberate burning down of the
project by not examining where this problematic action started. Using De
Groot's 'Actor's Field' schema however, one can easily recognize that the
participant is just at the end of a multiple actor's chain. In other words, the
problem of plantation burning is a network of many actors with roles or func-
tions not harmonized towards the attainment of the desired project outcome.
The contractor was not able to pay his labourers on time because the DENR
had not fully received yet the budget appropriation for the project. The DENR
blamed the Department of Budget (DBM) for having not programmed the re-
lease of funds and the DBM blamed the bank for their rigid conditions; and so
on.
With this analysis, it provided an empirical explanation of why some par-
ticipants behave problematically the way they do. However, what this method
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could only explain was the cause of the problematic action. There is the dan-
ger that with heavy focus on the problematic action, one may well fail to see
other interesting or contrasting aspects of the whole problem. For instance,
there were a number of participants who experienced the same problem of late
payments and yet performed very well in the project. In this particular case,
the practice of simultaneous intercropping in the project area or presence of a
financial status above subsistence level attributed this factor of success. Here,
the issue of late payment was still there, but it did not develop into problem-
atic behaviour. By now treating late payment as no longer relevant or not di-
rectly connected with the actor's alternative behaviour (meaning consistent
project participation), it loses its fixed problematic nature. This eventually led
to a fiirther study of the inverse side of the problem. Identifying the variables
to successful seedling establishment amidst project's cash flow problems be-
came a more interesting focus of the study.
In general, it can be said that the Problem-in-Context approach has its
highest strength in dealing with problematic situations having a direct rela-
tionship with actor's behaviour or option. In the study, the late payment
(problematic situation) triggered actor's option (burning down of the project).
However, in instances wherein the problematic situation has no direct relation
to the resulting actor's behaviour or option, the Problem-in-Context approach
is limited in its analytical attributes. Thus, the Progressive Contextualization
is regarded as encompassing with general applicability, while the Problem-in-
Context is specific to problem-oriented analysis.
In summary, both techniques appeared to be very appropriate for the
study. The difficulty of dealing with actor's varied perceptions, motivations
and options indeed required flexible analytical tools that are easy to operate.
One thing more, the advantage of being guided by the 'element of surprise'
and setting no fixed system boundary, paved the way for discovering equally
important things not initially conceived in the study. Furthermore, starting the
analysis with the actor's activity could direct the research inquiry to the core
issues of the problem, thus evading the trap of examining the entire elements
of the system. In other words, quantitative analysis has its specific place in the
study but does not yield the sole determinant of a good research. There are
instances in which statistical analysis does not apply and only through sys-
tematic and analytical reasoning on the explanation of a certain phenomenon
can be achieved.
10.3 Research Structure
Perhaps one of the possible methodological traps of using Progressive Con-
textualization is the risk that the constant changing context of the problem
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becomes a pretext to continuously change the research framework or not to
make one at all. In practice, there should still be a clearly defined conceptual
framework from the very start. However, it should not be rigidly fixed so that
it can constantly be modified as the need arises.
What happened in this study was that, after bringing together all the data
gathered from the 13 case studies under one conceptual working framework, a
generalized result could be drawn out. This general tree growing model could
have been stepwise developed, if there would have been no operational
framework for the analysis to help in: 1) formulating the research questions,
2) structuring the data, 3) setting a working hypotheses in each stage of the
research, 4) validating the previous findings in the earlier case analyses, and;
5) guiding the further field research. In practice, having a single working
framework is necessary to bring all cases under one pattern of analysis so that
their peculiarities and similarities can be identified and accounted for. Only
then the basis can be provided for determining the dominant factors to project
success which are common to all cases as well as those that are not so very
conspicuous but are critically relevant in specific instances.
10.4 The Actual Field Work and the Making of a Dissertation
The past two years spent for data gathering in the study did not only serve as a
learning experience but also a discovery of the struggle in staying too long in
the research site. While participant observation is indeed a very effective way
of getting through the respondents' world, a very long stay in the field may
not necessarily result in a better data than a shorter stay. It was a big advan-
tage to speak four different local dialects which are spoken in the study sites.
Thus, the duration of the stays in the study sites was restricted. What hastened
the pace in data gathering, besides knowing the local dialect, was the re-
searcher's easy grasp of the respondents' 'soft spots' in their life, which pro-
vided a helpful hint on how to stimulate openness without necessarily antago-
nizing them. As a guide for rapid participant observation, it helps to first pay
attention to the respondents' value system, because this will embody the most
sensitive elements of their culture. Their value system resembles a map that
can help one locate the entry point for a casual interview and that at the same
time can direct one to the points where the actor is most vulnerable to comply
with or resist to a certain external stimulus.
In line with this, it was noticeable that among participants below subsis-
tence level, the economic survival is the main driving force for compliance.
Anything that does not have something to do with this factor has no or little
effect in moving the people to act. In contrast for cash surplus contractors, the
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driving force for project compliance often is either profit making or the quest
for property rights or maintaining a good public image.
In principle, one can save time in doing participant observation if one can
speak the dialect. Also, starting with a focus on the sensitive psychological
and cultural elements of the respondent's patterns of life style rather than on
his activities will help one strategize effectively the interview approach.
On the aspect of dissertation writing, I was very excited writing many
ideas and even thought of having found real solutions to the problem I am in-
vestigating. After performing the analysis and structuring the findings, the
writing down of the policy implications and recommendations was a rela-
tively easy task. But from the viewpoint of the end-users, implementing the
findings will not be that easy at all.
Year after year many dissertations with promising results come out. If the
student is fortunate enough to gain a promotion for a higher degree for a good
scholarly work, this will eventually add to his credentials for a greater name
and economic advantage. But the subsistent farmer who provided information
for the study will not gain any benefit if nothing will come out as a result of
the research work. There is no limit to the conduct of research and the writing
of a dissertations. But the striking question is whether or not these disserta-
tions will really bring change in the balance between the rich and the poor,
between those who have power and who do not have, between the local and
supra local actors and between not sound and sound management of the envi-
ronment. It is therefore important to realize that writing a dissertation on a
social problem is not an end in itself. It is just the start of a real struggle in try-
ing to bring about a change as a result of the intensive actual field investiga-
tions.
I hope that this document will help in charting a new direction of the refor-
estation program in the Philippines. Likewise, I hope this study will provide
an eye opener or will strengthen previous research findings in other places,
directed towards a better strategy for obtaining sustainable people's participa-




Based on the results of the study, the following conclusions and recommen-
dations are drawn.
1. The Contract Reforestation program in the Philippines has a dual con-
cern: environmental rehabilitation and socioeconomic upliftment of the
rural poor. However, paid labour as a common government's incentive to
stimulate people's participation in tree planting, has generally not re-
sulted in the desired outcome. This is manifested both by the marginal
accomplishment of past regular projects as well by the poor initial per-
formance of the present contract reforestation program.
2. This poor performance of the present contract reforestation program ap-
pears to be partly due to late payment. The generally incurring irregular
payments had resulted in intermittent and problematic participation
among subsistent labourers. The delayed payment is however not the
only factor involved. Some projects appeared to be successful despite the
occurrence of the same cash flow problems.
3. Moreover, at the very same locations of unsuccessful DENR projects,
there are a number of successful spontaneous tree growing activities by
individual farmers without government's cash incentive.
4. By comparing successful and non-successful government projects, six
variables are identified as success conditions for a sustained contractor's
participation. These conditions are related to contractor's project percep-
tion, motivations and options and are broadly categorized into three pro-
gram dimensions; each one representing a major grouping of incentive
system, namely:/z«a«c/<2/, tenurial and social.
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5. Under the financial dimension, the predominant success conditions are:
a) 'wood market prospect' (i.e., the presence of a current demand for
wood or future market certainty), b) 'aspiration of a good track record'
(which means that the contractor hopes to get also future project con-
tracts for a good performance), and c) 'good financial situation of the con-
tractor' (which means that whatever the contractor's income source is, it
should be above the subsistence level).
6. Under the tenurial dimension, the success conditions are: a) 'intercrop-
ping between seedlings' (which means that apart from the tree crops, the
contractors can interplant subsistent or cash crops in the same project
site), b) 'assured access or property right' (i.e., the contractor's present
usufruct or tenurial right over the site is recognized or a future project
ownership right is being assured), and c) 'interest in other tree related
uses' (the presence of future land use development prospects or tree ben-
efits other than the wood products).
7. Under the social dimension, there is only one success condition identi-
fied: 'community cooperation' (local people's voluntary participation in
grassland fire protection and strict regulation of open grazing inside the
project area).
8. All aforementioned conditions have their own specific bearing on pro-
ject's success, although they are not independent of each other. Also,
they can support each other or can be complementary to one another. On
the other hand, they need not necessarily be present all at the same time
for project success to be achieved.
9. Four of the six success conditions in government projects also appeared
to be relevant in the spontaneous cases, namely: a) the good financial sit-
uation of the farmers, b) intercropping between seedlings, c) assured ac-
cess or property right, and d) interest in other tree related uses. In addi-
tion, 'wood products market prospects' turned out to be one important
success condition in spontaneous tree growing. In the future, this condi-
tion may also become relevant in government projects.
10. In terms of their relevance, four success conditions are regarded as the
most important, being considered as the main key bases or requisites to
sustained contractor's participation, in so far as the current reforestation
program is concerned. These conditions are enumerated in the order of
significance: 1) the good financial situation of the contractor, 2) his aspi-
ration for a good track record, 3) assured access/property right for the
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contractor, and 4) community cooperation. The second and the third con-
ditions can be alternative for each other.
11. The six success conditions are dependent on the determinant factors pres-
ent or generated by the three components of the project setting, namely:
a) site's characteristics (biophysical and tenurial settings), b) contractor's
characteristics (contractor's socioeconomic, cultural and behaviourial
settings), and c) project management characteristics (DENR policy direc-
tives or field management project operations).
12. Fifteen (15) determinant factors appeared to have bearing on the six suc-
cess conditions. In terms of critical importance, the following factors are
regarded to have the greatest effect on contractor's sustained participa-
tion in the first three-year period of seedling establishment. These are in
the order of highest relevance: 1) 'on-site' contractor's recruitment, 2)
promptness of DENR payments, 3) meantime payment of labourers'
wages by the contractors, and 4) site's good arability.
13. From the viewpoint of possible government policy interventions, both
the site's and contractor's characteristics are regarded as given or
inherent factors, that determine the 'opportunities' and 'constraints' for
project success. The project management, on the other hand, is crucial,
being the steering determinant factor of the final project outcome. This
means that the site's and contractor's characteristics are not the factors
which matter most in setting the condition for sustained project partici-
pation. Rather, it is the type of project management schemes that mainly
determine the final outcome.
14. It is thus well possible that a good opportunity will still lead to project
failure if the management interventions spoil it. Also, a constraint may
well turn out into success if the management schemes are able to mitigate
the negative site's or/and contractor's settings.
15. Prior to designing any reforestation project in an area, there should be a
thorough survey of the site's characteristics and the contractors' varied
needs. This is to identify the appropriate incentive system as defined by
the project setting and match it with the right policy instruments that the
government should adopt.
16. Policy instruments that are linked with each of the three types of incen-
tives for participation can be broadly categorized into financial, tenurial
and social instruments.
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17. The possible management schemes linked with the financial incentive are
the following: 'prompt release of DENR payment', 'provision of future
project prospect' and 'provision of wood market prospect'.
18. Continuous dependence on paid labour can in principle be avoided if
there are livelihood opportunities linked with tree protection and main-
tenance, such as the provision of a wood market, the allowance of
intercropping between seedlings in the case of arable sites, the introduc-
tion of agroforestry technology, and other related income-generating ac-
tivities.
19. The possible management schemes linked with the tenurial incentive are
the following: 'recognition of usufruct/tenurial rights' and the 'approval
of other land use combinations'.
20. Usufruct/tenurial right can best sustain participation when contractors are
allowed to use the project area simultaneously for short-term cropping. In
this case, reforestation may not necessarily be cash-induced. The grant-
ing of tenurial right can also be effective especially when contractors
have other future land use development prospects along with tree grow-
ing. As such, the FLMA can be awarded right from the start of the project.
21. Agroforestry and silvi-pastoral systems were preferred by most contrac-
tors as possible land use combinations under FLMA in the future. Such
preconceived land use options should be matched with a flexible refor-
estation plan for as long as it is not at variance with the desirable forest-
land use practice and principles. A flexible reforestation plan should in-
clude a free choice of tree species to plant, the spacing of tree rows, silvi-
cultural management and incentives in kind (such as the provision of
technical assistance, promotion of agroforestry technology, distribution
of fencing materials, introduction of a cattle dispersal program, provision
of improved strains of forage, and the provision of market outlets or a
contract growing agreement).
22. The use of tenurial instruments can result in a more sustainable private
individuals' participation in tree growing on public lands. However, its
effectiveness can only be enhanced if it is backed up by other financial
incentives like wood market prospects, production loans, crop insurance,
price securities, subsidies, and tax exemption.
23. There appeared to be four possible management schemes linked with the
social incentive and are the following. The first one was identified from
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the result of the present study (i.e., 'recruitment of "on-site" contrac-
tors'). This intervention satisfies the most basic requirement for commu-
nity cooperation because other government initiatives towards local insti-
tution building were grounded on this requirement (e.g., community or-
ganizing, local leadership training, the development of a local resource
management system and many other community-based development en-
deavours).
The other three interventions were derived from the literature study
and from other development projects' experiences. These are the follow-
ing:
a. localized management system. This means that the DENR management
responsibilities should be turned over to the Local Government Unit
or to the resource user's group representing the local people. But this
provision for community-based management should be subjected to
certain conditions to guard against possible abuse or incompetence in
project management,
b. benefit-sharing arrangement. Part of the future government revenue
from the project should be given to the community as a communal
fund or for the establishment of social services and related infrastruc-
ture; and
c. allowance for future communal resource use. The local people can
gather tree products from the project subject to the local community
management rules. Also, they should be allowed to use the area for
other purposes, for as long as it is not at variance with the ultimate aim
of the project.
24. In the past, community cooperation was often taken for granted, yet it is
considered a critical condition for the long-term survival of government
tree growing projects on public lands. It is the most strategic way of ar-
resting episodical environmental hazards such as grassland fires, open
grazing, illegal encroachment, poaching, etc., that may threaten to wipe
out newly established forest plantations.
25. Lumping together all existing tenurial policy instruments into one as pro-
posed by the DENR (e.g., ISFP, FLMA, CFMA, IFMA) seems inappropriate,
considering the varied project site's settings and the contractor's devel-
opment options. Instead, different tenurial instruments should be pursued
according to the participant's needs, resources and expected benefit pref-
erences.
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26. Incentives in reforestation programs should be designed around the ac-
tors' needs, interest in tree growing and consistent with their financial
capacities.
27. For contractors who are motivated by access or property rights over the
project, a tenurial instrument is best applicable, along with the introduc-
tion of agroforestry and other tree-based farming technology. These
types of incentive are appropriate for farm-based tree growing on open
public lands.
28. For community groups with a strong sense of collective participation and
with interest in the communal future use of the trees, a localized manage-
ment system alongside with a benefit-sharing arrangement should be
adopted. This type of incentive system is best fitted for community-based
tree growing on public and communal lands.
29. Private individuals or corporations with substantial capital could serve as
project financiers and main stockholders. The subsistent labourers in
search of direct cash earnings will then form the labour force. Apart from
cash payment, there should still be sharing of the future produce from the
project between stockholders and labourers to ensure the latter's quality
and sustainable participation. This type of institutional arrangement is
appropriate for industry-based tree growing on both public and private
lands.
30. Such a selective application of specific instruments according to partici-
pant's needs and future project options is considered to be an effective
and a rational policy for successful project management. Failure to iden-
tify who has interest in what, how and when, and the inability to recog-
nize the uses of the varied site qualities, coupled with the faulty prescrip-
tion of tenurial arrangements will continue to siphon off government
funds put into reforestation.
Glossary
Actor
General term to mean any type of participant (i.e., contractor or labourer),
including DENR and other government or non-government personnel in-
volved in the project
Actor's behaviour
Refers to participant's or DENR personnel's perception, attitudes and activ-
ities towards the project or the incentive system for reforestation
Contract
A binding instrument between the DENR and any party who is interested to
reforest a public land
Contractor
The person who enters into a contract with the DENR, i.e., a family head, a
representative of an organization or a corporation. It can also be an 'on-
site' farmer, or can also come from outside
Farmholding need
Contractor's striving to acquire or cultivate an arable land for subsistence
or cash cropping
Incentive
Any external assistance given to reforestation participants that could moti-
vate them to participate in reforestation projects
Instrument
Any government policy or program aimed to affect a desired public action
Intervention
Any intended scheme, plan or action set to affect a desired public action
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Itinerant wage earner
Labourer who moves from one place to the other in search of a daily wage
earnings
Labourer
A person hired by the contractor to perform a specific task in the project
without a definite tenure. Often he does not own a land. He may come
from inside or from outside the project site
Meantime payment
Contractor's voluntary act of paying cash or meeting labourers' need in
kind as a project compensation in the absence of DENR regular payments
Participant
Refers to both the contractor and the labourer
Prescribed for estland use
A predetermined use of the project site by the government or DENR by vir-
tue of its fragile or unique nature. Example of this includes critical water-
shed, protected area, natural parks, forest reserves, etc.
Project performance
This is measured in terms of seedling survival (at least 80 percent of the
total seedlings planted) and the required tree height corresponding to a
certain period
Regular
Past government's tree growing program that hired people on a regular
basis for tree planting and maintenance but without giving nature owner-
ship rights over the project to its participants
Seedling establishment
The first three-year period of the contract reforestation program covering
the nursery operations to tree planting and early stage of maintenance and
protection
Seedling protection and maintenance
A reforestation phase that requires intensive periodic patrol works, con-
struction of firelines and cultivation of the seedlings
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Spontaneous tree growing
A voluntary tree growing activity by individual farmers who are not part in
the government-sponsored reforestation projects
Usufruct




Participant's Response, Attitudes and
Involvement in the Contract
Reforestation Project
1. Percentage number of local participants - total number of local people
recruited from within the immediate community where the project is
located.
2. Participant's degree of project involvement - measures both the atti-
tudes and actual project participation.
a. passive - unmotivated and uninvolved
b. conditional - intermittent participation without definite period of
engagement in the project. Because participants are just hired as a daily
wage worker, they only perform specific type of job as agreed upon.
Involvement in grassland fire activity is not reliable because most of
the participants are itinerant daily wage workers who associate any
work being done in the project with payment.
c. meet DENR's minimum expectation - ability to comply with the pre-
scribed activities required in the contract but fire fighting is not organ-
ized as a communal activity, rather it is localized. This low group par-
ticipation stems from the notion that 'each one has to protect and keep
his own lot since everything is under contract. '
d. voluntarism at limited or local scale - strong sense of involvement in
all project activities with high degree of group participation in fire
fighting activities within the local domain.
e. strong collective cooperation - strong spirit of voluntarism and com-
munity cooperation in fire fighting activities because of strong socio-
cultural bond among local people.
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3. Sense of future ownership over the project - feeling of possession over
the planted site followed by strong sense of moral responsibility to pro-
tect and maintain it
a. none - superficial care and protection of the project because partici-
pants view their involvement as transient and contractual on a daily
wage basis.
b. care-free - no future ambition or interest towards the project because of
'come what may' mentality.
c. conditional certainty - participants are not yet sure of the future
ownership of the project because it all depends on their current project
performance as they are made to believe. Motivation to maintain the
project is either conditioned by their desire to attain FLMA or to obtain
the remaining payment from the project.
d. deterministic confidence - high expectation to obtain FLMA based on
their assessment of their current project performance. FLMA is an ac-
ceptable option.
e. absolute confidence - perceives strongly his ownership and moral
responsibility to protect and maintain the project regardless of the out-
come of his concurrent performance in the project.
4. Working morale - measures the level of enthusiasm and loyalty to the
project.
a. conditional - demands immediate payment to participate in any activity
in the project.
b. income-motivation - motivation to work is conditioned by wage
income derived from project participation. Can work even with delayed
payment.
c. objective - motivated to work not only because of payment. Environ-
mental considerations and future economic benefits are among the
other factors that condition participants to take part in the project.
d. creative - high motivation to work coupled with desire to experiment or
innovate, if given the opportunity and necessary support to do so.
e. unconditional - objective and creative, and most of all, can work even
without payment.
5. Emotional threshold - ability to contain irritations, stress and discour-
agement resulting from project-related problems.
a. manifested anger - dare to fight, furious and indignant.
b. minimal - easily provoked to anger or makes harsh comments when
asked about problems and needs related to project implementation.
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c. suppressed - restrained anger and can objectively raise comments and
criticisms without feeling of indignation. He can distinguish program
limitation from personnel moral value-related problem.
d. high - endure and overlook program implementation -related problems.
Most often is reserved to make any side comment regarding the project.
He is always hopeful that the best will still come out from the project.
e. tension-free - no trace of inner struggle regarding project implementa-
tion-related problems.
6. Response to actual amount of cash incentive obtained - refers to the
level of satisfaction on the actual income obtained from the project.
a. strongly dissatisfied - resentful, indignant and no longer interested to
participate in the project.
b. dissatisfied - obvious feeling of resentment and disgust over project-
related problem particularly on the issue of delayed and under pay-
ment, but still interested to go for another contract in the future.
c. 'good enough ' feeling - accepts the amount of payment joyfully and
sees it as better than having none at all but with a doubtful feeling.
d. satisfied - willingly accepts any amount of payment and considers any
problem arising from project implementation as part of the risk he has
for participating in the project.
e. highly satisfied - very grateful for the income gained from participation
and considers it as a useful saving or investment for the household.
7. Program policy awareness - degree of understanding of the terms and
conditions of the reforestation contract.
a. total ignorance - zero knowledge about the program because he is
merely hired as daily wage labourer or he just took over the project
from another contractor.
b. not understood everything - greater aspect of the contract is not clearly
understood.
c. partly understood - aware of the project objectives and strategies but
not the entire policy guidelines.
d. fully understood - almost all the important aspects of the contract are
clearly understood, including the concept of the program.
e. extended thought - comprehend very well the whole program concept
and has the ability to analyze the intention of the policy instrument.
8. Environmental consideration - concern about the success of the project
because of its soil and water conservation potential.
a. unconcerned - only after the cash income being derived from partici-
pation.
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b. peripheral concern - recognizes the importance of tree growing in the
rehabilitation of their immediate environment, although the main
motivation is the immediate cash income.
c. balanced concern - income and environmental protection are of equal
weight in his consideration.
d. strongly concerned - environmental consideration precludes all other
concerns.
e. environmental bias - pure concern for the environment, even without
cash payment from participation.
9. Level of organization - measures the degree of communal participation
among project participants.
a. non-existent - 'dummy' or 'fly by night'
b. loosely organized - without strong communal control and coordination.
c. partly organized - consists of many sub-groupings but not interacting
and cooperating with one another.
d. strongly organized - presence of communal identity and sense of
belongingness in the group. Strong communal concern is evident in
addressing individual members' project-related problems and needs.
e. culture-based - strong bond of socio-cultural affinity with collective
power to act as a community. Stable, sustainable and dependable.
10. Relationship with DENR - working rapport between participants and
DENR program personnel or project management.
a. abrasive - there is a strong sense of antagonism towards DENR.
b. remote - feeling of social distance and wide communication gap. Not
personally familiar with each other.
c. casual and conditional - there is certain degree of personal familiarity
but working relationship revolves around the terms and conditions of
the contract. Structured and semi-formal characterized with the prac-
tice of protocol.
d. close and informal - high degree of personal interaction with high sense
of mutual respect. Working relationship revolves around strong trust
and commitment.
e. growing harmony - growing sense of mutual interest between partici-
pant and project management or DENR personnel.
Appendix 2
Chi-square Test Raw Data
Parameter
1. Practiced of intercropping
- yes
no








4. Sense of community concern
with
- without
5. Aspire for good track record
- yes
- no




7. Awareness ofFLMA concept
aware
not aware
8. Working relationship with
DENR personnel
with respect and trust
abrasive and skeptical
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Summary
Tree Growing on Different Grounds
An Analysis of Local Participation in Contract
Reforestation in the Philippines
Alarmed by the country's worsening ecological condition, the Philippine
government launched the National Reforestation Program in 1986. It aimed to
rehabilitate 6.5 million hectares of degraded areas by the year 2000. To stimu-
late participation, people are paid to plant trees on public lands in the first
three-year period. In the second phase, the Forest Land Management Agree-
ment is awarded. This 25-year forest stewardship instrument gives the con-
tractor a usufruct over the area and a 70 percent share of the future produce
from the project, under the condition that the plantation is continuously main-
tained and protected.
This study examines success conditions and background factors leading to
sustained contractor's participation after the three-year contract payment
period will expire. These conditions provide a basis for a smooth transition
from the paid labour arrangement to the FLMA phase of the program.
Chapter 1 deals with the study's background and rationale. Poor reforestation
performance in the past raised some doubts of how the current program could
reach its aims, using the same cash incentive as instrument for participation.
Specifically, the objectives of the study are: 1) to determine the various suc-
cess conditions with their corresponding determinant factors leading to con-
tractor's sustained participation in some selected contract reforestation pro-
jects in the Philippines, 2) to analyze which of these success conditions and
determinant factors are considered critically relevant in sustaining participa-
tion in seedling protection and maintenance after the three-year contract pay-
ment expires, 3) to derive an optimal tree growing model from the analysis of
the study, and 4) to draw policy recommendations from the research results.
260 TREE GROWING ON DIFFERENT GROUNDS
Chapter 2 briefly introduces the contract reforestation program's concept,
objectives and strategies. Local and private participation are regarded as cru-
cial. The program addresses the poor and the marginal peasants' cash needs as
condition for participation.
Chapter 3 is a literature survey aimed at studying the various conditions and
background factors to sustained farmers' tree growing motivations in other
countries and in the Philippines. Among the various farmer's motivation lead-
ing to successful tree growing at the farm level include the following consid-
erations of uses or factors: a) direct household needs, b) income from wood
sales, c) land tenure, d) management arrangement, and e) soil conservation
measures. In addition, among the identified common government incentives
meant to stimulate participation in most forestry and environmental projects
are: a) cost-benefit sharing arrangement, b) paid labour, c) short-term subsi-
dies, d) loans, e) market incentives, f) land tenure, and g) access to future pro-
duce from the project. There is much known indeed about these conditions,
but as loose points. It is not in one encompassing picture about their rele-
vance; not about when some factors do apply and when they are not; and how
the different factors act together.
Also, there is a rather varying but predominantly insufficient and even nega-
tive results initially reported about the contract reforestation program in the
Philippines. In addition, there is a dearth of information about the conditions
which are essential for the successful implementation of paid labour as an in-
strument for participation. Given the assumption that paid labour is still a
powerful tool, which can or has to be profitably used in the Philippine refor-
estation program, the following research questions was formulated: 1) What
is the bottomline of actor's sustained participation in the three-year contract
reforestation period of the program? 2) What are the various success condi-
tions for and the determinant factors of farmers'/participants' sustained pro-
ject involvement after the three-year contract payment expires? 3) To which
extent can these success conditions and determinant factors be differentiated
with respect to different situations? 4) How can these success conditions to
sustainable tree growing be possibly enhanced and sustained in the
Philippines?
Chapter 4 describes the research structure and methodology. The study com-
prises of three parts. The first part contrasts two successful and two not-suc-
cessful projects in Cagayan Valley. The second validates the findings of the
first part in five additional successful projects in other regions in the country.
The third investigates four spontaneous non-government tree growing activi-
ties by individual farmers. Vayda's Progressive Contextualization and De
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Groot's Problem-in-Context Analysis consist the main social inquiry tech-
niques.
Chapter 5 contains the results of the contrast analysis. Six success conditions
that appear to have sustained contractor's participation were identified: 1) 'as-
piration for good track record' (which means that the participant hopes to get
also future project contracts for a good performance), 2) 'good financial situa-
tion of participants' (which means that whatever the income source is, the
participant should be above the subsistence level), 3) 'intercropping between
seedlings' (which means that apart from the tree crops are subsistent or cash
crops interplanted by the participants in the same project site), 4) 'assured
access/property right' (i.e., the participant's present usufruct or tenurial right
over the site is recognized or that he is being assured of a future project own-
ership), 5)'interest in other tree related uses' (the presence of future land use
development prospects or tree benefits other than the wood products), and 6)
'community cooperation' (i.e., local people's participation in fire protection
and strict regulation of open grazing inside the project site). Also, the deter-
minant background factors contributing to project success are identified and
were categorized under the following broad project settings:
1. Site Characteristics, which comprise the physical, biological and tenurial
settings of the project
2. Contractor Characteristics, which refer to the local actor's socio-eco-
nomic condition, personal traits as well as his project perception, motiv-
ations and future options.
3. Project Management Characteristics, which represent the supra-local ac-
tor's (which is the government or DENR) management schemes, interven-
tions and the whole aspects of the reforestation program implementation.
Under the site characteristic, the following determinant factors are:
a. 'site arability' (soil, climate and physiography);
b. 'accessibility' (distance and ease of reaching the project site from the con-
tractor's residence);
c. 'status of property regime' (tenurial status).
Under contractor's characteristics, the following determinant factors are:
a. 'subsistence level' (degree of food or cash security);
b. 'farmholding need' (demand for farmholding);
c. 'meantime payment of labourers' wages' (contractor's practice of provid-
ing the cash or in kind needs of his labourers during late releases of DENR
project payment);
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d. 'enterprising attitude' (a characteristic of having initiative, foresight, busi-
ness inclination, exploratory nature, and dare to take the risk in new ventures).
Under project management characteristics, the following determinant factors
are:
a. 'assurance of project prospects' (a promise of future projects for the con-
tractor or assurance of his secured stay in the site as a condition for good
project performance);
b. 'promptness of DENR payment' (regularity and timely release of partici-
pant's contract payment);
c. 'recognition of usufruct or tenurial right' (respect for 'on-site' partici-
pant's or local farmer's claim over the land which falls within the domain
of the project area);
d. 'approval of other land use combinations' (allowance for varied tree crop
combinations or future physical site developments other than for forest
production);
e. 'recruitment of "on-site" participants' (hiring of local people or farmers
who are already positioned in the project site).
The findings in this analysis serve as baseline information for the succeeding
sets of case studies.
Chapter 6 deals with the results of the validation study. The six success condi-
tions identified in the contrast analysis appeared to be also relevant in the five
additional case studies. Furthermore, two additional determinant factors were
found to have an effect on contractor's future project options. The first one is
'DENR prescribed forestland use' (i.e., the initial intended use of the site as
predetermined by the government; whether for watershed or for production
forestry). The second one is 'allowance for future communal resource use'
(which means that the contractor is also willing to allow the local residents
gather forest products or use the project site under certain conditions in the
future).
Chapter 7 presents the findings obtained from a number of spontaneous tree
growing activities by individual farmers. Most success conditions and back-
ground factors present in government projects also appeared in the spontane-
ous tree growing activities. In addition, 'wood market prospect' (i.e., the pres-
ence of a current demand for wood or future market certainty) surfaced as one
important condition for spontaneous tree growing. This condition may also
have relevance in government tree growing programs in the future, which
should be translated as one important aspect of project management interven-
tion.
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Chapter 8 synthesizes all findings. A conceptual tree growing diagram is de-
veloped based on the various success conditions and background factors de-
rived from all case studies. The relevance and relative importance of the dif-
ferent success conditions and background factors are discussed. In govern-
ment projects, the site and participant's features are regarded as given deter-
minant factors, while the project management characteristics are viewed as
the steering determinant factors. Both site and participant's characteristics set
the opportunities or constraints for project success. The project management
factors on the other hand either build on or reinforce such settings respec-
tively to bring about corresponding success or failure. Hence, project man-
agement has a prominent role in defining the desired outcome in government
projects. In spontaneous projects, however, it is the participant's characteris-
tics that play the primary role. The study's findings are compared to the litera-
ture review.
Chapter 9 contains the possible policy contributions of the study. Three major
dimensions of the current reforestation program are discussed: financial, te-
nurial and social. These dimensions correspond to three possible types of in-
centives (i.e., financial, tenurial and social) which are regarded of critical im-
portance for project management interventions. For labourers driven by cash
needs, continuous employment from the project is essential. For private entre-
preneurs, market security is utmost needed to sustain their interest in tree
growing. Those motivated by access or property rights over the project, a te-
nurial instrument could suffice. For all tree growing modalities, social incen-
tive is indispensable because the long-term project survival depends greatly
on community cooperation. Coinciding with the three types of incentive are
three possible organizational schemes of tree growing with their main instru-
ments for participation. These are: a) farm-based tree growing with tenurial
incentive, aimed to secure participant's usufruct or property rights over the
land), b) community-based tree growing with social incentive, aimed to as-
sure the local people of a share from the future project benefits or allow them
to have access of use over the produce under certain conditions, and c)
industry-based tree growing with financial incentive, aimed to provide con-
tinuous employment for the rural poor.
Chapter 10 evaluates the effectiveness of Vayda's Progressive Con-
textual ization method and De Groot's Problem-in-Context Analysis in the
study. Both techniques appear to be appropriate for the study. The advantage
of being guided by the 'element of surprise' and setting no fixed system boun-
dary paved the way for discovering equally important aspects, not initially
conceived in the study. Furthermore, by starting the analysis with the actor's
264 TREE GROWING ON DIFFERENT GROUNDS
activity, it directed the research inquiry to the core issues of the problem, thus,
evading the trap of examining the entire elements of the system.
Chapter 11 contains the study's concluding part. Since contract reforestation
on public lands cannot take place without accompanying incentives, it should
be designed around the actor's needs, interest in tree growing and financial
resources, for maximum program efficiency. Those with substantial capital
could serve as the project's financiers and the main stockholders. Subsistent
participants in search of direct cash earnings may well comprise the labour
force. For those motivated by access or property rights over the project, a te-
nurial instrument is best applicable. Such a selective application of specific
instruments according to participant's needs and future project options is con-
sidered to be an effective and a rational policy for successful project manage-
ment. Failure to identify who has interest in what, how and when; and the in-
ability to recognize differences in site qualities along with the appropriate
required tenurial arrangements for tree growing will continue to siphon off
government funds put into reforestation.
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